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WHATEVER may be thought to-day of the value
of Spencer s writings, no one who wishes to under
stand the thought of the nineteenth century can
neglect him. His system of philosophy influenced
his generation, not only in England, but in
America and elsewhere ; even those most pro
foundly antagonistic to it thought it necessary to
reckon with it and answer it : in science, though
not entirely in accord with Darwin, he helped to
popularise evolutionary ideas : in politics he repre
sented, if he did not lead, a body of opinion which
had great influence in his day, an influence which
even in these warlike times, so abhorrent as they
would have been to Spencer,
is not entirely dead.
Mr. Elliot s qualifications for the task of expound
ing Herbert Spencer s already almost neglected
tenets to the present generation are well brought
out in his introductory chapter. Once a fervent
admirer of Spencer, so fervent that he carried
volumes of the philosopher about with him when
campaigning in the South African veldt, he has since
re-read him, and without losing all his former love
can criticise Spencer in the light of history and ofvi GENERAL EDITOR S PREFACE
to-day s needs. As far as one can see, whether as a
philosopher or a man of science, Spencer is not
likely to live for future generations. If he lives at
all, it will no doubt be as a political thinker,,
representative of a school of politicians, wedded to
individualism and to peace, who, though never
hitherto able to resist the torrent of national
excitement at its height, are likely always to persist
as they have in our past history, not least when
we have been engaged in great wars which have
held the imagination of the majority ; the school
represented by a Bedford in Chatham s day, a
Fox or a Stanhope in the day of Chatham s son,,
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THE relation of philosophy to war is a question
that has occupied many of the most powerful
minds in all countries through all ages. The study
of that question has lately received a new impetus
on account of the terrible events now in progress
throughout the continent of Europe. Wide interest
has been centred upon the works of those German
thinkers who represent, and who are partially
responsible for, that morbid state of mind which
seeks gratification in wars of conquest and the
military organisation of society. Nietzsche, Bern-
hardi, and Treitschke have been constantly cited
as typical of the degrading militarism of modern
Germany. It is perhaps true that the first-named
of these writers has been somewhat unjustly
accused, and that we should regard Fichte and
Hegel rather than Nietzsche as the true philo
sophic apostles of German militarism. However
this may be, it is clear that many of the leading
German philosophers have regarded militarism
with a friendly eye.2 HERBERT SPENCER
People in general scarcely realise how different
has been the outlook of English philosophers.
It is natural that the country most abandoned to
the ideals of militarism should have produced
the philosophers most sympathetic to those ideals.
We in this country sometimes forget that we have
in the past been the least military (though, as
Moltke said, perhaps the most warlike) of all
the nations of Europe. And many are scarcely
aware that the main philosophic attacks upon
the doctrines of militarism have come from English
thinkers, and reached their climax last century
in the writings of Herbert Spencer. If we have
studied the works of those German authors who
are said to have brought on the present conflagra
tion, we ought surely to study also the works of
our own philosopher, who long ago foresaw the
goal of European policy, and contended with all
his might to stem the tide before it was too late.
For undoubtedly the main interest of Spencer s
works at present is on the social side. His scien
tific and evolutionary writings have already





thought, in the sense that they scarcely need to be
taught, but constitute the foundation upon which
more recent ideas are built. But his social writings
have not in the same way become axiomatic. On
the contrary, the political tendencies before the
war were all hostile to Spencer s teaching. ItINTRODUCTION 3
appears highly probable that, after the war, political
currents will again run in favour of Spencerian
ethics, if for no other reason because State-economy
will be the order of the day, and State-economy
is at the root of Spencer s social philosophy. At
all events, it seems to be clear that the social
policy against which Spencer fought is now bank
rupt. It has failed, and its failure threatens to
ruin Europe for a generation. It does not follow,
indeed, that Spencer s dogmatic individualism
will henceforth be triumphantly established : that
can never be. But it does follow that certain
important truths or principles,which he emphasised,
will when shorn of their dogmatism occupy a far
larger part of the field of attention than heretofore.
Spencer s position in philosophy is a compara
tively isolated one. He received little from the
writings of previous philosophers, but much from
the science of his own time. Nevertheless his philo
sophic affinities were with the naturalistic, and even
the materialistic, thinkers of the past, rather than
with the idealists or the metaphysicians. Let it not
be supposed that I use the word
&quot; materialism
&quot;
in its degraded popular signification. I use it only
in illustration of that tendency towards hard
facts and practical common sense which has been
so eminently characteristic of Scottish and English
philosophers in the past. In his purely scientific
writings, as in his social writings, Spencer was4 HERBERT SPENCER
peculiarly an English philosopher. He could not
read German : he loathed German philosophers ;
and such part of his controversial writings as were
not devoted to the condemnation of the Prussian
type of militarism and socialism were occupied
largely with attacks upon German metaphysics.
Of all great thinkers, he owed less to German
influence than any other who can be named. His
philosophy was wholly English by spirit and
descent, save perhaps for some resemblances to
the Scottish school of Realism. His social philo
sophy, pivoting on liberty and the limitations of
State-duties, is so pre-eminently English that it
is impossible to imagine the production of such a
work in any other race of people. Seeing that we
are already well acquainted with the writings of
Treitschke and Bernhardi, with the aims and
spirit of the German people, may we not now with
advantage turn to study the philosopher who,
more than any other, expresses our own spirit,
and sums up the aims and character of the free
citizen of Britain ? Let us visualise clearly not
only the principles, against which we are fighting,
but those for which the British Empire has always
stood in the past.
I do not mean that we are all likely to agree with
Spencer
: far from it. It is not the overt doctrines,
but the spirit underlying them, with which we are
in sympathy. And since we are compelled, forINTRODUCTION 5
the destruction of militarism, to assume tempo
rarily a military organisation ourselves, it behoves
us now particularly to keep our minds fixed upon
the great ideal of liberty, which we hope to estab
lish more firmly than ever upon the conclusion
of peace.
In attempting to place before my readers a
judicial estimate of the true value of Spencer s
philosophy, I may perhaps be pardoned if I
describe my own relation towards it. It has been
my singular fortune (or fate) to have read through
the whole of Spencer s works twice at an interval
of fifteen years, and each time in the midst of a
great war. The first reading in fact was carried
out on active service on the South African veldt,
where not infrequently I had little other baggage
than a toothbrush and a volume of
&quot; The Prin
ciples of Psychology.&quot; There exists in the English
language no more trenchant indictment of war
and militarism than is contained in
&quot; The Study
of Sociology.&quot; Yet it was my lot to read that
work many miles from any inhabited town, in
momentary expectation of an attack, and with
revolver ready loaded in case of sudden need.
To a certain type of mind, Spencer s doctrine of
social freedom is irresistibly attractive : even more
so than his easy naturalistic interpretation of
phenomena, expressed as it is in a style of extreme
lucidity. Spencer appeals so much to the6 HERBERT SPENCER
sentiments that his writings tend to excite either
hostility or dogmatic discipleship. The latter was
my case, and it was only after years of watching
English politics that the discipleship tended to
apathy
: for the realisation of Spencer s theories
appeared to be hopeless.
But the outbreak of a new and far more terrible
war has already done much to break up the
political agnosticism which had settled over a
large section of the British people. We are once
again in the presence of real issues. We are no
longer drifting slowly along the placid stream of
social reform, increasing month by month our
stock of legislative enactments, and adding year
by year to the powers of the Government over
the individual. Circumstances have driven us
headlong to a consummation which in many spheres
touches the limit to which previous legislation
was gradually progressing. In a few months the
power of the State has increased to a degree which
it could scarcely have attained in as many years
of social reform. If the State formerly was by
degrees asserting its authority over individuals, if
it was always enlarging its claim to control their
activities and to take their incomes as taxation ;
it has now overtly proclaimed its complete
authority over the persons and the incomes of
every individual subject to its control. Doubtless
it has done so by necessity ; but here we have aINTRODUCTION 7
definite and avowed social policy, which is exceed
ingly likely to be continued long after the tem
porary necessity has lapsed. Is this a satisfactory
social policy, or is it not ? That is the question
which Spencer s philosophy endeavours to decide.
On the one hand there is the argument that the
State, advised by the most highly trained experts,
is better able to decide what men ought to do
than the average semi-educated citizen can decide
it for himself. There is then the second step-
namely, after seeing what is right for men to do,
there arises the question as to whether they should
all be compelled to do it. In most of the legislation
in vogue before the war these doctrines were
tacitly implied, and they were scarcely at all
resisted. They are now overtly proclaimed ; and
as soon as the necessity of the moment has passed
we shall have before us the question of their real
validity.
On the other hand there is simply the doctrine
of freedom, and all the mental qualities which free
dom implies. It is that doctrine which Spencer s
philosophy endeavours to establish
; it will be
examined later in the light of his philosophy
and of subsequent events. At present we are
much more citizens than men, and much more
subjects than citizens. Probably most people will
decide the question forthwith by reference to their
personal sentiments ; but it is a question which8 HERBERT SPENCER
at all events is of first importance. We are at
length in the presence of a real issue, to be solved,
if possible, in the light of reason and inquiry, and
without prejudice.
Once again, during the progress of a war, have
I read Spencer s furious declamations against
warlike and military activities. But now in many
parts I find the arguments ill-founded ; in other
parts the conclusions are certainly false
; and the
style which formerly appeared so lucid now seems
to have settled down to a deadly and invariable
monotony. Yet still the thought arises, that,
if Europe had followed Spencer, this war could
never have occurred. Europe is now drenched
in blood
; its wealth and prosperity are fast being
drained away. The spirit of Treitschke has
triumphed over the spirit of Spencer the meta
physics of Germany over the common sense of
England. And while reading Spencer again, I
have reached the conviction that, notwithstanding
his errors, his spirit was sound and true. It is
useless now to sneer at liberty as a discredited
doctrine. Europe may have abandoned it ; but
see the result ! The social philosophy which can
take effect like this is unquestionably and irremedi
ably false. It does not follow, however, that the
rival system is wholly true. We must certainly
discard the whole dogmatism and formulary of
Spencer s social philosophy
: we cannot force theINTRODUCTION 9
conclusions of sociology into a few narrow and
rigid laws, as Spencer endeavoured to do. The
data are so complicated that we can only see the
issues
&quot; as through a glass darkly.&quot; We can discuss
only the vague outlines of a few very general
truths : we cannot see the sharp and detailed
outlines that most politicians imagine, or that
certain philosophers labour to describe.
Those who have had to deal with biography
soon become aware that, whereas the lives of men
of action are full of interest and detail, the lives
of men of thought are barren of incident : for they
live in their writings and not in their doings. The
chronicler of Spencer s doings has little to tell.
His life was par excellence in his writings ; and a
true biography of Spencer must consist chiefly
of an account of his works. He was one of those
authors of whom it may be most truly said that
his works were much greater than himself ; and all
the best of him will be found in his philosophy.
His personality, outside his works, was meagre
and petty. In this biography, therefore, I shall
devote the greater part of the space to an account
of his writings, in which he sacrificed the greater
part of his personality.CHAPTER II
LIFE
HERBERT SPENCER was born in Derby on
April 27, 1820. He came from a family chiefly
noticeable for their strong individuality and dis
senting tendencies. His grandfather, Matthew
Spencer, who was born in 1762, settled in Derby
early in life as assistant in St. Peter s parish
school. About 1791 he became head of a school




accounts, mensuration (with land surveying),
algebra,
etc.&quot; For board and education, his
terms were thirteen guineas a year, with an
entrance fee of one guinea. Matthew Spencer
had six sons, of whom the eldest, William George
Spencer, was the father of the philosopher. He
was commonly called George Spencer, and was
thus distinguished from a younger brother who
had also received the name of William. George
Spencer assisted his father in the management
of the school and inherited from him at his death
the property of the family, consisting of a few
cottages and two fields. He married in 1819 theLIFE n
daughter of a plumber and glazier, called Harriet
Holmes, who, notwithstanding a
&quot; small infusion
of Huguenot blood and trace of Hussite blood,&quot;
was a woman of very ordinary character, showing
little of the rebellious tendencies of the Spencer
family. She is described as patient and gentle
qualities altogether opposite to those of her
husband ; and the divergence of interests and
character did not conduce to a happy married
life. George Spencer followed the career of teacher
throughout his life
; he was brought up as a
Wesleyan, but in later years turned more naturally
towards the sect of the Quakers. He exhibited
much of the unbending discipline of that doctrine :






Reverend,&quot; but always as
&quot;
Mr.&quot; ;
nor would he ever take off his hat to anyone, of
whatever rank. He was keenly interested in
abstract questions of science and politics ; was
honorary secretary of the Derby Philosophical
Society, and by politics a Whig with tendencies
towards what would later have been called Philo
sophic Radicalism. A man of aggressive inde
pendence and much ability and originality, he
became somewhat irritable in later years, especially
with his wife, whose questions and observations
he used often wholly to ignore. He had nine
children in all, but only Herbert, the eldest,
passed the stage of infancy ; his four brothers12 HERBERT SPENCER
and four sisters all died in early years. It is often
said that great men tend to derive their characters
from their mothers
; but the case of Herbert
Spencer certainly runs counter to the generalisation,
for he had many and striking mental resemblances
to his father, and none whatever discernible to his
mother.
His education was of course very unusual, and
was mainly characterised by lack of coercion. It
was as widely different as possible from that of
John Stuart Mill, who began to learn Greek when
he was three, and who was intensively cultivated
to an almost incredible degree. Spencer, on the
contrary, was left largely to himself : he was very
backward as a boy in the ordinary subjects of
children s lessons, but he had derived from obser
vation of Nature, etc., a considerable amount of
miscellaneous information. At the age of thirteen
he knew
&quot;
nothing worth mentioning of Latin or
Greek.&quot; He had never been formally instructed
in English
: he had only the ordinary knowledge
of arithmetic, and was altogether ignorant of
English history and of biography. He knew,
however, something of natural history, and had
picked up the rudiments of physics, chemistry,
and anatomy. Morally, he was extremely dis
obedient and contemptuous of authority ; but
naturally intelligent and of a kindly disposition.
At the age of thirteen Herbert was sent toLIFE 13
Hinton Charterhouse, near Bath, in order that his
education might be carried on by his uncle, the
Rev. Thomas Spencer, an advanced social reformer
and temperance agitator. But he soon found the
discipline more severe than he cared about, and
ran away home to Derby again, walking forty-
eight miles the first day, forty-seven the next, and
twenty the third day, without sleep and with
scarcely any food. He was, however, sent back to
his uncle, with whom he subsequently got on
satisfactorily. When he finally returned to Derby
at the age of sixteen he had acquired a certain
amount of mathematics, but was still very ignorant
of languages and of history. He was, however,
well set-up physically, and had undergone three
years of a more rigorous discipline than that to
which he was subjected in his father s house.
The following year, Spencer commenced his
career as an assistant schoolmaster at Derby,
but after three months work with tolerable success
a better opening presented itself. His uncle
William obtained for him a post under Charles
Fox, who was permanent resident engineer of one
division of the London and Birmingham Railway,
and forthwith he embraced the profession of a
civil engineer. His salary was to begin at 80 a
year ; but within a year his abilities had secured
him a still better post as draughtsman on the
Birmingham and Gloucester Railway at 120 ai 4 HERBERT SPENCER
year, with headquarters at Worcester. His com
panions in his profession were not of a very ele
vating kind
; but Spencer continued to be
extremely steady, and his letters to his father at
this period are mainly filled with various questions
and suggestions on problems of mechanics. After
a time he was further promoted to be engineering
secretary to Captain Moorsom, who was engineer-
in-chief of the line. He began to think of other
things besides mathematics and engineering, and
in April, 1840, wrote to his father :
&quot;
I was think
ing the other day that I should like to make public
some of my ideas upon the state of the world and
religion, together with a few remarks on educa
tion.&quot; For the time, however, his speculative
tendencies were turned to invention. He devised
a scale of equivalents, which was not published,
and also a velocimeter for calculating velocities
on railways, etc. More interesting was a meeting
with a young lady of about his own age. For
a few weeks they saw much of one another,
and appear to have indulged in very mild flirta
tion. The association did not last long ; for the
lady was engaged to someone else. The incident
was of so light and transient a character that in
no ordinary biography would it be worth men
tioning. It is mentioned here only because this
appears to have been the only occasion in Spencer s
life when he ever experienced the attraction of
the other sex.LIFE 15
The construction of the Birmingham and
Gloucester Railway was finished in 1841, and the
engineers employed upon it were discharged. The
note in Spencer s diary
&quot; Got the sack very
glad
&quot;
indicates his satisfaction on the recovery of
his freedom. The hope of making something out
of his inventions of various kinds led him to refuse
a permanent appointment in the locomotive ser
vice, before even he had been informed what the
duties were. He returned to his home at Derby
with considerable savings, which he intended
to devote to the prosecution of his inventions.
Other interests of this period include natural
history, the collection of fossils, modelling, and
also phrenology.
The inventions, however, as usual came to
nought ; and the year 1842 is interesting only
on account of a series of letters written to an ad
vanced dissenting organ called the Nonconformist.
These letters, which bore the title
&quot; The Proper
Sphere of Government,&quot; proposed to limit the
functions of government entirely to the maintenance
of justice. There was to be no provision for
purposes of war, no restrictions on commerce, no
poor laws, no national Church or national educa
tion, and no sanitary administration. The whole
field of human activity was abandoned to private
enterprise and voluntary co-operation. In the
same year he embarked on active politics, and16 HERBERT SPENCER
became honorary secretary of the Derby branch
of the
&quot;
Complete Suffrage Movement,&quot; which
was allied to the Chartist agitation.
These occupations, however, did not solve the
problem of earning a living, and in 1843 Spencer
decided to adopt a literary career and came up
to London to seek his fortune. He sent articles
to various reviews, but they were not accepted.
He spent over 10 in reprinting as a pamphlet
his articles on
&quot; The Proper Sphere of Govern
ment,&quot; but the proceeds of the first year s sales
amounted only to 145. 3^. After three months
no literary engagement had turned up ; attempts
to find further employment at engineering were
equally fruitless, and at the end of 1843 Spencer
was obliged to return once more to Derby. After
several months of reading and writing, he was at
length offered the assistant editorship of a news
paper called the Pilot, which was about to be
established in Birmingham as an organ of the
Complete Suffrage Movement. The Pilot was
successfully launched after many difficulties, but
Spencer remained connected with it little more
than a month. An urgent invitation reached him
to assist in a survey of a proposed new branch
of the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway ; and
after some hesitation the proposal was accepted.
At this time Spencer was tolerably good-looking
in appearance, but brusque and self-assertive inLIFE 17
manner. His tendencies both in thought and
politics were excessively radical ; and apparently
his advanced views about religion caused some
lack of sympathy between him and his employer,
Joseph Sturge, the editor of the Pilot. He was
interested in philosophy, and even contemplated
the founding of a paper to be called the Philosopher ;
but neither then nor afterwards did he ever
undertake any serious course of reading on the
subject. He tried to read Kant, but quickly
threw him aside on the discovery that he disagreed
with his first principles. As he often said in later
life, idleness was a main characteristic of him, or,
as would have stated the facts better, an ineptitude
^for discipline or for adhering to any course which
^failed
to excite his interest.
The railway survey was succeeded by a visit
to London, in order that the plans might be laid
before the Committee on Standing Orders, with a
view to passage through Parliament of a Bill
authorising the construction of the new railway.
The plans, however, were not accepted, and with
their rejection came a permanent end to Spencer s
career as civil engineer. For two years he had no
settled occupation, and spent nearly the whole
of his time in devising various mechanical appli
ances
; he gave some thought also to the plan of
a new book in further development of the theories
&quot; The Proper Sphere of Government.
&quot;18 HERBERT SPENCER
He had, however, no idea at this time of making
authorship a profession.
Spencer s inventions were not more successful
than inventions usually are. He spent some time
in working out a machine for aerial locomotion ;
but the difficulties were too great to be overcome.
A
&quot;
binding-pin,&quot; for fixing together the loose
sheets of musical pieces or weekly periodicals,
was attended with somewhat better success. It
was placed upon the market, and the first sales
gave ground for the belief that they would bring
in a revenue of .70 a year. But when the novelty
had worn off the sales soon came to an end.
Spencer s prospects looked very gloomy, when
towards the end of 1848 he was offered and
accepted the appointment of sub-editor to the
Economist at a salary of 100 guineas a year, with
free bedroom and attendance at the offices of that
newspaper, at 340, Strand. On the opposite
side of the street was the publishing house of
John Chapman with whom Spencer soon became
acquainted. Chapman was in the habit of giving
soirees ; and at these entertainments Spencer met
many of those who in later life became his intimate
friends. Among these was George Henry Lewes?
with whom he carried on animated discussions




&quot; the theory that the organic world
is a product of development, and not of creation.LIFE 19
Lewes introduced him to Carlyle ; but their
temperaments were too divergent to permit of
friendship. At Chapman s soirees, also, Spencer
made the acquaintance of Miss Mary Ann or
Marian Evans, then chiefly known as the
translatress of Strauss, and afterwards famous as
George Eliot. Soon afterwards he met Huxley,
who introduced him to Tyndall ; and thus
began two of the most intimate friendships of
his life.
Spencer employed his spare time while at the
Economist office in finishing his first book, which
was published early in 1851 under the title of
&quot;
Social Statics.&quot; Chapman was the publisher,
but not unnaturally he declined to take any risks.
Money was advanced for the purpose by one Wood-
fall, who printed it and who arranged to give
Spencer two years credit on the security of 80
which was still due to him, through the official
liquidator, from one of the railway companies by
which he had been employed. The book, which
was dominated by the same idea as the articles
on
&quot; The Proper Sphere of Government,&quot; was
well received by the public ; the theories which it
contained were in harmony with the Radicalism
of the time, and brought Spencer some reputation.
Nevertheless his prospects remained very poor,
and he seriously considered the question of emi
gration. With habitual method, he drew up a20 HERBERT SPENCER
list of the relative advantages of life in England
and in New Zealand
; each item being valued by




&quot; valued at 10,
&quot; excitement in litera
ture
&quot; valued at 20,
&quot; excitement in science
&quot;
at 6, and so on. On the other hand, New Zealand
offered the prospect of marriage, valued at 100.
In all, England summed up to no points, against
301 for New Zealand. No steps, however, were
taken to carry the idea into execution.
It is curious that at this time the idea of mar
riage should have occupied his mind. Spencer s
acquaintanceship with George Eliot had now
ripened into a close friendship. As sub-editor of
the Economist he received tickets giving free
admission for two persons to the theatres and
the Royal Italian Opera ; and during the early
months of 1852 he constantly took George Eliot
as his companion in these amusements, and
current gossip suggested that they were about to
be married. But this was not the case. Various
passages in Spencer s Autobiography convey the
notion that she was in love with him, but that he
was not in love with her.
&quot; There were reports
that I was in love with her, and that we were
about to be married. But neither of these reports
was true.&quot;
1 In a letter to a friend written at this
period he describes George Eliot as
&quot; the most
1
Autobiography, i., 399.LIFE 21
admirable woman, mentally, I ever met
&quot;
; and,
as already mentioned, he then held marriage to be
one of the most desirable consummations of life.
The only clue to his attitude at this time is that
furnished by a passage in the
&quot; Reflections
&quot; at
the end of the Autobiography, where he says
&quot;
Physical beauty is a sine qua non with me
;
as was once unhappily proved where the intel
lectual traits and the emotional traits were of the
highest.&quot;
l I think there is no question whatever
that the allusion here is to George Eliot
; and the
conclusion to be drawn is that Spencer believed
that George Eliot would have been willing to marry
him. But he himself had at this age, I do not
doubt, lost any capacity he may have had for
falling in love.





an introduction to various reviews and periodicals.
G. H. Lewes was then literary editor of a radical
paper called the Leader; and for this journal
Spencer wrote a series of anonymous articles on a
great variety of subjects under the title
&quot; The
Haythorne Papers.&quot; The first was entitled
&quot; Use
and Beauty&quot;; the second dealt with &quot;The
Development Hypothesis
&quot;
; others with Archi
tectural Types, Gracefulness, etc. The article
on
&quot; The Development Hypothesis,&quot; is interesting
on account of its advocacy of an evolution theory,
1
Autobiography, ii., 445.22 HERBERT SPENCER
seven years before
&quot; The Origin of Species
was published. The inheritance of acquired char
acters was named as the only and the adequate
cause of development ; so that Spencer was at
this time more Lamarckian than Lamarck.
Most of these articles have been republished in
the Essays. In the same year, also, he wrote
an article for the Westminster Review on &quot;A
Theory of Population,&quot; which was subse
quently incorporated into
&quot; The Principles of
Biology.&quot;
In January, 1853, the Rev. Thomas Spencer
died, leaving over 500 to his nephew. With this
sum in hand, and with his new connections with
reviews, Spencer took the risk of resigning his
position on the Economist, hoping to earn a suffi
cient livelihood by writing miscellaneous articles.
He continued to write for the Westminster Review
and the Leader ; and in 1854 wrote articles also
for the North British Review, the British Quarterly
Review, and the Edinburgh Review.
For five years Spencer had not been out of
London for more than four days at a time, with
the exception of one interval of ten days. He took
advantage of his new liberty, therefore, to make
a tour in Switzerland. Notwithstanding good
resolutions, he physically overtaxed himself walk
ing and climbing ; and on his return to London
signs of cardiac disturbance began, which neverLIFE 23
afterwards left him, and which probably laid the
foundation of his future ill-health.
In 1854 Spencer began to write his second book,
&quot; The Principles of Psychology.&quot; The reader of
Spencer s life may not unnaturally inquire how it
happened that from this time forward Spencer
continued to write books on Philosophy, Biology,
and Psychology, without having undergone any
previous course of instruction in those subjects.
It is indeed not easy to say how he acquired his
information. As regards philosophy, he had read
Lewes s
&quot;
Biographical History of Philosophy
&quot;
;
and for the rest he appears to have glanced at a
number of works on these subjects, picking up a
little from each, but without any systematic course
of study. His association with many who were
destined to become famous in later years kept him
constantly in an atmosphere of high intellectual
character. But nearly all his books show, as might
be expected, little connection with the lines of
thought fashionable at the time. He came to
each subject perfectly fresh, and thought out
theories de novo for himself.
&quot; The Principles of
Psychology,&quot; for example, dealt with the subject
from an entirely new point of view. There can be
no doubt that he lost much from ignorance of the
work of his predecessors. There can be equally
little doubt that he gained more by coming on
the ground unbiassed and untrammelled by older24 HERBERT SPENCER
methods of looking at things. Most of the sciences
on which he wrote were in their infancy ; and
it was possible at that time to write upon them
with very little previous knowledge. Moreover,
the commercial success which ultimately attended
his works is doubtless due in part to the fact that
he started from ground that was common to most
educated people, and could therefore be appre
ciated by the more intelligent of the general
public. Had his philosophy been based upon the
technical knowledge already known, it might
possibly have had a more enduring value, but
would certainly have had a less wide popular
appeal.
:t The Principles of Psychology
&quot; was published
in 1855. No publisher would undertake any risks
in connection with it, and Spencer was obliged to
publish at his own expense. It met on the whole
with an antagonistic reception ; and in particular




in the National Review,
a quarterly organ of the Unitarians. While it was
being written Spencer made various excursions
one to Treport, on the north coast of France,
another to Wales. It was during the latter excur
sion that his health finally and permanently gave
way. The solitude entailed by hotel life led to
incessant thinking on the subject of his book,
until at length his nervous system broke down.LIFE 25
A peculiar sensation in the head seems to have
been the only definite symptom ; but it involved
an inability to sleep at night, which was never
afterwards cured, and was probably the ultimate
cause of his breakdown. For eighteen months
he travelled from one country place to another
in search of health, and in enforced idleness. As
illustrating his nervous instability, he curiously
mentions an occasion when his fishing-line got
into a tangle, and induced him to give vent to an
oath, which up to his present age of thirty-six
he had never previously done. His wanderings
at this time took him on one occasion to Paris,
where he met the philosopher Comte, who did
not greatly impress him.
At the end of 1856 Spencer returned to London.
He had been advised by his doctor never again
to live alone, and accordingly took up his residence
as paying guest in a family at St. John s Wood.
He recommenced work, though very slowly and




: Its Law and Cause,&quot; which
embodied one of the leading ideas of
&quot;
First
Principles.&quot; In 1857 he collected a number of his
essays together and republished them in a separate
volume. It was apparentlywhile preparing them for
press that he was first taken by the idea of writing
a System of Philosophy, which should gather
together and co-ordinate the various heterogeneous26 HERBERT SPENCER





all of these were based upon a naturalistic inter
pretation of phenomena, and many of them had
reference to evolution. The scheme of the proposed
system was drawn up in the first week of 1858.
It was based upon the law of evolution, or, as he
then called it, the law of progress ; and was to
apply that law in the various departments of
science and philosophy ; in astronomy, geology,
biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics, or
rectitude, as he called it. Just six months after
the projection of this scheme Darwin and Wallace
read before the Linnaean Society their papers
announcing for the first time the doctrine of
Natural Selection.
The important question now at issue was how
Spencer should execute his project for a System
of Philosophy and at the same time earn a suffi
cient livelihood. He proposed to Chapman, in
whose hands the Westminster Review then was,
to publish the work in that periodical by quarterly
instalments, payment being made at the rate then
usual of ten guineas a sheet. But Chapman saw
no prospect of any profit to the Westminster from
such a course, and he declined. Writing to John
Stuart Mill about this proposal, he referred to
Spencer as being all brain and having
&quot; no heart.&quot;
Spencer then endeavoured to obtain the post of
stamp-distributor at Derby, which he thoughtLIFE 27
would leave him sufficient leisure for carrying out
his purpose. With this object in view, he secured
testimonials from Mill, Huxley, Tyndall, Grote,
Hooker, Fraser, Sir Henry Holland, and Sir
G. C. Lewis ; but a Conservative Government was
in power, and the office passed to one of the party
adherents. At length it was decided to issue the
work by quarterly instalments to subscribers, at
the rate of 2s. 6d. for each instalment of 80 96
pages. Sixty-two subscribers, mostly of con
siderable distinction, were collected, and a circular
was drawn up, containing this list of names and
the programme of the proposed work, with an
invitation to the public to subscribe. The circular
was dated March 27, 1860
; and in the course of
the spring a total of between 300 and 400 sub
scribers was obtained, offering the promise of an
income of 120 or 130 a year. Professor Edward
L. Youmans, who afterwards projected the Inter
national Scientific Series, worked up the scheme
in America, and succeeded in obtaining another
200 subscribers, so that the total at last reached
600. With this arrangement Spencer at the age of
forty began to write the
&quot;
Synthetic Philosophy.&quot;
The contract was kept neither by Spencer nor
by his subscribers. It was not kept by Spencer,
for a nervous relapse entailed a delay of three
months in the issue of the first number ; nor was
it kept by the subscribers, whose subscriptions28 HERBERT SPENCER
were often difficult to collect. The work was
begun in a boarding-house in Bloomsbury, and
carried on during frequent excursions to various
parts of the country. Parts ii. and iii. were issued
at the proper intervals, and then the smash of
his printers involved him in an unexpected loss
of 40 or 50. In the autumn of 1860, however,
another uncle (William Spencer) died, and left
him a legacy which enabled him for a time to
continue his work. His health still remained
exceedingly unsatisfactory, and he resorted to
all sorts of methods to stave off cerebral conges
tion. He found great relief in dictating all his
work to an amanuensis. Part of
&quot; First Prin
ciples
&quot; was written in a boat on the water in
Regent s Park. Spencer would row for five
minutes and then dictate for a quarter of an hour
and so on. He also took his amanuensis to an
open racquet court at Pentonville : he dictated
the philosophy in a room near by, repairing to the
racquet-court at frequent intervals to play a
game or two and relieve the congestion of blood
in the brain. The difficulties of making progress
at length became so great that Spencer was
ultimately obliged to issue a notice to the sub
scribers to the effect that each instalment would
be issued when completed, without reference to
regular dates. The book was at last finished in
1862
; it attracted little attention. Such commentsLIFE 29
as were published by the newspapers were mainly
devoted to criticism of the agnostic attitude of
the metaphysical portion. The book was pub
lished on commission by Messrs. Williams and
Norgate in England, and on a royalty of 15 per
cent, by Messrs. Appleton in New York. This
arrangement was adhered to in the case of all




&quot; was finished Spencer
collected four essays, previously published in
reviews, and re-issued them as a book entitled
&quot;
Education.&quot; This work has had an enormous
success, and is now translated into all the chief
languages of the world, as well as into several of
the minor languages.
Upon the conclusion of
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
Spencer immediately proceeded to work on the
next volume of the System of Philosophy, viz.,
vol. i. of
&quot; The Principles of Biology.&quot; It was
written in many different places in the Highlands
of Scotland, in London boarding-houses, etc., and
was finally published in 1864, but, like its pre
decessor, attracted little public attention. While
engaged upon it he collected and republished a
second series of his
&quot;
Essays,&quot; but this also
received scant notice in the Press. Shortly before
the publication of vol. i. of
&quot; The Principles of
Biology
&quot;
Spencer took up his residence at a
boarding-house at 88, Kensington Gardens Square.30 HERBERT SPENCER
In the same year, 1864, he published his essay on
the
&quot;
Classification of the Sciences
&quot; as a brochure
with a postscript entitled
&quot; Reasons for Dissenting
from the Philosophy of M. Comte,&quot; both now
republished in vol. ii. of the
&quot;
Essays.&quot; The
postscript was prompted by a suggestion in the
Revue des Deux Mondes that Spencer adhered to
the Positive Philosophy ; he was always extremely
sensitive to any suggestion of indebtedness, either
to the views of Comte or anyone else. This sensi
tiveness is shown again by his repudiation of the
idea that Huxley and Hooker had supplied him
with his facts for
&quot; The Principles of Biology.&quot;
They did in fact read the proofs of that work and
make suggestions, for which acknowledgment is
made in the preface.
At the end of 1864 was founded the famous
x club, consisting of Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall,
Hooker, Lubbock (Lord Avebury), Frankland,
Busk, Hirst, and soon after, W. Spottiswoode.
It was a dining-club which met on the first Thurs
day of every month, and exercised considerable
scientific influence, including, as it did, among its
members three who became President of the Royal
Society, five who became President of the British
Association, as well as a President of the College
of Surgeons and a President of the Chemical
Society.
The second volume of
&quot; The Principles ofLIFE 31
Biology&quot; was published in^866. Spencer dis
covered that Alexander Bain had been deterred
from reading his previous works by deceptive
notices in the Press. He therefore decided not to
risk any further misrepresentation of the kind,
and the new volume was not sent out for review
at all. While engaged in its composition, he
carried out the only piece of practical research
work which he ever undertook. The subject of
it was the circulation of sap in plants ; the main
object was to show that the sap flowed through
the channels in the wood, and to offer suggestions
as to the mechanics of the process.
At the time when
&quot; The Principles of Biology
&quot;
was completed Spencer calculated that he had
sunk altogether nearly 1,100 in writing and
publishing books. He was obliged every year to
dip into the capital which he had acquired from
his two uncles : at length he was approaching an
end of his resources, and at the end of 1865 issued
to subscribers a notice of cessation. Many offers
of assistance were at once received. John Stuart
Mill wrote offering to guarantee the publishers
against any loss that might be incurred by a con
tinuance of the work, etc. ; but Spencer remained
obdurate. A circular was then drawn up, without
Spencer s knowledge, and signed by Mill, Huxley,
Tyndall, Busk, and Lubbock (afterwards Lord
Avebury), inviting a wider public to subscribe to32 HERBERT SPENCER
the philosophic serial. Spencer assented very re
luctantly to the issue of the circular ; but just
at this moment the death of his father brought
him once again a legacy, which relieved his situa
tion, and he at once wrote to ask that the arrange
ments for its issue might be cancelled. Never
theless the announcement of cessation of the serial
had produced its effect. Professor Youmans in
six months collected a considerable sum in America
from Spencer s admirers. Aware that any direct
presentation would certainly be declined, they in
vested 7,000 dollars in Spencer s name in public
securities, so that he had no option of refusal ; at
the same time they presented him with a hand
some gold watch. Henceforward Spencer s circum
stances became comparatively easy ; for his books
soon after began to pay, and as they were all pub
lished on commission, the profits accrued directly
to him. The death of his mother left him free
from any embarrassments. During her illness he
invented a new kind of invalid bed, which, how
ever, never had any public popularity. He now
settled himself to work steadily onwards with his
philosophy. Refusing an invitation to stand for
the Professorship of Mental Philosophy and Logic
at University College, he went to live at a board
ing-house at 37, Queen s Gardens, Lancaster Gate,
taking also a room close by at 2, Leinster Place to
serve as a study. Here he continued to live forLIFE 33
nearly a quarter of a century. Henceforward
there are few events in Spencer s life worth
relating. In the critical year 1866 he had been an
active member of the so-called Jamaica Committee
for the prosecution of Governor Eyre a Committee
which included also the names of John Mill,
Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace. But the conse
quent excitement had bad nervous effects, and he
never again joined in any active public movement.
Spencer s first concern after the conclusion of
&quot; The Principles of Biology




some new ideas which had come to him while
writing the essay on the Classification of the
Sciences. The next business was to proceed with
&quot; The Principles of Psychology,&quot; based upon his
earlier work, which was to form the next division
of the System of Philosophy. But before embark
ing upon this work, Spencer had to make arrange
ments for acquiring a collection of facts on which
to base the inductions of the later volumes on
Sociology. The preparation for this work involved
the perusal of immense numbers of books, describ
ing the customs and organisation of primitive
as well as civilised peoples ; and in 1867 Spencer
engaged Dr. David Duncan (afterwards his bio
grapher) to read books of travel and to select
from them all statements that had any sociological
interest, and to arrange them in accordance with34 HERBERT SPENCER
a classification which Spencer had drawn up. In
1868 he was elected a member of the Athenaeum
Club under Rule 2, which empowers the com
mittee to select from among the candidates nine
each year who have attained to special eminence
in science, literature, art, or public services. He
was much gratified by his election, and thereafter
became a very well-known member of the club,
spending several hours there each day, and espe
cially frequenting the billiard-room. The same year
he made a tour in Italy, and while at Naples a
pickpocket snatched his opera-glasses from his
pocket. Spencer immediately started off in pur
suit, and finally caught the thief and delivered
him over to the police. In Rome he found plenty
of scope for his independence of judgment and
defiance of authority in criticising the works of
the old masters, mainly on account of the technical
and scientific errors in their productions.
&quot; The Principles of Psychology
&quot; was based upon
Spencer s earlier publication, with the addition
of several new parts. Portions of this work were
dictated in the intervals of rowing on the Serpen
tine, the boat being moored under the bushes
when composition began. But Spencer still made
frequent excursions to the country, and especially
to Scotland, where he was fond of fishing. Inci
dentally he invented and published in the Field
a description of a new form of joint for fishing-LIFE 35
rods. The first volume of
&quot; The Principles of
Psychology
&quot; was published in 1870 and the
second in 1872. In that year his portrait was
painted by J. B. Burgess, on behalf of Appleton,
his American publisher, who wished to present it
to some institution in New York.
In 1872-3 there occurred a temporary inter
ruption in Spencer s philosophical work. His
friend Professor Youmans, who had founded the
International Scientific Series, pressed Spencer to
write a volume for it, and he at length agreed to
write on
&quot; The Study of Sociology.&quot; The chapters
were published serially in the Contemporary Review,
and Youmans endeavoured to arrange for simul
taneous publication in some American review.
His efforts were without success ; but, being a
man of energy and determination, he promptly
started a review of his own, in which Spencer s
articles might be published. In this way was
born the Popular Science Monthly, which has had
a long and successful career. The book itself
was issued at the end of 1873 and turned out to be
remarkably popular. It was sold for 55-., and
altogether Spencer made a net profit of more than
1,500 from the articles and book together. The
articles, moreover, stimulated the sale of all his
other works.
Dr. Duncan had now so far advanced with his
work of compilation of sociological facts that the36 HERBERT SPENCER
first volume of
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology
&quot;
was published in 1873, and the next year it
was followed by the second volume. In 1870 Dr.
Duncan had been appointed Professor of Logic at
Madras, and his work was taken over by Mr. James
Collier. In the following year Yqumans pressed
Spencer to accelerate the work by appointing an
additional compiler, undertaking that the ex
penses should be defrayed by American admirers.
Accordingly an advertisement in the German
Press brought an answer from Dr. Richard
Scheppig, who thereafter continued the work in
addition to Mr. Collier. The financial arrangement
with Youmans, however, was not carried out.
Spencer s meticulous pride and fear of misrepre
sentation led him to reject the proposal for reim
bursement by the Americans, notwithstanding that
the issue of the first number cost him nearly
.700, and the proceeds of the sale were very small.
A second and independent offer of ^500 from an
actuary of St. Louis to enable the work to be
continued was similarly declined. In all, eight
folio volumes of
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology
&quot;
were published before the heavy losses involved
compelled a cessation of publication in 1881. The
work consists of series of large tables of classi
fication of sociological facts, succeeded by a great
number of extracts from books of travel, on which
the tables are based. They are therefore quiteLIFE 37
unsuitable for general reading. At the time of
cessation trie total loss on the undertaking, without
reckoning the loss of interest on money sunk, was
about .3,250.
The tabulation of facts had proceeded far enough




&quot; when he had finished with
&quot; The
Study of Sociology.&quot; It was issued to the sub
scribers in the ordinary way during the following
three years, and vol. i. was ultimately published
as a volume in 1877. By this time the philosophic
serial had run to forty-four numbers ; and as there
no longer appeared any reason to continue the
serial form of publication a notice was sent out to
the effect that thenceforward the volumes would
only be published when completed. With vol. i. of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology
&quot;
Spencer resumed the
habit of sending out copies of his works for review.
His next task was to proceed with vol. ii.
opening with an account of
&quot; Ceremonial Insti
tutions.&quot; An arrangement was made with Mr.
John Morley to publish the successive chapters as
articles in the Fortnightly Review; but so little
public interest was excited in them that the
arrangement was soon brought to an end.
&quot; Cere
monial Institutions
&quot; was published as a separate
volume in 1879. At this time Spencer s health was
so greatly reduced that he had reason to fear he
would never be able to reach the end of his under-38 HERBERT SPENCER
taking. He therefore decided to drop the remainder
of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology
&quot;
for the present
and to start upon the final work,
&quot; The Principles
of Morality,&quot;
&quot; since the whole system was at the
outset, and has ever continued to be, a basis for
a right rule of life, individual and social.&quot; The
name Ethics was substituted for that of Morality,
and the first portion of
&quot; The Principles of Ethics
&quot;
was published under the title of
&quot; The Data of
Ethics
&quot;
in 1879. So anxious was Spencer to
make progress with this part of the work that he





&quot; The Data of Ethics
&quot; was already
out.
During the latter half of Spencer s life his hours
of work were limited to three or four a day. After
I or 2 o clock he was unable to sit down to any
work requiring attention, under the penalty of
having an altogether sleepless night. Even novel-
reading, of which he was very fond, was too
stimulating for him, and he resorted to all kinds of
methods for killing time during the greater part of
the day. One expedient adopted for this purpose
was the preparation and dictation of his Auto
biography, begun in 1875. If, therefore, we are
inclined to criticise that work on account of its
unwieldy size and somewhat tedious self-analysis
and relation of trifles, we should remember that it
represents the desperate efforts of a confirmedLIFE 39
invalid to find occupation during long hours of
weariness.
On the publication of
&quot; Ceremonial Institutions
&quot;
Spencer joined some friends on a tour to Egypt
and up the Nile. His ill-health, however, pre
vented the enjoyment of the trip ; dyspepsia
gave rise to a mild form of delusions, which caused
him to hasten back to Cairo before reaching the
end of his voyage on the Nile. He returned home
by Venice, remarking of St. Mark s that it was
&quot; a fine sample of barbaric architecture.&quot; He was
greatly pleased on arriving once more in England
and being able to continue his former work.
With the completion of
&quot; The Data of Ethics
&quot;
he returned to the next division of
&quot; The Principles
of Sociology.&quot; This division was issued, like the
previous one, in a series of articles for the Fort
nightly Review, simultaneously published in the
Popular Science Monthly, and in various foreign
European reviews. The volume was issued in
1882 ; and at the same time it was bound up with
the previous work on
&quot; Ceremonial Institutions,&quot;
and the two together were re-issued as vol. ii. of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology
&quot; and vol. vii. of
&quot; The Synthetic Philosophy.&quot; About this time
Spencer was active in assisting in the foundation
of a new society called the Anti-Aggression League,
in which he was associated with Mr. Frederic
Harrison, Mr. John Morley, and others. The40 HERBERT SPENCER
object of the League was to try and prevent
aggressive wars on primitive peoples ; for he
regarded most of our colonial wars in this light.
Nothing came of the movement, however ; and
the excitement had so bad an effect on Spencer s
health that he never permanently recovered from
it.
In the autumn of 1882 he paid a visit to America.
Numerous attempts were made to fete him, but
he exercised the greatest care to preserve his
incognito ; and once only in New York was he
entertained at a banquet. He prepared himself for
the ordeal with the utmost care
; waited in an
ante-room near by until the last moment before
dinner when it was necessary for him to appear ;
and during dinner requested his neighbour to talk
to him as little as possible. His carefully-prepared
speech was delivered without much effect or
oratorical power
: the burden of it was that life
was not for work or for money-making, but that
work and money-making were the means, easily
overdone, of leading a fuller and happier life. He
declined as much as ^300 for a lecture, saying that
he was wholly unaccustomed to lecturing, and that
to do so
&quot; would be nothing more than making
myself a show ; and I absolutely decline to make
myself a show.&quot;
Soon after his return to England Spencer
started upon a crusade against the political move-LIFE 41
ment which was then beginning towards an increase
in the functions and activities of the State as
opposed to the individual. In 1884, four trenchant
articles on this subject appeared in the Contem
porary Review, which were afterwards bound
together and issued under the title of &quot;The Man
versus the State.&quot; The next occupation was to
proceed with the third volume of
&quot; The Principles
of Sociology,&quot; and in 1885 the first part of this was
published separately under the title
&quot;
Ecclesias
tical Institutions.&quot; The final chapter of this work,
entitled
&quot;
Religious Retrospect and Prospect,&quot;
was published independently in the Nineteenth
Century, and immediately gave rise to a vigorous
controversy with Mr. Frederic Harrison. Spencer
had contended that the religion of the future would
take the form of a contemplation of the mysteries
of the Unknowable
; Mr. Harrison, on the other
hand, urged the religion of humanity. Youmans
wrote to Spencer from America, emphasising the
need for republishing the succession of articles in
book form in that country. This accordingly
was done, under the editorship of Professor
Youmans, and including also a general review of
the controversy by the Count Goblet d Alviella.
&quot; The Nature and Reality of Religion,&quot; as the
volume was called, was published by Messrs.
Appleton in the spring of 1885 ; and a copy was
sent to Mr. Harrison, who immediately wrote to42 HERBERT SPENCER
Spencer to ask why his permission had not been
sought before the re-publication of his share of the
controversy. This letter was followed two days
later by a letter of protest to The Times, under
the title of
&quot; A New Form of Literary Piracy.&quot;
Although the American copyright law furnished
no protection whatever to authors who published
in England, yet a moral claim was always recog
nised by the leading American publishers, includ
ing, of course, Messrs. Appleton. Moreover, seeing
that Youmans had written for the book a strongly
Spencerian introduction and had appended hostile
notes to the articles of Mr. Harrison, it was per
fectly clear that Mr. Harrison had an eminently
legitimate grievance. After some days Spencer
recognised the unfortunate error that had been
made, and cabled to New York to have the book
suppressed which was immediately done. Mr.
Harrison behaved to Spencer throughout with
the greatest courtesy and consideration ; and
there seems no reason why Spencer should have
felt any animosity for a mistake which was entirely
due to himself and his friends. An unauthorised
and piratical edition was afterwards brought out
in Boston. An account of the book is included
in Chap. VIII.
In 1886 Spencer published in the Nineteenth
Century his articles on
&quot; The Factors of Organic
Evolution,&quot; affirming the inheritance of acquiredLIFE 43
characters, and the inadequacy of natural selection
to account for all the phenomena of evolution.
Up to this date he had continued to live in the
same boarding-house near Lancaster Gate ; but
he was beginning to feel the necessity of a more
commodious residence, and in 1889 he took a
house at 64, Avenue Road, St. John s Wood, with
three maiden ladies. Meanwhile he continued to





once again to abandon &quot;The Principles of Socio
logy,&quot; until he should have finished his last and
more important work on Ethics. On turning to
this task, he began with the most important
division on
&quot;
Justice,&quot; which was published in
1891. In 1892 the first volume of &quot;The Prin
ciples of Ethics
&quot; was completed, and the year





In 1889 there occurred an unfortunate incident
which temporarily broke Spencer s long friend
ship with Huxley. A correspondence in The Times
on Land Nationalisation turned in part upon
Spencer s views on that subject. As a young man
he had been warmly in favour of that policy,
which, indeed, he had advocated in the original
edition of
&quot; Social Statics.&quot; But later on he had
come to the conclusion that, although nationalisa
tion of the land was equitable from the point44 HERBERT SPENCER
of view of Absolute Ethics, yet the economic
difficulties were so great that in the view of
Relative Ethics such a change was in practice
undesirable. Huxley intervened in the contro
versy, scoffing at the conception of any Absolute
Ethics
; and the result of the controversy was an
estrangement, which was exacerbated the follow
ing year by another controversy in the Daily
Telegraph of the same character. The difference
was not made up till 1893. In that year and
the following year Spencer was busy with his
controversy with Weismann on the inheritance of
acquired characters ; and then he turned his
attention to the conclusion of the Synthetic
Philosophy. There remained only the third
volume of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology
&quot; to be
completed, and this was published in 1896. A
chorus of public congratulation followed. Sir
Joseph Hooker addressed to him a letter signed by
eighty-two of the most distinguished represen
tatives of science and literature, requesting him
to sit for his portrait with a view to its presen
tation to one of the national collections. He had
already once declined to sit for a portrait by
Millais
; but the present invitation was too strong
to be resisted, and it was arranged that the portrait
should be painted by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Hubert
von Herkomer. But Spencer was too impatient,
and his health was too bad, to allow of satis-LIFE 45
factory sittings, and the portrait was only a
moderate success.
From this time forwards Spencer s life must
have been singularly unhappy. His health went
from bad to worse, and the valetudinarianism into
which he was forced led to a heightened egoism,
in which his thoughts were turned permanently
and almost without relief upon himself. He
became exceedingly irritable and sensitive, and
was largely preoccupied with rebutting charges
of indebtedness for his ideas to previous authors.
A man whose emotional tendencies had been
drained off into philosophical studies, he seemed
largely to have lost the capacity for personal
affection
; he was ready to quarrel with almost
any friend
; his life was bound up in the advocacy
of his philosophical opinions. And unfortunately
the current of opinion was running every year
more strongly against his views. In Biology he
witnessed the gradual decline in favour of his
favourite theory of the Inheritance of Acquired
Characters. More trying still was the rapid
advance in England towards Militarism and to
wards Socialism, against which the main doctrines
of his Social Philosophy were exclusively directed.
Moreover, it is impossible to study his works
closely without perceiving a marked deterioration
both in his powers of thought and in his literary
style. As regards the former, he did little more46 HERBERT SPENCER
than follow up mechanically the conceptions
which he had entertained in youth. As regards the
latter, he became pompous, and, if he had been a
lesser man, it might even have been added prig
gish. A clue to the deterioration may perhaps be
found in a sentence in his preface to the Auto
biography
:
&quot; in the genesis of a system of thought
the emotional nature is a large factor.&quot; But
Spencer became emotionally barren ; the Syn
thetic Philosophy alone was too abstract and
unsubstantial to provide adequate outlet for the
deep feelings of a vigorous constitution. His
emotions withered from lack of sustenance
; and
his powerful mind became concentrated on the
minute trivialities of a common-place life. So
deeply did these trivialities obsess him that at
the end of his life he even condescended to write
for the information of posterity a detailed account
of the state of his teeth, the age at which they
had begun to decay, etc.
The French have a saying that
&quot; La Vanite est
1 ennemi du bonheur.&quot; Vanity is but one of the
manifestations of egoism ; and egoism is the fate
of those who have lost the capacity for the more
massive emotions. When the mind is by nature
powerful, the degradation is the more over
whelming and complete. Corruptio optimi pessima.
Spencer can never have been a truly happy man.
Even in the thirties he had reached the conclusionLIFE 47
that, notwithstanding all his personal advan
tages, life was scarcely worth living ; and it is
curious to note the immediate and energetic
repudiation of this utterance by Lewes and George
Eliot, in whose presence it was made. What was
then a mere absence of happiness became later
a complete domination of wretchedness. It may
perhaps be said that the deepest distinction
between youth and age is that the former is
devoted to the pursuit of pleasure, the latter to
the avoidance of pain. If Spencer never achieved
the former, he still more completely failed in
meeting the latter condition. Yet the true philo
sopher will not regard him with blame. The
physiological tax entailed by the origination of a
great system of thought may well account for
weakness elsewhere.
Spencer had now lived for some years at 64,
Avenue Road, but on April I, 1897, he decided to
terminate the agreement with the three ladies who
lived there with him.
&quot; All things considered,&quot;
he wrote to them,
&quot;
I do not desire any longer
to maintain our relations. . . . On estimating the
advantages I derive from the presence of yourself
and your sisters in the house, I find them but
small not by any means great enough to counter
balance the disadvantages.&quot; And so he gave them
three months notice to leave. After a short stay
in the country he took chambers in London near the48 HERBERT SPENCER
Athenaeum, but after three days he broke down and
returned for another few months to the house in
Avenue Road where he was now alone. Dislike of
the solitude and monotony, however, caused him at
the end of the year to change his abode altogether,
and at the beginning of 1898 he took a house at
5, Percival Terrace, Brighton, where he hoped
many of his friends from London would visit him,
and where in any case the monotony would be
relieved by more sunlight and the prospect of the
sea. Here he engaged two ladies to complete his
domestic circle one to act as housekeeper and
the other as pianist ; for music remained as almost
the last pleasure of his life.
The remainder of Spencer s life was spent in
dreary emptiness, preoccupied to a great extent
with clearing up misrepresentations of his doctrines
or ascriptions of his ideas to previous writers. But
as he said himself, after fifty years of a literary life
it was impossible altogether to give up the habit of
writing books
; and on April 25, 1902, he published
a volume of short essays under the title of
&quot; Facts
and Comments.&quot; His ill-health prevented him
from giving more than a few minutes dictation
every day to the writing of this book
; and, as it
was definitely announced as his last, considerable
public attention was attracted to it. At length he
began to be overwhelmed by his infirmities,
symptoms of aphasia presented themselves, andLIFE 49
he died early in the morning of December 8,
1903. He was cremated at Golder s Green without
any religious ceremony. By his own previous
instructions no mourning was worn and a secular
address was delivered by Mr. Leonard (now Lord)
Courtney. The ashes were subsequently buried
in Highgate Cemetery.CHAPTER III
CHARACTER
IN his Autobiography Spencer has attempted
to analyse his own mental characteristics ; but it
cannot be said that the attempt was altogether
a success. For although that work certainly
provides a valuable picture of the man, yet the
value is not so much in the conscious analysis
as in the unconscious style
: the things which he
thought worth while setting down and the way
in which he said them. Spencer was too much
addicted to self-analysis to describe himself in a
way that would interest other people. He was too
prone to set down what interested himself, and
analysis by an outsider will bring out many points
which he scarcely perceived himself. Let us
follow his own plan and deal with his physical
characteristics first.
He was 5 feet 10 inches in height ; and though
his constitution did not appear to be robust, yet
he had none of the appearance of a confirmed
invalid. He was particularly proud of his hands,
and when he was seventy-eight had a plaster-cast
taken of them, which is now in the public museum
at Derby. They were of smaller size than usual ;CHARACTER 51
and he was fond of using this fact in illustration of
the theory of inheritance of acquired characters.
His ancestors for some generations back had done
no manual labour (a circumstance of which, I
think, he was inclined to be vain) ; their hands,
therefore, had not been largely developed, and he
had been born with hands congenitally smaller
than usual.
He was also somewhat vain of his teeth ; and
it is indeed remarkable that through all his long
life he never had one taken out or stopped. So
much we are informed in the official Life by
Dr. Duncan
; but Spencer himself has recorded
that as he got older many of his teeth were badly
decayed ; and it would have been very much better
for him if he had foregone his dental prejudices and
had them properly attended to. In the light of
recent theories it may even be surmised that the
condition of Spencer s health was in great degree
contributed to by the unhygienic state of his teeth.
The origin of his illness has been recorded by
Spencer with minute detail in his Autobiography.
It appears to have been an uncommon form of
neurasthenia, of which the most conspicuous
symptom was inability to sleep at night. He him
self believed that the fundamental cause was
congestion of the blood in the brain
; and in docu
ments hitherto unpublished he attributes his
breakdown in great part to exercises which he52 HERBERT SPENCER
took in violent breathing, in the hope that he
might derive from it some benefit.
The result of this nervous condition was that
he was never able to do any work or carry on
exciting conversation after the middle of the
day without paying the penalty of
t a sleepless
night. Even novel-reading for more than a few
minutes at a time was an excitement which he
had to forego. It was in view of the necessity of
avoiding any form of excitement that he carried
with him a pair of ear-pads connected together
by a spring passing round the back of his head.
Sir Ray Lankester relates how, when he was quite
a young man, Spencer asked him to call to see him
at the Athenaeum to give him some information
about certain biological matters. On arriving,
Spencer expounded to Sir Ray his own theories
with regard to the matters in question. But as
soon as Sir Ray began to point out one or two
difficulties, Spencer hastily closed the conver
sation by fitting on his ear-pads, saying that his
medical advisers would not allow him to enter into /
discussions.
This same neurasthenia likewise caused Spencer
to develop a habit to which for some reason his
biographers have paid very little attention, namely,
that of the regular taking of opium. Soon after
he was forty he took morphia at occasional inter
vals in order to restore the periodicity of sleep ;CHARACTER 53
and as an older man he contracted the habit of
invariably taking one and a half grains of opium
every night. He defends the practice on the ground
that there is an unreasonable fear of this drug,
which when not abused is of great value. But it
seems a question whether taking it regularly even
in small quantities does not constitute an abuse,
and may not have been another contributory cause
of his shattered nervous system. Of his physical
characteristics it only remains to add that, apart
from his peculiar complaint, he had a strong
constitution, and, though somewhat lacking in
muscular strength, was in his youth a good walker
and runner.
Mentally, Spencer s most obvious characteristic
was his extreme originality and dislike of authority
or convention,- He was by nature a rebel ; in
early manhood he was well described by one of
his friends as
&quot; radical all over.&quot; But as he got
older this trait lost its fluidity
: on the one hand
it hardened into dogma, while on the other hand
he respected the conventions in reality far more
than he would have cared to admit. In all those
matters on which he rebelled during youth he
adhered to his attitude and became, as it were, a
heretic on principle. But in other matters to
which he had given little attention in youth he
was not inclined to become heretical in later years ;
and his behaviour in society was much like that54 HERBERT SPENCER
of ordinary middle-class people. For it must be
noted that, in appearance and conversation, the
bourgeoisie was tolerably conspicuous. In those
spheres of conduct where his philosophic prin
ciples had nothing to say, he tended even to be
representative of the Bayswater boarding-houses,
where his inclination led him to spend so large
a portion of his life.
Yet Spencer was a man of immensely strong
individual personality. There can be little question
that this was the basis of his doctrine of social
freedom. He could not bear to have his liberty
of thought or action curtailed in any kind of way.
His personality was everywhere intruded, and
could suffer no limitations and live under no
compulsion. And this fact partly explains how
he a singularly idle man came to write so many
learned volumes. It was all part of his expanding
personality
; or, if we like to put it so, an immense
monument of egoism. And this same fact also
explains another striking characteristic of his
mind, the utter lack-of-receptivity. He was always
a very small reader ; he can scarcely ever have
sat down to learn something new, and the books
which he read were those which were agreeable
to him, either from intrinsic interest or on account
of their harmony with his own views. He often
boasted how he had never read more than a few
pages
of Kant ? and had thrown aside the worksCHARACTER 55
of that philosopher as soon as he came upon a
conclusion with which he disagreed. And he
applied the same principle, or gave in to the same
weakness, throughout.
His methods of work again illustrate an almost
morbid exaggeration of personality. Men of
science and philosophers commonly set before
themselves some problem to be solved, and pro
ceed to work, up the facts all round it with the
view of finding the solution. Spencer never did
anything of the kind. His system of thought
grew up organically inside him. His network of
principles gradually enmeshed one after another
of the common problems of the time ; but until
this expanding network reached them naturally
he took no interest either in them or their solution :
they were outside his sphere altogether. He could
not read Kant from the same mental peculiarity
that he could not have a tooth extracted : in both
cases a subtraction from his own personality was
involved. For the same organic reason he was a
deadly opponent of militarism. How could such
a man have supported the restrictions x&amp;gt;f a soldier s
life ? How could he have sunk himself to be a
mere unit in a drilling regiment
? As Renan
said of himself, he would either have deserted
or committed suicide. Let not our criticisms
be too severe. If some persons cannot be forced
into our mould, we must consider whether after56 HERBERT SPENCER
all it is wise that there should only be one mould
into which everyone must go.
From these mental features monoideism is
/another corollary. Spencer s mind was obsessed,
/ as already explained, by a few general principles
in accordance with which he conducted his entire
V^life and fabricated his entire system of thought.
In the subjects which fell within those principles
he had extraordinary power and insight truly
wonderful gifts
: in the subjects which fell without
their scope he was just the ordinary man in the
street, the suburban owner of a semi-detached
villa. We have all heard at times of the astounding
achievements of persons (sometimes of inferior
intellect or even feeble-minded) whose minds
are wholly limited to one idea. The achieve- \
ments of Spencer are of that order the super-
)
natural acuity of vision endowed by the most
overwhelming intellectual concentration.
Spencer was systematical and methodical in
all walks of life. As a young man he took natu
rally to mechanics ; and his whole system of
thought is based on a mechanistic or naturalistic
way of looking at things. Mathematics naturally
appealed to him
; for it proceeds by the deductive
method from a few simple premises. And the
branch of mathematics in which he took the
greatest interest was geometry. We may suspect
that he belonged to the psychological type ofCHARACTER 57
strong visualisers. His philosophy is in many
respects Euclidean in form, and his scheme of
phenomena is such as may be seen in imagination ;
the world is laid out on the pattern of a geometrical
diagram.
Emotionally Spencer was somewhat cold. Allu
sion has already been made to an unpublished
letter from John Chapman, the publisher, to John
Stuart Mill, written when Spencer was about
forty, in which Chapman refers to Spencer as
having
&quot; no heart,&quot; but as being totally consumed
by his extraordinary intellect. It would, however,
be incorrect to say that he did not feel deeply,
for in fact he was exceedingly sensitive. In the
preface to his Autobiography he observes
&quot; that
in the genesis of a system of thought the emo
tional nature is a large factor : perhaps as large
a factor as the intellectual nature.&quot; As already
explained, his whole energy, emotional as well as
intellectual, was absorbed in the principles around
which he constituted his life and philosophy. He
had not much feeling for persons, for the same
reason that ascetics and martyrs have little
feeling for persons. Thus we have the strange
circumstance that he practically did not know
what it meant to fall in love. Marriage appealed
to him as an abstract proposition, but he never
found any temptation to it in the concrete. In
matters of sex he carried prudishness to an extreme58 HERBERT SPENCER
degree. The principles of his social philosophy
did not embrace any sexual problems ; they never
occupied any perceptible share of his attention ;
and being, as it were, outside his philosophy, his
views on sex were just those of a middle-class
dissenting minister in the most rigid period of
Victorian banality. Although there was a deep
strain of the puritan and ascetic in Spencer, yet
he was exceedingly intolerant of minor discom
forts. He appeared to be acutely sensitive, and
in various ways laid himself out to procure enjoy
ments. There is no sort of ascetism in his philo
sophy
: his ethics are professedly hedonistic ;
and he often condemned both in writing and
speaking those who took a severe view of the
pursuit of happiness. But one thing seems cer
tain : that if he aimed at happiness in theory
he scarcely achieved it in practice. Ey^en when
young and prosperous, he doubted whether life
was worth living ; when old and invalided, he
found life a perpetual round of weariness and
misery. Perhaps this peculiarity is best explained
by lus non-emotional type of character ; for
happiness resides, not in sensation nor in intellect,
but in emotion : and no philosophical principles
can induce emotion where there is naturally
little.
If it has to be added that Spencer was both
vain and egotistical, I am merely naming traitsCHARACTER 59
which go necessarily with those already mentioned.
Yet both these flaws were in him entirely venial
and free from the unpleasant social results com
monly associated with them. This was in part due
to the fact that his good opinion of himself was
entirely justified by the very eminent qualities
which he plainly possessed ; but still more to the
fact that they were completely dissociated from
any form or suggestion of affectation. Spencer
was pre-eminently simple and unadorned in
manner : his judgment of other people s charac
ters was similarly guileless ; in this respect he
scarcely rose above the capabilities of an average
clergyman or schoolmaster. Probably of all
human weaknesses affectation was that most
foreign to his character. He was sincere to the
last degree
: ..the most absolute sincerity charac
terised not only his philosophic opinions, but his
every action and utterance in the smallest detail
of life and conversation. Shallow people are
very apt to attribute all kinds of eccentricity or
breaches of convention as springing from affec
tation : they do so because in their own cases
their only temptation to heterodoxy is from
affectation ; and nearly all men commit the error
of judging others by themselves. But Spencer s
mind was wholly different from the common run
;
and those who will attempt to understand his
motives by reference to their own would be well60 HERBERT SPENCER
advised to relinquish the study of him without
delay.
Spencer s sincerity was the occasion of some
deficiency of social tact. The man who in any
society will invariably say precisely what he
thinks is something of an enfant terrible, and apt
to be occasionally misunderstood. This result
is still more emphatic when what he thinks
happened so often to be entirely opposed to what
anybody else thought. But there was not a spark
of self-suppression in Spencer s constitution. To
tell a lie, or even to appear by his silence to
acquiesce in statements with which he really
disagreed, were contrary to the deepest instincts of
his nature. And all this, be it observed, is bound
up with his fundamental love of freedom. When
society is free and tolerant, the average truthful
ness is high. It is a well-known principle of
education that the least truthful children are
those who have been subjected to the most coer
cive methods. Men are born unlike
; and they
always remain unlike, at least in the minor affairs
of belief and conduct. No coercion can reduce
them to real similarity, though it can and does
easily reduce them to the outward appearance of
similarity. In proportion as society is tolerant
of divergences from the normal, there remains
small occasion to conceal such divergences. But
in proportion as society insists upon a rigid con-CHARACTER 61
formity, the innate differences will be, not
abolished, but concealed, and the general state
of truthfulness will suffer.




among strangers a feature which arose partly
from shyness and partly from a natural dignity.
Although little accustomed to restrain expressions
of opinion or feeling, he never appeared excited,
and was rarely betrayed into unparliamentary or
rather unphilosophic language. In the Auto
biography he relates indeed one occasion when he
was betrayed into
&quot;
venting an oath.&quot; The cause
of his irritation, as already related, was when his
fishing-line had got into a tangle a time when
swearing is surely venial if not actually desirable.
Tyndall once said of him what a much better
fellow he would be if he had a good swear now and
again. But Spencer s feelings were rarely of the
kind that may be relieved by swearing.
It remains to be added that Spencer was by
nature an exceedingly idle man. His education
had been singularly free from coercion and lacking
in the customary discipline of authority. He had
all his life been free
; and after he grew up he
never attempted to discipline himself. His know
ledge arose, not from set studies, but from the
possession of wide general principles which drew
in cognate facts like magnets acting on iron filings.
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of his mind was its extraordinary power to see the
essential elements in any heterogeneous mixture
of events. He carved out a principle, which
immediately introduced order and method, where
previously there had been nothing but a hopeless
jumble. Galton describes Spencer s mental work
ings in a vivid manner 1
:
&quot;The power of Spencer s mind that I most admired,
was that of widely-founded generalisations. Whenever
doubt was hinted as to the sufficiency of his grounds for
making them, he was always ready to pour out a string
of examples that seemed to have been, if not in his
theatre of consciousness when he spoke, at all events in
an ante-chamber of it, whence they could be summoned
at will.&quot;
This is another form in which his passion for
principles appeared. Psychologically it was based
on a power to detect fundamental resemblances
or
&quot;
association by similarity.&quot; A medley of
facts would thus be quickly classified and hung up
on horizontal poles, as it were, as the principles
evolved out of them. To this single capacity are
traceable all his powers of analysis, synthesis,
generalisation, etc.
His methods of thinking and writing were
wholly conformable with his character. He no
more thought of sitting down to think than he
thought of sitting down to read. In the course of
promiscuous idling he would come across some
1 Duncan, p. 502.CHARACTER 63
significant fact or idea, which very likely he would
temporarily forget. But later on it would be
liable to turn up in his mind again, well on the
way to being a full-fledged principle. And once
the principle got rooted, relevant facts would
come flying in from all quarters, until on all that
subject quite a considerable amount of knowledge
had been more or less unintentionally accumulated.
These processes apparently occurred with special
strength while taking walks : on these occasions
he was often absent-minded and noticed little of
what was going on about him. He had of course
immense natural concentration, but it was never
brought on by an effort of will.
His method of writing was of the same kind.
The written matter flowed naturally from him,
without conscious effort, and it was very little
revised after being written. Unlike John Stuart
Mill, who wrote out his Logic many times before
he was satisfied with it, Spencer never re-wrote :
his first copy was what went to the printers,
though he made a number of minor alterations in
the proofs. All this came partly from natural
idleness, and partly from the fact that his mental
concentration, being involuntary, could scarcely
be brought a second time over precisely the same
subject. The great majority of his works were
dictated : this he found a great relief
; the dissi-\
pation of muscular effort in writing was saved for64 HERBERT SPENCER
the unconscious mental effort. He could take up
this dictation at almost any moment in the
intervals of rowing on the Serpentine, or of playing
games of racquets with his amanuensis.
His style, as may be supposed, is singularly
easy and fluent. In his earlier essays it was also
vigorous and redeemed by flashes of humour.
But later on it became less fluid : it hardened
into an almost deadly monotony, and an outward
symbol of the wooden dogmatism into which he
gradually sank. But it always remained exceed
ingly lucid. As William James truly remarked
of his mind, it had not the lights and shades of an
ordinary style, it was a remorseless glare through
out. The oratorical passages which occur from
time to time are often powerful, and arose from
profound conviction and intense feeling of the
truth of what he wrote. For the settled calm
ness of Spencer s mind was susceptible of occa
sional elevation. Even bis self-confidence had its
moments of maximum intensity.
It is well known that Spencer throughout his
life refused all honours offered him, whether by
universities, Governments, or scientific bodies.
This was due in large part to pique ; for honours
only came to him comparatively late in life. As
he had no sort of official position, nor even a
university degree, his success in the world natu
rally came later than is usual in the case of thoseCHARACTER 65
who start their careers under the aegis of univer
sities and along the regular paths. A remarkable
personality backed by immense natural powers
will tell in the end
; but public recognition is
necessarily slower than with those who are brought
by their positions before the public eye. After




he no doubt thought that he had a strong claim
to be elected a fellow of the Royal Society. But
that honour was not offered him till much later in
life, at a time when all his contemporaries had
become senior fellows ; and he would have been
ranked with men a generation younger, and far
less distinguished, than himself. He was not
offered it, in fact, until his reputation was securely
established beyond dispute ; and he felt that if
they declined to help him when he most needed
it there was no reason why he should acquiesce in
their authority when he could no longer derive
any advantage from it. Just as in the sphere of
action a rolling-stone usually comes to no good,
but on rare occasions becomes more famous than
any of the official hierarchy, so in the sphere of
thought a free-lance is usually worthless, but may
ultimately attain a distinction unknown to his
official contemporaries. In both cases the pre
sumption is so much against the individualist that
recognition is usually long delayed. The departure
from the normal is usually a departure for the
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bad. Not in one case out of a thousand is it
really an improvement ; but then it is apt to be
an improvement of revolutionary importance
such as was certainly the case with Spencer.
Spencer, having begun by refusing honours, could
not well change his attitude when they began to be
crowded quickly on him. He no doubt felt flat
tered at the thought that his success had been
achieved solely by personal merit ; and there is
an undoubted distinction in surpassing the repu
tation of nearly all his contemporaries without
any sort of handle to his name, such as they
possessed in abundance.
Moreover, Spencer was by nature a republican
and averse to all forms of social distinction. He
would at any period of life have refused honours
offered by the Government, on the ground that it
was no part of the functions of government to
award praise or blame to citizens ; and in fact that
they were not fit judges, at all events in the
realm of philosophy. It is true that as he grew
older he abandoned republican views, at least as
regards society in its present condition. He
expressed the opinion that it was no more right to
deprive the people of their king than it was right
to deprive a child of its doll. But his independent
spirit could not enter easily into the social hier
archy ; nor could he ever have suffered the thought
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position of inferiority to those who had higher
titles. The sentiment was far commoner then
than it is now ; but we cannot deny to it a genuine
dignity, and in any case it is a sentiment that is
not likely to be harboured by little men.
Spencer was more than once invited to stand
for Parliament ; but his opinions were much too
individual and much too uncompromising to
admit of his accepting such invitations. Socially
he had a great attraction towards club life, which
was eminently suited to his disposition. To those
whose minds naturally rebel against formalities
and restrictions clubs offer an ideal social resort.
There are no ties as to hours or appointments
:
it is possible to go in at any time as inclination
prompts ; to read, write, or talk at will
; to make
friendships with many people, and to keep them
up by constant intercourse without pre-arrange-
ment ; to leave at any moment, and to speak more
freely than in society outside. There are no re
strictions as to dress, and no conventions beyond
those which are essential in all social life. Clubs, in
fact, offer the freest possible form of society, and
as such strongly commended themselves to Spencer.
He belonged both to the Athenaeum and the Savile.
Of the former he was for many years a most regular
habitue ; and his service on the committee was the
only approximation to administrative duties that
he was ever really interested in. His election to68 HERBERT SPENCER
the Savile did not take place till he was older :
he joined it partly, perhaps wholly, because he
could play billiards there on Sunday, which was
and is still interdicted by the ecclesiastical preju
dices of the Athenaeum. Although the Savile
society was in many ways more amusing and not
less distinguished than that of the Athenaeum, he
never went there sufficiently to get in touch with it.
The members were younger, and far less reverent :
and they were certainly less imbued with the Vic
torian spirit, of which he was perhaps the most
typical representative.
Billiards was his favourite recreation in his
clubs. He attained a passable proficiency, and
has defended the pastime on philosophic grounds
from the frowns of Victorian puritanism. But he
did not care for cards, and was a bad whist-player.
Again on philosophic grounds he objected to
gambling ; and when he played cards he would^
always pay his losses but decline to receive his
]
winnings. It is worth while pointing out that
;
Spencer s argument against gambling is founded
on a logical fallacy which has occasionally been
repeated in text-books of logic. Supposing (as
in the case of Mr. Micawber) that a man has an
income of twenty pounds a year. Then if by
gambling he takes the risk of gaining or losing one
pound, he must (argued Spencer) on the whole be
a sufferer. For as a man s income increases eachCHARACTER 69
additional pound is of less value to him than the
last. The twenty-first pound in a man s income is
of less value to him than the twentieth pound.
The privation involved by reducing an income
from twenty pounds to nineteen pounds is greater
than the advantage accruing to him by increasing
it from twenty pounds to twenty-one pounds.
Hence by taking an even chance of winning or
losing a sovereign we are, according to Spencer,
taking a greater risk of pain than is balanced by
the chance of pleasure.
The fallacy resides in this : that the problem
is not of a logical but of a psychological character.
Although for a man without feelings and wholly
logical the pound won is of less value than the
pound lost, yet, human nature being as it is, the
satisfaction of winning one pound is in fact greater
than the pain of losing one pound. Unpleasant
thoughts of loss are quickly extruded from the
mind, and leave only passing effect, while pleasant
thoughts of gain last longer. If the question is to
be reduced to one of material satisfaction, Spen
cer s argument fails for the same reason that some
of his philosophy fails namely, that it is founded
on deduction from a principle instead of upon
observation. But Spencer argued against gam
bling on yet another ground
: it was wrong, he
said, to obtain satisfaction at the cost of another
person s dissatisfaction ; it seared the sympathies.70 HERBERT SPENCER
Yet here again it has to be replied that in
moderation and among friends it certainly does
nothing of the kind, but rather the opposite. His
objection to taking money by gambling, on the
ground that it involves pain to another, is analo
gous to his dislike of Stevenson s
&quot; Travels with
a Donkey in the Cevennes,&quot; owing to the pain
which he experienced on reading of the donkey
being flogged. In both cases the truth is that he
was trying to justify his puritanical prejudices
by an altogether Quixotic extension of philo
sophical principles. Spencer could never have
admitted to himself so inconsistent a thing as a
prejudice. His whole thought had to be consistent
with principle. Yet we all have our prejudices ;
and the greatest philosopher will be he who
recognises that they are prejudices ; and that it is
better to suffer them gladly than to pervert them
into conformity with principle. As Emerson has
said,
&quot;
consistency is the essence of absurdity.&quot;
A true philosopher must often have occasion to
say
: Video meliora proboque ; deteriora sequor.
But such a maxim would have been intolerably
offensive to Spencer ; yet he could only escape it
by harbouring perverted views.
As to his other amusements, he is said to have
been fond of skating. He was exceedingly fond of
fishing, and succeeded after some years absten
tion in squaring that pursuit with his conscientiousCHARACTER 71
objection to giving pain. The fine arts he did
not really appreciate, except in the case of music,
to which he was very strongly addicted. Of all the
fine arts, music is that which requires the least
amount of trained intellectual discernment. For
that reason it has usually been the most favoured
among those whose intellects, by strong concen
tration on science and philosophy, have become
ill-adapted for moving on aesthetic lines. As
regards literature, he can have had little apprecia
tion of style for its own sake. He took no interest
at all in biography or history, but, curiously
enough, was exceedingly fond of novels. Probably
he very seldom in his life read any book from cover
to cover, except novels.
The foregoing delineation of Spencer s character
has reference chiefly to the most active part of
his life. For there is no doubt that he changed
considerably as he grew older ; and as the great
majority of his still-living acquaintances knew him
best as an old man, wrong ideas have very readily
gained currency. Though still retaining his pecu
liar gifts, his mind lost its plasticity, and, like
his style, appeared to become sclerotic. It very
commonly happens among men that those who
have retained throughout life and with little
modification the convictions of their university
days become hardened into one rigid mould of
thought. They do not defend their views with72 HERBERT SPENCER
any less energy than before ; but their vivacity is
less the produce of heart and soul than of profound
dogma. The normal progress of years brings perhaps
more usually a wider and more tolerant outlook
upon the world. The old beliefs are still enter
tained, but with a growing consciousness that there
are other things besides. Spencer, and many like
him, showed no such consciousness : unable to yield
anything of his earlier convictions, those convictions
could only be preserved in their original intensity
as dogmas. The condition of Spencer s health no
doubt accounted for much of what was really a
form of degeneration. His excessive sensitiveness,
his overweening pre-occupation with himself, his
long hours of enforced idleness, must inevitably
have corrupted his outlook upon life. The effects
may be seen in the laborious dullness of the
Autobiography. They may be seen in the elabo
rate precautions which he took to prevent that
work becoming public before his death. Mr.
Williams, of Messrs. Williams and Norgate, who
were Spencer s publishers, has kindly shown me a
letter which Spencer wrote to his father concern
ing this Autobiography ; and which I am permitted
by the trustees to publish.
&quot;
64, AVENUE ROAD, N.W.,
Oct. itfh, 1889.
&quot; DEAR MR. WILLIAMS,
&quot; As you have taken so much trouble in fulfilling my
wishes with respect to the printing of the Autobiography,CHARACTER 73
I feel that it is but a small return on my part to give you
the option of being one among the first half-dozen to
whom the volume is lent. In all preliminary letters to
friends I am including the following paragraphs.
&quot;
I had originally intended to print fifty presentation
copies for friends, but consideration made it manifest
that were so large a number distributed and permanently
left with those to whom they were sent, not a very long
time would elapse before a copy would find its way to
America, since in many cases copies would be lent and not
very carefully looked after by the loanees. Publication
there would not only defeat my intention to withhold the
book from the public during my life, but would entail
loss of the English copyright. A comparatively safe course
seemed to be that of printing half a dozen copies for the
purpose of lending to friends for short periods ; and this
has been the course taken.
&quot; * There still remains, however, a certain amount of
risk
; since, when known in America, as it will presently
be, that some copies are in circulation, efforts will be made
by piratical publishers to obtain one through the agency
of servants or others. Hence the need for precautions.
Any friend to whom the volume is lent must promise that
while in his or her possession it shall not be allowed to
leave the house
; that while in the house it shall not be
seen by anyone connected with the press, or who might be
likely to make any public use of its contents ; and that
when not in hand it shall be kept under lock and key.
Doubtless the risk in each case is very small ; but
just as one insures against fire, not with the expectation
that the house will be burnt down, but to be secure
against the very remote risk of its being burnt down,
so these precautions are to be taken, not against
the probability of escape, but against the possibility of
escape.
&quot; * The volume should be returned in ten days or sooner,74 HERBERT SPENCER
and as a security let me request that, when sent back by
post, it may be registered.
&quot; I am, truly yours,
&quot; HERBERT SPENCER.&quot;
Spencer s will was characteristically individualist.
The first clause directed that he should be cre
mated without any form of religious ceremony,
after being placed in a coffin
&quot; with a loose lid
Easily opened from below.&quot; Various small bequests
were made to a number of people ; but the bulk
of his property was placed in trust for the con
tinuance of
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology.&quot; Mr.
Auberon Herbert, Dr. Charlton Bastian, and Dr.
David Duncan were appointed trustees, and
Mr. Henry Tedder the first secretary to the trust.
Apart from the bequests above alluded to, the
income derived from the sale of his works, as well
as from investments, was to be spent in bringing
out new volumes of
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology
&quot;
dealing with peoples not previously dealt with,
and in republishing parts both of the old and new
volumes in a more handy form. When this work
was concluded the whole of Spencer s estate was
to be sold, and the proceeds divided between
twelve scientific societies which he named (but
which did not include the Royal Society), on the
understanding that the money should be spent
by them within five years of its receipt, and
not used for any purposes of endowment. AtCHARACTER 75
the present moment, two new volumes of
&quot; The
Descriptive Sociology
&quot; have appeared since
Spencer s death ; and Dr. Duncan is the only
surviving trustee.
Judgments on Spencer s character are likely to
vary with the critic. We shall perhaps be well-
advised to refrain from judging at all. He may
have had many qualities which we do not care
for
; but he had many others which placed him
morally as well as intellectually high above the
average man. It is a vice of the present age to
insist that a man shall come up to a certain all-
round standard in mental and moral qualities.
If he falls in certain respects below that standard,
it is held insufficient that he should soar high above
it in other respects. As our social policy has
drifted for long in the direction of dead-level
equality, so there is a constant tendency, in judg
ing men, to require a certain general conformity in
all directions before we feel free to admire qualities
of the highest rarity and excellence. Yet this
attitude is irrational ; for the excessive develop
ment of a few mental faculties almost inevitably
carries under-development of others. In propor
tion as we require conformity to the prevailing
standard, and in proportion as that standard is high
and far reaching, we cut away the basis of great
ness and of genius. If we judge great men by their
foibles we condemn our own common sense. Surely76 HERBERT SPENCER
we must allow some latitude to genius
: we must
regard the aberrations of genius with a more tolerant
eye than the aberrations of commonplace people.
Spencer had astonishing intellectual powers ; he
summed up the thought and spirit of his time as
no other writer could have done : the whole of
modern thought is founded, consciously or uncon
sciously, on Spencer s work. Many seem to regard
him wholly from the point of view of the weak
nesses inherent in a great character
; but these
charges merely recoil on the head of those who
make them and who are ready to judge a man,
not by what he did in the world, but by the least
relevant of his deficiencies. I feel indeed some
sadness in the thought that any such observations
should appear to be called for. If we are going to
judge great men by reference to the narrow ambit
of our personal sentiments, what hope shall there
be for genius in the future ? If society is to pro
duce great men, the atmosphere must be tolerant
and free.CHAPTER IV
PHILOSOPHY
THE Synthetic Philosophy is divided into two
parts of very unequal length. Part i.,
&quot; The
Unknowable,&quot; occupies little more than the first
hundred pages of
&quot;
First Principles.&quot; Part ii.,
&quot; The Knowable,&quot; occupies all the remainder of
the work : that is to say, by far the larger part
of
&quot;
First Principles,&quot; and the whole of the nine
succeeding volumes. The Philosophy, in so far
as it concerns
&quot; The Knowable,&quot; has five main
divisions. The first of these is
&quot;
First Principles,&quot;
in which are laid down the main philosophic
doctrines, which are applied to the various special
departments of knowledge in the subsequent
divisions. We begin with
&quot; The Principles of
Biology,&quot; then
&quot; The Principles of Psychology,&quot;
then
&quot; The Principles of Sociology,&quot; and finally
&quot; The Principles of Ethics,&quot; which Spencer
regarded as the flower of the Philosophy, and the
goal to which all the preceding volumes led.
In addition to these ten volumes Spencer
published eight other volumes, which may be
regarded as subsidiary to the main philosophical
work. Most important of these is
&quot; The Study of78 HERBERT SPENCER
Sociology,&quot; which was intended to be preparatory
to his formal sociological treatises. There are
three volumes of long essays, and two smaller
volumes of short essays
: the former mainly written
when he was young, and marking the stages in
the growth of his system of thought ; the latter
written when he was old, and touching in a more
casual way on a great variety of topics which
happened to interest him for the moment. Then
there is his first book
&quot;
Social Statics,&quot; the revised
edition of which is now bound up with four articles
reprinted from the Contemporary Review under the
title of




will be described later
; and
finally there are the two volumes of Autobiography.
Before descending into the details of this
immense system of thought, it will be well to take
a bird s-eye view over the whole. Spencer was
a man whose theories and conduct in life were all
subordinated to and explained by a small number
of general principles. Anyone turning over at
hazard the pages of one of the philosophical
volumes would be overwhelmed by the multitude
of facts and details brought forward. He would
be lost as to the meaning of it all : he could not see
the wood for the trees. But when once the very
few principles at the basis of Spencer s mind are
understood, the rest becomes easy. Every prin
ciple drew to itself like a magnet all the factsPHILOSOPHY 79
from every department of knowledge which in
any way illustrated or supported it ; and the
meaning of this maze of detail at once becomes
clear.
There are two fundamental ideas at the root of
the Philosophy. The first is that of universal
evolution ; the second is the guiding principle
of his social and political writings. As regards
the doctrine of evolution, Spencer early in life
rejected the supposition that the universe was a
thing created and stationary. He perceived that
all Nature was in a constant state of change or
flux ; and h endeavoured to find some law which
should describe the tendencies of such change
a law which should be equally applicable to the
change of a nebula into a star or stellar system,
and of a protozoan animal into a man. This law
he called the law of Evolution. It proposed to
describe the various stages characteristic of all
progress in all departments of Nature as the
universe grows older. He believed that the out
lines of such changes were similar throughout all
varieties of the changing substance.
The second fundamental conception of the
Philosophy, and perhaps the more important, as it
was certainly the larger section, is devoted to
political and social thought. When Spencer was
a very young man he found himself in the midst
of what were then very Radical surroundings,8o HERBERT SPENCER
His father was almost, if not quite, a Quaker ;
his uncle, Thomas Spencer, was an advanced
reformer and forerunner of the school of Man
chester Radicals. Spencer himself was of an
insubordinate mind, to which restrictions of any
kind were insupportable. Can it be wondered at
that he eagerly caught up the catchword of
Liberty and proceeded to identify social progress
with the admission of every individual to the
maximum freedom consistent with social order
and security ? When very young he went even
beyond the latter condition. He accepted the
Quaker view that all war was wrong ; and that
the maintenance of military forces was no part
of the duties of the State, but on the other hand
to be condemned as an infringement of individual
freedom. But he soon saw the visionary nature
of such an ideal : he soon admitted that the
defence of the State from foreign aggression was
as much a part of the duties of government as the
protection of individuals at home from the aggres
sion of criminals. Yet throughout his life he
preserved an inveterate hatred of war and of
militarism. Peace was the first fundamental corol
lary from his doctrine of liberty.
The second corollary proposed to limit the
functions of government to the single sphere of
police duty. Any further coercion of the indi
vidual by the State he regarded as an improperPHILOSOPHY 8 1
encroachment on individual liberty. To take the
extreme cases, he condemned the control of
sanitary administration or the upkeep of roads by
the State : such work fell to private corporations
of citizens who undertook it as a matter of ordinary
business, and who, of course, had no coercive
power over their fellows, except by the exclusion
of those who refused to pay, from the advantages
offered them. He objected to the Post Office
being in the hands of the State, and still more to its
being a monopoly. And he objected to State
education, first on the grounds of its compulsory
character, and secondly because the Government
had no right to tax citizens for a purpose which,
even if beneficial, was not part of their natural
duties. Extreme though these views now appear,
it must be remembered that they did not seem
nearly so extreme then. Moreover, it is unwise to
condemn a general principle because its applica
tions have been pushed too far ; but to this subse
quent reference will be made.
In any case, Evolution and Liberty are the two
guiding stars of Spencer s philosophy. Evolution
professes to be a statement of fact ; it records the
direction in which the material and spiritual
changes of the universe are tending. Liberty, on
the other hand, is put forward as a human aim
and the highest injunction of political ethics.
It is natural that, as we shall see, he should en-82 HERBERT SPENCER
deavour to connect the two. But all that here
remains to be said is that when once the reader has
grasped these fundamental conceptions of Spencer s
mind he has already advanced a long way towards
the comprehension of the System of Philosophy.
Doubtless Spencer had numerous lesser prin
ciples, but none which dominated his work to
anything like the same extent. To all these lesser
principles reference will be made in due course.
His biology contains several doctrines of import
ance, not connected either with evolution or with
liberty. Moreover, he had a special metaphysical
doctrine of his own. The average reader would
perhaps be surprised to find that Spencer s Philo
sophy scarcely touches at all on metaphysics.




&quot; The Principles of Psychology,&quot;
there is no metaphysics in his Philosophy, and
even these small portions are extraneous and
unnecessary to the main argument. The bulk of
the Philosophy is devoted to problems of science,
not metaphysics
: for even the law of general
evolution, though not belonging to any one branch
of science, belongs in a sense to all, and is based,
like all science, wholly on the observation of
material facts.
Such being the general plan of the Philosophy,
let us pass now to consider its method. All additions
to knowledge, except in the case of metaphysicsPHILOSOPHY 83
(which many regard as not being knowledge),
are based in the last resort upon observation of
natural phenomena. But the mere accumulation
of facts does not constitute knowledge
: the facts
have to be co-ordinated ; generalisations have to
be made : the facts have to be united or strung
together on a general principle laws, that is to say,
have to be formulated, which endow the facts with
meaning and value, in the human sense. And these
laws may be attained by one of the two opposite
methods of induction or deduction. In induction
we start with the accumulation of facts, and by
probing about among them, looking for similarities
and dissimilarities, we form theories and learn how
they are connected together. In deduction, on the
other hand, we start with the theory. It may be
derived either from inductions reached elsewhere,
or it may be a hypothesis invented by our own
minds. At any rate, we start with a theory and
then proceed to the accumulation of facts to see
how the theory fits them. If it does not fit them
(as commonly happens at the first trials), we
discard it or modify it until it does fit them. But
unfortunately the amour-propre of humanity does
not easily discard its pet theories
; and it fre
quently happens that instead of the theory being
discarded the facts are twisted about and arranged
in such a way as apparently to be covered by
it. It is from the universal tendency towards84 HERBERT SPENCER
such illegitimate manipulation that the deductive
method has fallen into such deep discredit in many
branches of science.
Now the whole of Spencer s Philosophy was
worked out by the deductive method. It is
probable that he would have objected to so sweep
ing a statement
; but nevertheless it is true. It
is probable that he would have pointed to the
tables of
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology
&quot; as evidence
of his inductive procedure.
&quot; The Descriptive
Sociology
&quot; consists of a vast accumulation of
facts of all kinds that could be of any use in the
formation of sociological theories. The facts were
collected from immense numbers of books of
travel, and of description of native races ; they
were mainly selected by private secretaries who
had no special theory in view, but cut out from the
books they read any fact which in their opinion
had any significance with regard to any socio
logical theory whatever. It is necessary also
to admit that Spencer accumulated these facts,
at great expense to himself, before writing his
&quot;
Principles of Sociology,&quot; and for the professed
purpose of supplying himself with a basis for
that work. Here, then, would appear to be a
plain instance of the inductive method. Great
piles of facts first accumulated from com
pletely impartial sources : a careful study of
those facts ; and then three volumes of
&quot; Socio-PHILOSOPHY 85
logy&quot; containing the principles generalised from
them.
But the appearance of induction is only an
appearance. The solid truth remains that Spen
cer s fundamental theories were formed long in
advance of the compilation of
&quot; The Descriptive
Sociology.&quot; I do not mean to deny that many
of the minor theories of the &quot;Sociology&quot; may
have been derived by true induction ; but the
major theories the necessity for peace and for
the limitation of Government functions were
entertained by Spencer long before he ever heard





and the net result of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology
&quot;
is to establish, with the greatest abundance of
evidence and at the greatest length, just those
very doctrines which Spencer had so warmly
espoused in early manhood. It may perhaps be
replied that it is hard if he should be debarred
from the inductive method merely on the ground
that he previously held true theories : it may be




based on induction, whether or not he happened
to hold them before. All that is true ; but the







just the two doctrines which he imbibed with the
greatest avidity in his early years as a political
agitator. It would indeed be a fortunate coinci-86 HERBERT SPENCER
dence if a young man, without knowledge and
without study, were to hit by chance on the two
social principles which subsequent research showed
to be the fundamental conditions of social welfare.
It would be still more strange if the enthusiastic
advocacy of those principles, before they had any
basis of knowledge, should bear so intimate a
resemblance to the equally enthusiastic advocacy
of them after they had been independently estab
lished on a basis of observation and induction.
Indeed, it cannot be seriously denied that, in the
main, Spencer formed his theories first, and
established them by induction afterwards.
Nor is the case different with the other great
principle of the Philosophy the law of universal
evolution. This theory grew out of a statement
which he read in von Baer to the effect that the
embryonic development of animals is always from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Here was
a theory such as Spencer s mind delighted in : it
stuck fast in his memory when all the other details
of von Baer had faded away. It obsessed him ;
he went about applying it all round ; every kind
of change around him presented itself as a progress
from homogeneity to heterogeneity
: this mode of
development appeared to be illustrated in every
class of natural phenomenon. Gradually the law
grew. Development was not only from the homo
geneous to the heterogeneous
: it was from thePHILOSOPHY 87
simple to the complex ; from the incoherent to
the coherent ; from the indefinite to the definite,
and so on. Spencer was a mono-ideist
; the same
idea revolved incessantly in his brain, gathering
to itself every sort of cognate doctrine, until at
last it seemed to fill the whole universe. And here
again it must be remarked what a fortunate
coincidence it was that a raw and unlearned youth
should have seized by chance the one doctrine
which his subsequent research showed to be the
fundamental law of universal change. The marvel
is that his immature opinions should so very rarely
have failed to be supported and established by
subsequent induction.
An even more striking instance of this mode of
procedure is found in his doctrine of Organic
Evolution. It was necessary to his theory that
animals and plants should all have evolved
from the most elementary unicellular organisms.
Accordingly he was an ardent believer in Organic
Evolution years before Darwin and Wallace
enunciated their theory of Natural Selection. In
1852 he wrote an article in order to show that
Organic Evolution had arisen from the unique
factor of the inheritance of acquired characters,
for he could not think of any other factor. Here he
was entirely mistaken. Writing now at a distance
of much more than half a century from this essay
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biological speculation and spirit of inquiry it
may be stated that not one single fact has come to
light which justifies the belief that acquired
characters are inherited. Yet Spencer was pre
pared to base the whole theory of evolution on
the assumption that every individual item of
progress has arisen from that single and unaided
factor. Of course, when Natural Selection was
discovered he modified his views. But the fact
remains that so long as his theory required the
assistance of a spurious factor, so long did he
consider that factor quite adequate to support it.
The truth is that Spencer had the makings of a
fanatic, and herein lie both his strength and his
weakness. The stream of thought in a fanatic
is a narrow one. Nothing counts outside the
province on which attention is concentrated. But
within that province the waters flow with irre
sistible violence between their narrow banks and
carry every obstacle before them. Simeon Stylites
could never have stood upon a pillar for forty
years if his mind had been free to pass the limi
tations of a single obsessing idea. Spencer also
had his few groundwork principles ; and so
strongly did they move him that he, naturally
an idle man, was driven to erect the most volu
minous and elaborate system of thought of his
time.
But it may be observed that at all events thePHILOSOPHY 89
theory of evolution was true. Spencer conceived
the right principle, although he supported it on
wrong grounds. And so, too, it may be inferred
that perhaps, after all, much of his social teaching
was correct. The views he put forward were
indeed representative of the best and most ad
vanced political thought in the country at the
time when he was young. May it not be, then,
that he was a man of very strong natural pene
tration, and that his prepossessions, however
violent, were founded on a true instinct ? Such
indeed was most probably the case, and such is
the thesis that will subsequently be developed.
But it is best to clear the ground at the outset by
admitting that they were prepossessions.
Spencer s mind moving among facts was like
a magnet moving among metal filings. If we
throw together a medley of filings of iron, silver,
nickel, and tin, and then pass a magnet over the
heap, the iron filings will rise forth and cluster
round the magnet, while the other metals will lie
still. If the experiment is performed carefully,
the heap will soon be deprived of all its iron, while
no particle of the silver, nickel, or tin will have
been removed. And so it happened when Spencer
applied his sociological principles to the accumu
lation of facts in
&quot; The Descriptive Sociology.&quot;
Every fact which illuminated those principles was
drawn out and clustered round the magnet, while90 HERBERT SPENCER
the remaining facts lay unseen and untouched.
For this reason Spencer s Philosophy does present
a vast agglomeration of facts the appearance of
an encyclopaedic knowledge and of genuine induc
tion. But for this reason also it was possible to
say of him,
&quot; Scratch Spencer, and you find
ignorance.&quot; The residue of facts not affected by
his magnets remained to him a sealed and unknown
book. And be it added, without his magnets he
would have known nothing
: he had not the spirit
of the observer, who can amass isolated facts and
slowly evolve a theory to connect them. There
was no room for an isolated fact in his mind
; it
would drop out at once. Yet it speaks much for
the all-embracing character of his principles that
they could draw to themselves so many verifying
circumstances. Considering his methods, the gaps
were wonderfully few. The question is to what
extent they are vital to his theories.
That Spencer would have admitted this modus
operandi is scarcely probable. Even Newton
understood his own methods so little as to say
hypotheses non jingo. But the whole scheme of
Spencer s Philosophy bears the traces of its method.





it was in principles alone that he was interested.
And the entire Philosophy is entitled
&quot;
Synthetic,&quot;
meaning a bringing together or clustering of
phenomena around a single focus or principle orPHILOSOPHY 91
law, or, as by previous analogy, magnet. His
great aim was the unification of knowledge
: the
discovery of a single formula which should unite
all classes of phenomena in the universe
; a magnet
which would attract every variety of metal in any
heap and leave no residue at all.
With this general view of the aim and methods
of Spencer s Philosophy we may now proceed to
consider it in detail. It will be my purpose not only
to furnish an account of the outlines of his system
of thought, but to indicate the attitude of modern




A HUNDRED years ago civilised societies were
commonly classified into those which were mainly
democratic, those which were oligarchical, and
those which were monarchical. Of the two latter
types there was already considerable knowledge ;
the advanced thinkers of the time tended very
generally to condemn them and to fix their hopes
for the regeneration of the world on the triumphant
establishment of democracy. The course of poli
tical action followed, as usually happens, the course
of philosophical speculation ; and throughout the
nineteenth century a gradual progress of democratic
institutions was witnessed in all the civilised
countries of the world.
It soon became apparent, however, that what
ever benefits might be derived from democracy, it
certainly was not the general panacea for all
social evils that its early enthusiasts had hoped.
Undoubtedly the nineteenth century was marked
by an immense increase of knowledge and of
material prosperity in all ranks of society. But
these improvements were due in large part to
the huge increase of wealth following on theSOCIAL WRITINGS 93
development of railways, the universal introduc
tion of machinery, and the consequent expansion
of trade. It is not to be denied that improved
methods of government did contribute to some
extent to the new social prosperity ; but for the
first three-quarters of the century democratic
legislation was directed mainly towards the break
ing up of the remnants of feudalism rather than
to the introduction of definite schemes of construc
tive improvement. At all events, philosophers
began to doubt the all-embracing efficacy of
democratic ideals, in proportion as those ideals
began to sink into the minds of the people at
large. In this predicament some new dividing
line between societies was sought some classi
fication based upon a deeper analysis than that
of democracies and monarchies. The practical
experiments of France in various types of govern
ment furnished much material for generalisation ;
for that country of advanced thought oscillated
between a republic and a monarchy, without
any great differences being effected in the lives or
social conditions of the people. The most pro
found alterations in the form of government
appeared to carry no corresponding alterations in
the real prosperity of the community. It was
clearly necessary to draw some more fundamental
line between types of government than that
suggested by a merely superficial glance.94 HERBERT SPENCER
The new analysis of social types found its most
perfect expression in the works of Herbert Spencer.
He preached the doctrine that the two funda
mental types of society are those in which there is
much government, and those in which there is
little government. All classes of political thinkers
of course recognise the necessity for some govern
ment, even if limited to the preservation of
internal order and the defence against foreign
aggression. But beyond this minimum or common
basis government may ramify deeply into all
branches of society and affect the lives of citizens
at almost every turn, whether by restrictions or
commands, and with the associated burden of a
heavy taxation
; or on the other hand, it may
hold aloof and leave citizens to live their own lives
with scarcely any interference, save such as are
plainly indispensable, and demanding only a small
taxation, to meet the cost of the few functions
undertaken. This distinction was adopted by
Spencer as the basis of a true classification of
societies. The division into democracies, oligar
chies, etc., he regarded as concerned only with
the form of government ; the new division con
cerned the substance of government, and was
therefore a far more important and fundamental
classification. Changes in the form of government
such as those which took place last century in
France do not affect the lives of the people, becauseSOCIAL WRITINGS 95
the substance of government remains unchanged
throughout.
Having established the distinction between the
two main types of society, Spencer proceeds to
ascertain the characteristics exhibited by each.
He finds that the type which exhibits much
government generally prevails where wars are
common
; while the type which exhibits little
government is specially associated with peace.
Where the safety of the community is in jeopardy
from external enemies, it is clearly necessary that
the activities of individuals should be subordinated
to the needs of the State : society has to be
organised on a military basis. Where, on the other
hand, wars are rare, social development proceeds
along industrial lines. In commerce and industry
men are more likely to put forth their best efforts
when working for their own welfare than when
working for the welfare of the State. Hence
industrial and individual freedom characterises
those societies which are the least addicted to war.
The two fundamental types of society are thus
named, according to their principal characteristics,
the military and industrial types the former
showing much and the latter little control of
individual activities by the State.
The military type of society is again divisible
into two other classes namely, the purely mili
tary type organised for the purposes of war, and96 HERBERT SPENCER
the socialistic type organised for the supposed
welfare of its citizens. It might appear at first
sight that socialistic and military societies are
antithetical. This Spencer denies, for both are
characterised by an extensive governmental organi
sation limiting and directing the activities of
citizens. The circumstance that the organisa
tion is established for different aims does not
obscure the fact that the organisation exists, nor
can it conceal the fundamental similarity between
the two kinds. In evidence of this proposition
Spencer points out the close association between
Militarism and Socialism in modern European
countries. The most extreme form of despotism
is found in Russia, and there too occur the most
violent forms of Socialism and anarchy. Germany
is one of the most military nations of Europe ; and
it has a larger proportion of Socialists than any
other country. On the other hand, England is the
least military of European nations, being until
lately the only one which did not have conscrip
tion. And the Socialist propaganda in England
is likewise the weakest in Europe. All this which
was true last century still remains true. The
growing military organisations of foreign countries
have been accompanied by a rapid progress
of socialistic legislation. And in England the
nearest approach to the pure industrial type
military and socialistic ideals have grown handSOCIAL WRITINGS 97
in hand. Our Government at the outbreak of
the present war had gone farther in the direction
of Socialism than any previous Government in
our history. Yet within a few weeks, and with
scarcely a change of personnel, it embarked upon
military operations likewise without a parallel
through all our great wars in the past. Where the
people are accustomed to Government control,
where there exist normally large regulative organi
sations, those organisations can without excessive
dislocation be employed for meeting new needs
suddenly arisen.
Spencer gave some attention to the relation
between the form and substance of Government.
A democracy differs from a monarchy only in
form ; in the one case a king rules, in the other
case a majority of the people rules : in each case
the individual may be more or less free, or more





he reached the conclusion that democratic forms
are the best of all others for the purely industrial
type of society ; but that for the military type of
society it is the worst of all others. Where the
sphere of Government is large, democracies cannot
pay attention to the workings of its numerous
ramifications. Moreover, mobs are the most
dangerous of tyrants. From a dictator there is
always an ultimate appeal to the people ; his
H.S.98 HERBERT SPENCER
conduct is controlled by what the people will
tolerate. But from a majority of the people there
is no appeal. The tyranny of a majority is subject
to no limitations. When, however, it is clearly
understood that the functions of Government may
not pass certain limits, then representative insti
tutions constitute the best form of government.
Tyranny is impossible, when the expansion of
government is prevented. In another essay
Spencer urges that interests, and not persons,
should be represented. The labouring classes under
universal suffrage would possess far more political
power than they were entitled to
; and other
interests, not less important to the State, would
be prejudiced and overwhelmed by an unfair
majority.
These are the main doctrines of Spencer s





&quot; The Principles of Sociology.&quot;
The former work is a compilation in folio volumes,
in which the leading traits of different societies are
exhibited in tabular form. Their purpose is to
ascertain what kinds of social institutions com
monly go together, the relation, for instance,
between militancy and trade or domestic insti
tutions, the status of women, etc. The generalisa
tions thus obtained form the body of
&quot; The Prin
ciples of Sociology.&quot; Its main results are the
establishment, as already stated, of two chiefSOCIAL WRITINGS 99
types of society, and a description of the general
characteristics of each. Spencer finds that the
industrial type is distinguished by most of the
virtues, and the military type by most of the vices.
A high status of women and children, a strong
philanthropy, a vigorous initiative and disregard
of authority, a strong and sympathetic character,
go with the industrial type, in addition to its main
feature of great individual freedom. But cruelty,
revenge, superstition, and brutality go with the
militant type, offset only by the virtues of
obedience, patriotism, and loyalty to rulers. That
other loyalty, consisting in a high standard of
truthfulness and hatred of fraud or deception, is
conspicuously lacking in militant societies, and
conspicuously present in industrial societies. Of
all these doctrines, a complete account will be
found in the following chapter.
In all scientific investigations the truth is
generally reached by a gradual elimination of
error. Spencer plainly thought that he had
reached a final settlement of the proper classifi
cation of societies. Such a result was indeed very
unlikely to be achieved the moment the science
of sociology was founded : zoology had been in
existence for centuries before anything approaching
a true classification of animals had been discovered ;
one scheme of classification was discarded after
another, each one being on the whole a nearerioo HERBERT SPENCER
approximation to the truth than its predecessor.
So, too, in sociology, the features which constitute
the really fundamental points of difference between
societies are scarcely likely to be isolated till
after laborious research lasting over generations.
A general principle, such as that laid down by
Spencer, falls to the ground if one fact can be
named with which it is incompatible. It appears
that the modern industrial development of Ger
many constitutes just such a fact. According to
Spencer, the militant and industrial regimes are
antagonistic
: a rapid industrial development
carries with it an immense increase of individual
liberty and a reduction in the functions of the
State. Yet in Germany the industrial develop
ment has gone with a corresponding military
development, and with an extension of State func
tions. Indeed, it seems to some extent to have
been due to the initiative and enterprise of the
State, which according to Spencer could only
have acted as a drag by the imposition of burden
some restrictions.
Nevertheless Spencer probably arrived at a
\ruer notion of sociology than existed before
him. Between nations organised for war and
nations organised for peace there does exist a
more fundamental difference than between a
monarchy and a republic, as such. There is
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monarchy and the French or American republics
than there is between the English and Russian
monarchies. The amount of interference by
Government with individual liberty is a true
criterion of the condition of society ; but it is not
the whole truth ; it is only an adumbration of the
truth. Spencer s sociology was unfortunately
under the immediate and powerful bias of his
Ethics. From the earliest days, he was strongly
inclined to peace, a hater of militarism, and a
believer in individual liberty. Societies which
exhibited these traits naturally appeared to him
to stand out in a separate class, to which the
militant type, so repugnant to him, was the anti
thesis. But the fundamental antagonism between
the two was perhaps as much a reflection of Spen
cer s mind as of objective facts. It is possible to
go even farther. At the time when he was develop
ing his theories, about the middle of last century,
there was a real antithesis between militarism and
industrialism : the activities of the State were
aimed to some extent against an industrial regime ;
and at that time there was considerable truth in
the doctrine that the development of industry
implied the abolition of restrictions by the State.
But Spencer had no historical sense
; he seems to
have inferred that because Government activities
were injurious then, they must always be so in
any sphere whatever. Accordingly he was led to102 HERBERT SPENCER
condemn the introduction of national education ;
and also all forms of sanitary supervision by the
Government. In very early youth he even denied
the right of the Government to maintain an army
or navy ; but this extreme doctrine was soon
struck out from among his beliefs ; it was expressed
only in the first edition of
&quot; Social Statics,&quot; which
for half a century has been out of print. In all
his later writings he emphasised the somewhat
obvious truth that the national defence is the
prime duty of Government ; and he even admitted
that in times of public danger through war the
Government has an absolute right over the lives
and properties of all its citizens.
As regards national education, most readers
will doubtless regard Spencer s views with a smile
of contemptuous superiority. Yet it is certainly
the case that all Spencer s prophecies on this sub
ject have turned out to be far more accurate than
those of the reformers who initiated it. It was
generally believed that universal education would
finally abolish all the evils of social life. Immense
things were expected of it, not one-tenth part of
wh
:ch have been realised. The sanguine tempera
ment of mankind is always ready to believe n a
high-sounding remedy, which will lift humanity
out of its vulgar barbarism into a race of super
men. Inventors may know that not one in a
thousand of the inventions that are patented everSOCIAL WRITINGS 103
achieve success ; but inventions continue to be
patented in undiminished number. Authors may
know that not one in a hundred of the books that
are written ever find a publisher ; yet books con
tinue to be written in the inexpugnable hope that
large profits may accrue from them. The columns
of our newspapers are filled with advertisements
of patent medicines, for which the most absurd
and extravagant claims are made. Yet year after
year humanity squanders huge sums in the purchase
of these drugs, of which some are injurious, most
are useless, and nearly all vastly inferior to the
remedies publicly recognised by the science of
medicine.
If men are thus irrationally sanguine in the
simpler matters of life, it is natural they should
be still more so in the complex affairs of social
government, where the guidance of experience is
less available. The people who advocated national
education thought that it would be the forerunner
of permanent peace ; for as people knew more and
became more refined they would naturally be less
addicted to war. The belief like so many & priori
convictions, seemed eminently reasonable ; and
the reformers would have utterly declined to
believe that, after half a century of compulsory
education throughout Europe, the inhabitants of
that continent would have embarked upon the
bloodiest war in all history, and a war in which a104 HERBERT SPENCER
larger proportion of the people rushed to engage
than in any previous period known to history,
with the possible exception of the first crusade.
The reformers figured to themselves an enlightened
public reading useful and edifying works : they
did not anticipate that universal reading would
call into existence an enormous flood of villainous
literature and journalism, by which for a few
halfpennies the people would be enabled to
debauch their minds to the lowest pit of degra
dation. By arguments such as these did Spencer
attempt to defend his views. Nor can they be
dismissed with the contempt that it has long been
fashionable to pour upon them. For what was the
alternative ? If there had been no compulsory
education, the bulk of the people would still have
been educated in private schools. Only the sur
plus of the population would have remained unable
to read or write ; and there are only too many
occupations where reading and writing are un
necessary. The immense taxation on account of
education would have been non-existent, and the
money so saved would have gone to stimulate
industry and added to the capital of the country.
But all this is part of the larger question which
must now be considered.
Most of the ideals for social reform fall under
the motto of the French Revolution Liberte,
Egalite, Fraternite. Of Fraternite there is notSOCIAL WRITINGS 105
much to be said
; few can question the desirability
of attaining it, and even fewer will imagine that
it may be established by law. But of Liberte and
Egalite there is much to be said ; for the convic
tion has gradually been growing that these high
sounding titles embody ideals which are irrecon
cilable. The natural inequality of men is such that
it can only be abolished by deep inroads on
individual liberty ; and social freedom similarly
results in a rapid inequality of social status. We
are within certain limits obliged to choose between
the two, recognising that we are unable to have
both. For the last few decades the notion of
equality has been the inspiration of nearly all
social legislation. It is felt that those who are
poor are no worse, and are often better, than
those who are rich ; and there appears to be a
grave injustice in the present social system which
offers all the advantages and opportunities in life
to a few while withholding them from the many,
without the smallest reference to personal merit.
In a wealthy community like our own this senti
ment does not issue in sudden revolutions, directed
towards the hopeless aim of an immediate recon-
stitution of society. But it does get expressed
by the general drift of legislation towards the
establishment of greater equality
: we have not
set up Socialism and Equality, but each of our
new Acts of Parliament carries us a step furtherio6 HERBERT SPENCER
in that direction, and is inspired by an ideal
unconsciously felt rather than consciously thought.
The most specious cry of Socialism is
&quot;
equality
of opportunity.&quot; It is recognised by most people
in their calmer moments that men cannot all be
equal. But the plausible argument is advanced
that all should have equal opportunities of securing
the favoured positions in our social system.
Now it is an inherent misfortune of those who
attack the ideal of equality to be associated with
the Conservative school, who may be said to be
biassed in favour of the maintenance of that
particular social system in which they and their
families are pre-eminent. It is possible, however,
to take a purely scientific view of the whole thing ;
and Spencer an ideal Radical cannot be accused
by anyone who has the least knowledge of him
of any sort of merely conservative taint. The
question for him all pivoted on liberty. It was
pointed out by Lord Bryce some years ago that,
whereas the leaders of thought last century were
inclined to favour the Liberal party, they are in
the present century inclined to favour the Con
servative. The true inwardness of this indubitable
fact is that they are on the whole biassed in favour
of freedom, which was the watchword of the
Liberal party last century, and that they are on
the whole biassed against equality, which is the
watchword of the Liberal party in the presentSOCIAL WRITINGS 107
century. Two highly distinguished and non-
political men of science stand out now with especial
prominence in opposition to the cry of equality ;
the one Dr. F. W. Mott, F.R.S., and the other
Professor William Bateson, F.R.S., who regarded
the matter as of such first-rate importance that he
dealt with it in his Presidential Address to the
British Association in 1914. It is still, as it always
has been, one of the most fundamental issues of
social ethics ; and under one form or other is
certain to come forward again immediately the
present hostilities are concluded.
It is a paradox of Socialism to think wholly
in terms of individuals. The ultimate sentiment of
Socialists is the feeling of injustice aroused by an
arrangement under which the goods of the world
are held by a few, who are no better than those
condemned to comparative poverty. Yet the
problem is not of individuals, but of what is best
for society as a whole, and of what leads to the
greatest happiness on the average of all the
individuals who make up society. And before
passing on to the positive arguments against
equality, two facts may be noted which already go
far towards destroying the arguments in favour of
equality. The first of these is the profound psy
chological truth that wealth is not the source of
happiness; and if we want to raise the sum-total
of happiness, we are travelling along altogetherio8 HERBERT SPENCER
the wrong road if we think to achieve it by an
equal distribution of wealth. That indeed is a
gross form of ethical materialism, and as far
removed as can be from any true insight into
human character. Is the rentier a happier man
than the employe ? Is the millionaire happier than
the factory girl
? Few who know both classes will
answer these questions in the affirmative
; for
human nature has not changed since the eighth
century, when Abdalrahman, the monarch of
Cordova, whose magnificence is famous, exclaimed :
&quot;
I have now reigned above fifty years in victory or
peace ; beloved by my subjects, dreaded by my enemies,
and respected by my allies. Riches and honours, power
and pleasure, have waited on my call, nor does any earthly
blessing appear to have been wanting to my felicity. In
this situation I have diligently numbered the days of pure
and genuine happiness which have fallen to my lot : they
amount to FOURTEEN : O man, place not thy confidence
in this present world !
&quot; 1
Once again, in the twentieth century the
accumulation of wealth among all classes is far
greater than ever before in our history. Are we
then to infer that men are happier now than ever
before ? and that in all the centuries of our history
no such happiness has been known as that which
we now experience
? Surely not. Two qualifi
cations indeed have to be made. First, a poverty
which cuts off the real necessaries of life does bring
1
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unhappiness ; and, secondly, a poverty which
cuts off the artificial necessaries does the same.
The possession of a certain income very quickly
generates new wants : the ability to satisfy them
soon constitutes them into necessaries ; and the
privation of them brings as much real misery as
the privation of food to a man who has always
been poor. It is impossible to name any sum,
such as 400 a year, which brings happiness to
all. For a millionaire it would involve privation
which would imply complete wretchedness, and
often before now has even led to suicide. For an
unskilled labourer it would bring at first extrava
gant joy, until after a few years his new luxuries
had become necessities, and he would find himself
with as many fresh and unsatisfied wants as he
had before. But apart from these qualifications
there is no genuine relation between wealth and
happiness ; and as a mere scientific fact a more
equal distribution of wealth would not lead to a
general increase of happiness
: the means are
wrongly contrived for the end in view. Equal dis
tribution may possibly be right on other grounds,
but for raising the standard of happiness it is
irrelevant.
The second fact to be named with regard to the
equality campaign is that it is based on sentiments
of the nature of jealousy. There is a real, often
unconfessed, feeling of animosity against thosei io HERBERT SPENCER
who have much, so often out of proportion to their
deserts. Ostentation is always bad taste the
symbol of vanity and a little mind. But apart
from ostentation, it is inevitable that A. should
speculate why B., no better than himself, should
be so much more kindly endowed by society ;
and from this sentiment, usually not intense, but
strong by reason of its ubiquity, springs perhaps
the main origin of equality legislation. It is to be
hoped that there is no need to labour the argument
that social reform based on animosity against
individuals is necessarily unsound at core. True
reform must be animated by pure philanthropy,
guided by reason
; it should be inspired by the
single-minded desire for the benefit of society or
of individuals, never by hostility to individuals
or to any class of them. If we really desire to
achieve by legislation the welfare of humanity,
there must be no jealousy lurking in our minds :
there must be no suspicion of acting merely out
of hostility to others, or to get square with them.
But it is not easy to realise in practice the pure
spirit of fraternite which is so essential to true
political progress.
If many of the arguments used in favour of
equality are unsound, there are various arguments
of an opposite character which furnish cogent
reasons against that ideal. As already observed,
the matter at issue is not concerned with the wel-SOCIAL WRITINGS in
fare of individuals, but with the welfare of society
as a whole. And if it is shown that inequality
is a wholesome state of society, the outraged
sentiments of some individuals must simply be
disregarded. From the point of view of society
as a whole the position is this : that the work of
the world is of very diverse character and requires
very diverse kinds of quality and education in
those who perform it. Of the necessary work of
society, a very large part is unskilled routine or
drudgery, needing little beyond continued muscular
effort from those to whose lot it falls. Skilled
manual labour constitutes another large desidera
tum of social life, though the number of individuals
occupied in it is smaller than that devoted to the
lower types of duty. The skilled manual labourer
does not need a large general education. He
requires a high development, chiefly muscular,
of a single quality. A still smaller class comprise
those whose work is mainly mental : they are
engaged in the direction and organisation of
affairs. The work of this class calls for such
qualities as judgment, intelligence, and decision
the development of which implies a much higher
degree of general education.
Finally, the progress of the world needs yet
another class of men of science, authors, artists,
musicians, etc. This class is more closely associated
with the ideals of progress than of order
; it canii2 HERBERT SPENCER
hardly be described as essential to the orderly
continuance of society, yet it takes precedence of
all others as being intimately bound up with the
state of civilisation. Upon it civilisation depends ;
and from it emanate the new discoveries and
the new ideals which ultimately stimulate social
progress, lead to the happiness and improvement
of mankind, and constitute the highest expression
of human life, by which our societies of men are
differentiated from societies of bees or ants. This
class is and should be the smallest of all
; and in
general the mental cultivation required for it is
of the utmost intensity and rigour so intense and
vigorous indeed as often to involve (as in Spencer s
case) a permanently enfeebled physical con
stitution.
Such in very rough outline is the work that
society has to do. We may visualise a com
munity of civilised men in the form of a pyramid,
the base of which is constituted by the dull and
stupid labour of physical existence, and demand
ing the largest single class of individuals. As we
ascend the pyramid the work is of progressively
higher type and the class devoted to it becomes
progressively smaller ; till, near the apex, the
work is one of the highest virtuosity and the
number of workers is exceedingly small. It is
clear already that inequality is of the essence of
healthy social life. Those near the apex wouldSOCIAL WRITINGS 113
be plunged in hopeless misery if they were called
upon to do the work of the base. Those at the base
would be utterly incompetent to carry on the
duties of the higher strata. Our task is to ascer
tain what social conditions are the most har
monious to the desired end.
If we could ascertain by a study of heredity, or
by an examination of all new-born babies, for
what stratum they were the best adapted, we
could then adjust their education to the position
in life which they were best fitted to fulfil. But
any such forecast is at present hopelessly beyond
the power of science, and equally beyond the
powers of discretion and judgment which would
be needed in the inspectors who were to decide
the lot of the infant. It is true, indeed, that just
as men are unequal in adult life, so they are born
unequal. In some the heredity is of the finest
character ; in others it is such as cannot lead to
any real greatness. But the difficulty of discrimi
nation is so overwhelming that for practical
purposes we have to treat all new-born infants
as being equal. In very extreme cases, such as
congenital idiocy in the parents, it may very
likely be proper to assume that the child will be
fit only for the lowest type of work. But such
cases must be rare, and do not affect the main
contention. In any case we have no business to
suppose that the children of the rich are con-ii4 HERBERT SPENCER
genitally better than the children of the poor.
Evidence may point in that direction in the
future, but at present there is none on which to
base an opinion. While recognising, then, that men
are born with very unequal potentialities, yet we
are obliged, by our inability to determine those
potentialities in advance, to rank them (with very
few exceptions) as all being equally fitted either
for the highest or for the lowest grades of labour.
So far we are in no particular opposition to
the average social reformer. The more ignorant
among them would perhaps hold that new-born
infants are actually equal in potentiality
: the
Helvetian doctrine of a tabula rasa has still its
adherents among the class of reformers who have
never heard of Helvetius, and are unaware of the
discussions which have taken place on the subject.
But for practical purposes we have not yet differed
from the Socialist, for by admitting that all infants
must be regarded as equal we concede all that he
demands. The agreement does not last long,
however. The Socialist forthwith leaps to the
conclusion, summed up in the phrase
&quot;
equality
of opportunity.&quot; By giving all children an equal
opportunity of advancing in the social scale we
provide (argues the Socialist) a natural test which
sorts out individuals and allows each one to fall
into that stratum which his true value indicates.
Once more we witness here the tendency toSOCIAL WRITINGS 115
think in terms of the individual the cloven hoof
of vicarious jealousy. It is not possible to deter
mine during childhood in what individuals there
will occur any particular efflorescence of genius.
Spencer himself is an apt example. Under any
system of equal opportunity he would, at any
period of his childhood, have been marked out
as unsuited for the higher strata of the social
pyramid. For he was distinctly backward in his
studies : he would have been massed with the
majority, whose work in life lies at the base of the
structure. It is scarcely more possible to deter
mine during education the true bent of a child
than it is to determine it immediately on birth.
Genius is apt to be rebellious and individual ; it
is far removed from all relation to pedagogy ;
and the application to men of pedagogic standards
necessarily issues in failure. The child of the
highest pedagogic standard is not in any case the
future genius. Moreover, this system involves
an immense waste of social energy. If it is to have
even a remote chance of success, equality of
opportunity must be carried onward at least to
university age ; and long before that time educa
tion begins to be specialised for the particular
purpose to be filled in life. For those who are to
work in the higher strata it has already been
carried to a point far higher than is necessary or
desirable in the case of those who have to workii6 HERBERT SPENCER
in the lower strata. For those who have to fill the
great and responsible positions of society no
expenditure of trouble or of money is too great to
ensure their appropriate development. That ex
penditure is far greater than could possibly be
devoted to all individuals. Moreover, since the
great majority, by the conditions of our existence,
have to do the lower types of work, it would be
squandered on them. Worse still, it would render
them unfit for and discontented with their
humbler work. The effort to give to every child
the training required to fulfil the highest kinds of
work in later life is doomed to prove abortive,
by reason of its very extravagance. Since only
the few are needed for these higher kinds, it is
doomed also to bring disappointment to the vast
majority who are left over to carry on the humbler
vocations. When for most of our social work
what we want is carthorses, it is extravagant and
brutal to train all individuals as racehorses and
then to put them to the work of carthorses.
We are therefore thrown back upon some
principle of selection. The requirement before
us is that of training most men for the humbler
work and a minority for the higher work. By what
standard shall we decide upon the selection ?
If researches into heredity make large practical
advances in the future, we shall then perhaps have
a satisfactory reply to this question. But so longSOCIAL WRITINGS 117
as we are obliged to regard all infants as alike in
their potentialities we have no guidance at all in
selection ; and it becomes a matter of complete
indifference what children are taken for the more
intensive lines of cultivation and what children
are left. It may then very well be abandoned to
the unfettered working of ordinary social laws.
Under those laws one comparatively small class
has all the opportunities ; the mass of the people
lack the higher training which is superfluous for
the work they have to do. The proportions
between these classes, when not interfered with
by legislation, seem to be well adapted to the
requirements, and in fact arise in consequence of
the requirements. Are they not then best left
alone ? The structure of society is not merely
haphazard and devoid of purpose
: it exists
because it is adapted to the needs of society. We
have no guarantee that a different structure would
be adapted to the needs of society
: we have no
reason to suppose that artificial social schemes
would work : we have, on the contrary, every
reason to suppose that, like the ideas of the average
inventor, unforeseen difficulties would lead to
ruin. The analogy is even stronger than it
appears ; for the difficulties cannot be regarded in
any way as unforeseen. They are only too patent.
It is certain that the main objections to this line
of argument come from sentiments rather thanii8 HERBERT SPENCER
reason, and from thinking in individuals rather
than in societies. It will be pointed out that a
class of idle rich is parasitic and offensive. True,
it is a grave defect in the social system, but prob
ably a necessary one. For it is necessary to have
a wealthy class, whose existence is justified if it
produces only a few who carry on the important
work of society, which could not be done by the
products of a poorer class. The riff-raff of the
wealthier classes, constituting probably the majo
rity, may well and rightly be objects of popular
contempt ; but their numbers are insufficient to
constitute any really perceptible burden on the
backs of the workers. And as for the feeling of
animosity against them by those who have to work,
such feelings are inevitably a wrong motive of legis
lation. As already observed, the workers are in
general at least as happy as the idlers.
It must then be admitted that the conception
of human equality is spurious, for the fundamental
reason that the work of the world is extremely
various and needs for its performance very varied
types of men. In the conflict between liberte and
egalite^ egalite must within certain limits be aban
doned. Yet this conclusion applies only to social
and not to legislative equality. It is one of the
most important principles of jurisprudence that
all men are equal before the law
; it is a principle
so well established that its defence would be anSOCIAL WRITINGS 119
absurdity, and it has only to be stated. But
when the law begins to ramify through every
branch of social activity, carrying with it neces
sarily the principle of equality, then liberty begins
to suffer. Equality is overdone, because legis
lation and government are too voluminous, too
ubiquitous for a healthy community. Yet it
is questionable whether such arguments as these
lead to Spencer s conception of Administrative
Nihilism. It may well be that the Governments of
countries can do much valuable work, though on
different lines to the efforts of the last half-
century. Since it seems probable that after this
war the need for economy will constitute an
absolute bar to a further expansion of State func
tions in the direction of so-called social reform,
we have to inquire whether the State shall con
tract again to its earlier impotence, or whether it
shall branch out in new lines of progress.
The triumph of democracy would seem to
indicate the latter view. And yet there is much
to be said for the temporary quiescence of the
European Governments. The exaggeration of the
State idea leads, as Spencer was never tired of
insisting, to a state of war. When men s ideas





&quot; as an agency which does
things, wars are bound to be frequent. For chief
among the things done by Governments is the120 HERBERT SPENCER
waging of wars ; and the more men s eyes are
turned to their Governments the more they enter
into the life and feelings of their Governments the
more ready will they be to have their personal
sentiments raised by petty national differences,
which are not deserving the attention of the people
as a whole, and still less that utter absorption of
attention implied by war. On these grounds it
would appear a more wholesome social condition
when men are thinking more of their own affairs
in life and less of the affairs of the nation as a
whole, for by such means the welfare of the
nation is more likely to be achieved. The working
of the human body is not improved by fixing
attention on the workings of the various organs,
on respiration, on the beating of the heart, on the
action of the liver, etc. In the healthy state
the body works best when its various functions are
not the subject of too close attention and when a few
general rules of health only are carefully observed.
So the body politic seems to work best when its
separate parts are not subject to undue inspection
or interference by Government, but when legisla
tion is limited to a few rigorous ordinances.
Spencer s final view of the functions and duties
of the State differed scarcely at all from his earlier
views. The first duty of the State is protection
against foreign aggression and the maintenance of
an army and navy adequate for that purpose ;SOCIAL WRITINGS 121
the second duty is that of policing the country,
i.e., the protection of citizens against the aggres
sion of other citizens, against crime, breach of
contract, etc. Beyond this the State should, in
Spencer s view, do nothing.
&quot;
Every man is free
to do that which he wills, provided he infringes
not the equal freedom of any other man.&quot; The
construction and maintenance of roads, the Post
Office, education, factory laws, sanitary inspection
are all to be left to private enterprise. He never
suggested, of course, that the State should suddenly
abandon those branches of activity on which it
has long since embarked. Spencer did not believe
in sudden or revolutionary changes. Still less did
he hold that these services, which we have now
come to associate inseparably with the State,
should be left undone. On the contrary, the whole
tendency of his arguments was to show that they
would be far more efficiently and cheaply carried
out by corporations of private individuals. It is
always difficult to realise a state of affairs widely
different from that in which we live ; and with
many of these services it seems quite possible that
private enterprise would have been a far more
efficient mode of working them. Multitudinous
examples are piled up in all parts of Spencer s
works to show that private enterprise is more
efficient than public. In private concerns self-
interest is enlisted in favour of efficiency and122 HERBERT SPENCER
economy, and competition acts as a permanent
spur to improvement. Individuals are confronted
with the alternative of supplying well and cheaply
the public demand for some commodity, or else
of failure. Public bodies are under no such
powerful incentive ; their services are run by
officials drawing fixed salaries, and driven by a
far less urgent stimulus than the private trader.
Moreover, they are frequently protected from
competition. Take, for instance, the Post Office.
Few people realise the heavy tax entailed by a
penny postage. The cost of carrying a letter
from one part of London to another, for instance,
is a mere fraction of a penny. Were there no State
monopoly of letter carrying, Spencer conceives
two or more private post offices competing against
each other, cutting down their rates to the lowest
possible point, and raising to the highest efficiency
the rapidity of the conveyance. There would be
a pillar-box in the wall of every house a house-
to-house collection as well as a house-to-house
delivery. Nor can such a scheme be regarded as
altogether visionary ; for in fact where private
companies exist for the carriage of parcels they
are almost always cheaper than the parcel post,
notwithstanding the subsidy which they are
obliged to pay to the State for the privilege ; and
in London not only are the two or three competing
companies cheaper than the State service, butSOCIAL WRITINGS 123
they have long instituted a house-to-house collec
tion, whereas you are required by the State service
to carry your parcel to a post office yourself. And
many people have observed that the civility and
general amenities in the public post offices are
inferior to those usual in private shops. There is
not on the part of the Post Office officials the
powerful stimulus of competition, which impels
the private trader to meet the convenience of the
public in every possible way. Post offices are
almost the only kind of shops in the kingdom
where you cannot run up a bill, but have to pay
in cash over the counter for everything you
purchase. But we are so accustomed to these
impositions, that they are not realised as griev
ances. And so, Spencer argued, the same state
of affairs exists wherever public bodies possess
a monopoly in any branch of trade.
This is not the place to investigate the complex
problems here raised. They are, after all, affairs
of economics rather than of ethics. If Spencer s
arguments are sound, not much more can be said
than that they involve the public in a loss and
inconvenience which, even if serious, can hardly
have the moral importance which he endeavoured
to ascribe to them. It may be true that the best
railways in the world are in the hands of private
companies, and that the worst are those owned
as a State monopoly ; it may be true that Govern-124 HERBERT SPENCER
ment trading generally is costly and inefficient ;
and yet there may be other arguments which out
weigh those of pure economics. But in certain
other spheres Spencer s conclusions seem open to
a much more formidable criticism. He condemned
sanitary inspection by Government, for instance :
he considered that the maintenance of public
health was no part of the duties of Government.
This proposition will now be admitted by few.
Spencer imagined the existence of private com
panies of sanitary inspectors, who would carry
out any work brought to them at a far lower fee
than that now charged by way of taxation. He
imagined, further, a greater efficiency of sanitary
inspection by private companies. For a company
which once made a mistake passed an insanitary
dwelling as healthy would immediately be ruined ;
the public would in future straightway resort to
rival companies. A mistake by a private inspect
ing company would be far more impossible than
by a Government company, where nothing more
serious would ensue than hostile criticism. And
Spencer fortified his arguments, with his usual
brilliance, by citing innumerable instances of the
follies of public inspectors and of the ill-success
which had attended all efforts to suppress disease.
In many of these criticisms he was well justified.
In one of them namely, the Contagious Diseases
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come round to his belief that the attempt to
combat these diseases by Government inspection
cannot succeed.
Yet the arguments on the other side seem even
more conclusive. If there were no compulsory
sanitary inspection, then it would be open to the
poorer or stupider people to live in insanitary
places. Spencer would allow a man s ignorance or
obstinacy to stand in the way of his protection
from disease ; so long, indeed, as his insanitary
conditions did not endanger his neighbours.
It is very easy, and in these days very popular,
to criticise Spencer s demand for the self-effacement
of the State. Yet we must not forget that in the
state of knowledge attained when he wrote the
advice was probably better founded than most
people would care to admit. But knowledge
continues to advance in a series of geometrical
progression. Science has at length placed in our
hands weapons for dealing with our environment,
of a potency undreamt of half a century ago.
These mighty weapons cannot be wielded by
private citizens ; they require all the strength,
wealth, and power of the State. If the State does
not wield them, they must remain unused. There
are more cogent arguments for State activity now
than there ever were in Spencer s time. The war
against disease for instance, is not the war of a
class, or of a section, or of a majority of the people.126 HERBERT SPENCER
It is a war of the whole people, and in the imme
diate interests of every citizen in the land. Nor is it
war against any foreign nation, or section, or class
of the people ; it is a war against the common
enemy of all mankind and of every individual
born into the world. And in its mental aspects
it is equally to be desired. For it is not based
upon passion, hate, or jealousy ; it does not
cultivate emotions of violence and disorder. It con
stitutes in itself an object lesson in the power and
beneficence of science
; it leads to a mental elevation
towards general philanthropy rather than to the
anti-social results of war of the mediaeval kind.
It is hard to condemn Spencer s views in our
present state of knowledge, for they have never
been put to the test. The period in history when
they were most nearly realised was perhaps the
most flourishing period of progress that there has
ever been. Yet we must remember that he wrote
for his times, and when public ideals were very
different from what they are now. For the forties
and fifties of last century his theories probably
did represent the best line of social progress. But
Spencer s mind became dogmatic as he grew
older and his theories froze into a solid frame
work which resisted all modification by newer
ideas and by greater knowledge. We cannot admit
that the dogmas of the fifties are the last word in
the science of sociology or in the art of ethics. YetSOCIAL WRITINGS 127
one thing we may with advantage carry forward,
not only into this century, but as a permanent part
of our acquired civilisation. That thing is the ideal
of liberty, which must constitute the background
from which all our social theories and all our
legislation must start. We cannot define it in a
formula, as Spencer attempted to do
; we cannot
establish hard and fast restrictions upon the
activities of the State. Liberty should not be a
dogma, but should constitute the atmosphere of
social and political thought. We may not like
many of the applications of the doctrine of liberty
which were emphasised by Spencer and Mill ;
but that does not invalidate the doctrine itself.
Just as Spencer s own doctrines became hardened
by dogmas and formulae, so there is a danger that
progress in the body politic may be arrested by
laws and formulae which freeze society into its
existing form. The fluidity maintained by free
dom allows the natural changes of social order to
advance unimpeded. It does not tie men to those
particular ideals which are peculiar to any special
age. Only a country which is steadily animated
by the great ideal of freedom can hope to escape
that degeneration of old age which in the body
politic, as in the body physical, comes on by the
slow dissemination of rigidity and unadaptability
throughout the tissues of the organism.CHAPTER VI
GENERAL SUMMARY OF
&quot; THE PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIOLOGY
&quot;
THIS is by far the longest single work written
by Spencer. It occupies three stout volumes, of
which the first alone contains nearly 900 pages.
&quot; THE DATA OF SOCIOLOGY.&quot;
Part i. deals with &quot;The Data of Sociology,&quot;
and occupies in itself 432 pages. The earlier
volumes of the Philosophy are devoted to Organic
Evolution. Spencer now deals with what he calls
Super-Organic Evolution, that is to say, Evolution,
not of single individuals, but of societies con
sisting of many individuals. The factors con
cerned in this super-organic evolution are divisible
(according to Spencer) into two main groups
the external and the internal. The external
factors are such as climate, the surface of the
earth, the fauna and flora. The internal factors
are those arising from the physical, intellectual,
and emotional characteristics of the men and
women who constitute the society in question.
Dealing first with the external factors it is
obvious that social evolution is impossible outside&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 129
certain limitations of heat and cold. The earliest
forms of society arose in hot climates, and in
countries where the means of existence were
abundant ; so that much spare energy was avail
able for social progress. In some countries, such
as India, carnivores and reptiles stood in the
way of evolution. In others, pastoral life may be
prevented by insects, such as the tsetse fly in
Africa, or agricultural life by swarms of insects
which devour the crops.
Turning to the internal factors, we come first
to the physical characteristics of primitive man.
There is, Spencer says, reason to believe that he
was smaller in stature than civilised man, and had a
lower muscular development and physical strength.
His alimentary system, on the other hand, was
larger ; for his food was inferior in quality, and
the supply irregular, demanding a greater capacity
for digesting large amounts when it was available.
On the other hand, he was hardier than civilised
man and much more tolerant of pain. He arrived
earlier at maturity.
Passing to the emotional characteristics of
primitive man, impulsiveness is a striking feature.
Emotion tends to pass straightway into action
;
and the character is inconstant, fickle, and im
provident. ^Sociality is poorly developed, and
regulation of conduct weak. / All the sympathetic
sentiments reach a low development only ; and130 HERBERT SPENCER
the higher forms, such as that of justice, are very
rudimentary. Fixity of habit is very strong
:
there is dislike of novelty ; and the emotional life
flows to the concrete, with little development of
any of the higher or more abstract sentiments.
Intellectually, primitive man resembles the
children of civilised man. Primitive men are
absorbed in sensation and preception to the detri
ment of higher intellectual qualities. Theifjsenses
are more acute than those of the civilised. They
are unable to concentrate their attention for long
on any one thing, but are quickly exhausted*
They have great imitative powers, but low capacity
for generalisation, or for passing beyond the region
of isolated facts. They show little aptitude for
being surprised, and small curiosity ; but on the
other hand are exceedingly credulous, believing
any story, however monstrous, and adopting any
explanation, however absurd.




namely, a theory as to the origin of
the idea of spirits, and of religions in general.
The occurrence of unaccountable events gives rise
to the notion of a general arbitrariness of Nature
;
sudden appearances and disappearances suggest
ing a duality of existence. This suggestion is
fortified by dreams. During sleep primitive man
passes through experiences which he imagines to
be real, He seems to visit various places, and talk&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
):
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to various people, while all the time his friends tell
him his body has been lying still. He thus jumps
to the conclusion of a dual personality
: he thinks
he has aj_soul which has wandered away from his
body and returns when he awakes. The belief
that he has a double is strengthened by observa
tion of his -shadow an intangible, inexplicable
being which seems to accompany him about.
His reflection in still water further bears out the
idea of duality ; and the Basuto will not walk by
a stream, lest a crocodile should seize his shadow
or reflection. In swoon, apoplexy, etc., the double
may depart for longer periods before returning to
the body ; and in death the possibility of its
future return is still entertained.
The double is at first conceived as a facsimile
of the original. It is liable to hunger, thirst, etc.
;
it may have an accident, or it may itself be killed.
On the death of a man food, drink, weapons, etc.,
are buried with him for the use of his double ;
and his wives may be sacrificed for the same
purpose. After a time the number of ghosts thus
originating begins to accumulate, until at length
every unaccountable event is set down to their
instrumentality. Disease is regarded as the work
of a spirit which has taken up its abode in the
patient s body ; and attempts are made to exor
cise it by horrible grimaces, or abominable stenches,
cr by thrashing the patient so that his body should132 HERBERT SPENCER
become an uncomfortable habitat. On the other
hand, they may be dealt with by propitiatory
measures by prayers, offerings, etc.
; from which
arises the practice of worship.
We arrive now at Spencer s final elaboration of
the &quot;Ighost theory,&quot; or the theory that all forms of
religious observances have grown from the |Worship
_of the souls of deceased ancestors. In some cases
it is supposed that the souls of the departed may
inhabit manufactured effigies ; hence the worship
of idols. Or they may enter into other inanimate
objects, giving origin to fetishism. Animal worship
arises in a similar way. Snakes, owls, etc., haunt
ing a house which was inhabited by the deceased
may by a very natural superstition be supposed
to harbour the spirit of the deceased, and may
subsequently come to be worshipped for their own
sake, when the origin of the practice has been
forgotten. The common habit of giving animal
nicknames to chiefs would also generate animal
worship. A powerful chief is supposed to retain
his power, or even to gain an increased power,
after his death. He is therefore an object for
general propitiation. If the chief had been known




Bull,&quot; the propitiation offered in that name
would be supposed by later generations to be
directed to the animals themselves
; for primitive
speech easily lends itself to confusion of this kind.&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY&quot; 133
Hence in Spencer s opinion there would ultimately
arise a genuine animal worship?)
Plant worship and Nature worship have a similar
origin. Worship of the &quot;.Dawn
&quot; would develop,
as above described, from propitiation of the ghost
of a deceased ancestor, who had been so nick
named, possibly because he was born early in the
morning. Worship of the sun is of the same
character, the nickname in this case being due
either to the exalted position of the deceased
warrior, or to a birth name, or to the fact that he
belonged to a conquering family which had first
turned up from the East.
From the idea of ghosts, thus conceived, Spencer
deduces all ideas _of deities, not excluding that of
the Hebrew religion. The deities, at first held to be
exact duplicates of living men, gradually become
more refined and rarefied, till they develop into
the gods of civilised nations. Fasting arises from
the practice of setting apart one s food for the use
of the soul of the departed. Sacrifices, offerings,
etc., are similarly accountable. Temples, altars,
and so on grow from the mounds of earth thrown
over the body of the dead man
; these mounds
being intended either to protect his soul from
wandering carnivores and the accidents of Nature
or to keep his soul securely buried underground
and prevent it from sallying forth to disturb the
lives of younger generations.134 HERBERT SPENCER




of the origin of religious beliefs. Criticism
upon it may take the form of a suggestion that,
while Spencer unquestionably set forward one
and perhaps the most important factor in the
origin of religions, there are probably many
other contributory factors which he failed to
recognise. It is characteristic of his mind to
compel all the facts to conform to the one prin
ciple which filled his attention at the time. Just
as he was prepared to base organic evolution on
one factor only, and that one now held even by
the few who support it to be at most a minor
factor, so he was to such an extent obsessed by
his ghost theory that he was quite incapable of
admitting the existence of any other element.
But a still more cogent line of criticism might be
advanced. Spencer endeavoured to think him
self into the mind of the savage, and thereupon
to argue out the inferences which a savage would
draw from the various phenomena which came
under his observation. And he defends the ghost
theory on the ground that, in the particular intel
lectual state which primitive man had reached, the
&quot;
hypothesis of survival and gods was the most
rational open to him. These superstitions in fact
offered the most logical theory, to the primitive
mind, in explanation of the surrounding universe.
Now it may be argued that the problem is not&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 135
one of logic at all, but of psychology. Men in
general, and especially primitive men, do not
reach their conclusions by any process of intellect
or logic, but by emotional bent. Spencer may
correctly have indicated the process of reasoning
most natural to a primitive man, if they did reason.
In his efforts to read himself into their minds he
has only partially succeeded : he has to some
extent assumed their methods of thought, but to
a greater extent endowed them with his own. He
depicts them rather as miniature Spencers, and
their mythology as a miniature Synthetic Philo
sophy. He has found it impossible, or perhaps
omitted to attempt, to realise the emotional
condition of primitive man. Yet it is one of the
most fundamental truths of psychology that any
emotion tends to call up in imagination objects
which are agreeable to that emotion. A person
suffering from melancholia sees in all the events
of life threats to his safety and happiness. A
person under the influence of powerful fear sees
in his environment nothing but terrifying objects.
If a man is in love with a commonplace woman,
and someone remarks that she possesses some
peculiar virtue, he is very likely to believe it with
out further criticism. If he has the undisciplined
mind of a savage, he is quite certain to believe
it. We now as a nation have a powerful emotion
of dislike to the Germans. If anyone were to136 HERBERT SPENCER
suggest some evil attribute of the German mind,
most of us would receive the suggestion with
acclamation ; but if anyone were to suggest a
noble attribute, we should demand full proof,
and even then should not be very ready to accept
or repeat it. And if we were primitive men the
tendency would be far more overwhelming than
it is. In short, for any undisciplined mind only
two conditions are needed for establishing a belief :
(i) A pre-existent emotion, which the belief
would gratify ; (2) a suggestion. If the suggestion
is in harmony with the emotion or gratifies the
emotion, belief ensues. The suggestion may be of
the most casual and trifling description
:
&quot;
Trifles light as air
Are to the jealous confirmations strong
As proofs of holy
writ.&quot;
Now the state of mind of the savage is pre
dominantly emotional, to an extent which we can
hardly conceive. He knows none of that intel
lectual and critical discipline which is possessed
in some degree by the most ignorant of civilised
men. His emotional condition is one that en
courages every sort of strong conviction ; his
intellectual faculties of criticism are almost absent.
The slightest suggestion that harmonises with
his raw and aboriginal emotions is received with
the most bigoted credulity. The ground is almost
infinitely fertile
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husbandman to rake out the weeds which fall
upon it. The most conflicting and absurd beliefs
are simultaneously entertained, so long as they
satisfy the single condition of being agreeable
to the emotions natural to his constitution.
Under these circumstances it is irrelevant to
inquire, as Spencer did, into the source of the
suggestion which leads the savage to his myth.
The one relevant factor is the emotional state of
mind which makes him ready and eager to embrace
that myth. How it started, how the original
suggestion occurred, is nothing
: the most casual
remark, the most fleeting thought, the whistle
of the wind in the branches of a tree, would suffice.
Anything or nothing
: we can never know, nor
can it ever matter to us. How is it that some card-
players think that luck attends certain seats or a
certain colour of the cards ? It is merely a sug
gestion which, falling on fruitful ground, instantly
generates a tendency to believe. This particular
suggestion has in fact produced a sort of half-
belief in a certain proportion of card-players.
But to explain the superstition we should surely
never enter into a detailed inquiry as to how the
suggestion was first made
; and if we ever could
make the discovery, it would help us not a whit in
comprehending the superstition. For the super
stition is attributable wholly to emotional factors
not to any process of logic or intellect.138 HERBERT SPENCER
And so it is with primitive man. In seeking
the logical antecedents of their myths, Spencer
was after a Will-o -the-wisp. The suggestion which
originally introduced the germ of those myths
must inevitably be lost in obscurity, and in any
case is irrelevant ; for if that particular suggestion
had not occurred, some other closely resembling
it would have served as the starting-point. Many
such must occur even in one ordinary day of
a savage s life. The relevant and fundamental




an emotional ground on which certain kinds of
seeds flourish luxuriously. If we are studying the
reproduction of plants, we do not think it neces
sary to trace the particular pollen-grain which
sets up fertilisation in a given case. It behoves
us only to know from what species or variety of
plant it came. The air is full of such pollen-grains
:
the wind blows them about in unaccountable ways,
and finally one of them lands on a stigma ripe to
receive it, and the rest follows. The precise
journey of the pollen-grain, its isolation from all
other pollen-grains of the same variety, is beside
our point, in addition to being a difficult and
unprofitable investigation.
Spencer then appears to have committed what
may be called a heuristic error of method. The
gods of primitive men are the creations of their
emotions ; and in all cases their gods have the&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
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qualities which excite and enhance those emotions.
A savage is subject to no emotion so constant
as that of fear. Accordingly he entertains a belief
in gods, ghosts, and every sort of supernatural
being, which have this in common that they
instil fear. Feelings of obedience and reverence
are common to many primitive peoples, and are
intensified by the political conditions under which
they live. And these emotions quickly raise up,
from any slight and fortuitous suggestion, super
natural beings which demand and enhance the
tendencies to obedience and reverence. Just as
the roaring lion walks about
&quot;
seeking whom he
may devour,&quot; so the submissive spirit goes about
seeking whom he may obey. The readiness of
the emotions, the total absence of a critical faculty
these are the prerequisites. Then the first
chance suggestion acts like a spark, to start off the
train which develops into the ultimate myth.
Everywhere the type of myth is a certain index of
the state of mind. Jealousy gives rise to a
&quot;
jealous
god.&quot; The tender emotions produce a god of love.
Moral emotions establish a god who enjoins moral
codes, and enforces them by punishments, which
are savage or mild, according as the emotions of
primitive man are cruel or gentle. The emotions are
first : they are part of the physical constitution
of man
; and given the emotions, given the absence
of a critical faculty, the mythology is inevitable.140 HERBERT SPENCER
Spencer s discussion of
&quot; The Data of Socio
logy
&quot; concludes with a chapter on the scope j
of the Science of Sociology. The first division
of the science, according to his treatment, is the
study of Domestic Institutions, with an account
of the result upon social evolution, of the various
forms of domestic life. Next come the three
forms of Regulative Institutions, political, eccle
siastical, and ceremonial, the last of these dealing
with the minor forms of control exercised by
public opinion, finally Industrial and Professional
Organisation have to be dealt with. But before
coming to these main divisions of the work we
have still (in accordance with the general plan of
the Philosophy) to give an account of
&quot; The Indue-





&quot; THE INDUCTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.&quot;
These Inductions take the form of a detailed
comparison between the body politic and the body
&quot;
physical. They constitute a description of the
social organism, with its points of resemblance to
and difference from the individual organism.
The analogy between the two arises from the
single circumstance that in each the different
parts are mutually dependent. In the social
organism this dependence is expressed by division
of labour. In the physical organism there is&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 141
likewise the
&quot;
physiological division of labour
&quot;
:
each organ is developed for the performance of
some special function necessary to the general
life of the organism. The individual, moreover,
consists of a vast aggregation of living cells, just
as the social organism consists of a population of
separate individuals. The most cardinal difference
between the two arises from the fact that whereas,
in the individual, consciousness
( is concentrated in
a small part of the nervous system, in the social
organism it is equally diffused throughout the
whole of the individuals constituting the society.
/Growth is manifested by both kinds of organism ;
and in both it may be effected either by the union
of previously separate organisms, or by interstitial
growth by multiplication of the cells in the one
case, and of the individuals in the other, so as to
increase the size of the body, physical or politic.
In animals of low types, there is very little struc
ture
; organs are lacking, and there is comparative
homogeneity throughout. So it is in societies
of low type ; they are little more than mere
collections of individuals. But as these societies
advance they acquire great heterogeneity and com
plexity corresponding to the heterogeneity and
complexity of evolved animals. In early stages
each individual is comparatively self-sufficient
;
in later stages he becomes differentiated, in so
far that he devotes himself and becomes specially142 HERBERT SPENCER
adapted to one particular kind of work, while
trusting to the remainder of the community
to supply his other needs. Moreover, those
engaged in the same kind of work congregate
in particular places as, for instance, spinners
at Oldham, or cutlers at Sheffield. So, too, in
an animal, cells performing the same function are
aggregated together to form an organ, as, for
instance, the liver. The social organism, like the
individual, can produce offspring in the form of
colonies, which straightway assume the developed
structural characteristics of their parentage.
The first main differentiation to appear in an
evolving society is that between the regulative and
the operative activities. One class, that of the
warriors, becomes adapted to purposes of offence
and defence, as well as of government ; the other
becomes industrial and is devoted to the susten-
tation of the society. In this we see a correspond
ence with animal development. On the one hand
there are the structures for ensuring the safety
and preservation of the animal
; on the other hand
there is the alimentary system for sustaining it.
Between these two there evolves later a distribut
ing system in each.
In the social organism the distributing system
is represented by railways, roads, tracks, etc.,
along which commodities travel from that part
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where they are needed. In animals this function
is carried out by the vascular system,
. which
carries the digested nutriment to all parts of the
body. Even the pulsations in the blood-flow
are paralleled by the alternate increases and
decreases of traffic from hour to hour, day to day,
week to week, etc. Just as the main arterial and
venous vessels are endowed with walls which
sharply limit and define the course of the blood,
so the main railways and roads are sharply marked
off by lines or fences from the surrounding country.
As the blood-vessels become smaller, their routes
become less definite and less rigidly enclosed, until
we reach the capillary vessels which have no
defined path. So in the social distributing agen
cies, the smaller roads are often not fenced and
less sharply marked off from the adjacent land,
until we reach the country paths and tracks which
have neither permanency nor definiteness.
The regulative system consists, in the social
organism, of the governmental-military agencies ;
and in the individual organism of the nervo-
muscular apparatus. The nervous system, like
the governmental agency, consists of a hierarchy of
nervous centres subordinate to one another. The
simpler kind of stimuli are met by an immediate
response of a lower centre, as in reflex action. The
more complex pass up to higher centres, whose
decisions are conveyed by means of nerve fibresH4 HERBERT SPENCER
to the muscles which have to be actuated. These
nerve fibres themselves are analogous to telegraph
wires in the social organism. In primitive animals
an impulse passes slowly from one part to another
as news passes slowly in a primitive society.
With evolution the passage of the impulses
becomes defined by fixed routes and along fixed
structures. In animals the volume of blood
passing along a vessel is controlled by the vaso-
motor nerves which run along the vessel-walls,
and which can produce contraction or expansion
of the lumen of the vessel. So, too, in the social
organism, the railways are accompanied by tele
graph wires, which serve to control and regulate
the amount of traffic which passes. Both nerve and
telegraph wire have to be insulated ; and where
the telegraph is laid underground, the wires are
collected into bundles, each single wire having its
insulating sheath just as nerves in their myelin
sheaths also run in bundles within other sheaths.
After describing thus the analogy between the
individual and social organism, we are introduced
to two modes in which societies may be classified.
According to the first mode, they are arranged
according to their degree of composition as simple,
compound, doubly-compound, and trebly-com
pound. The simple societies are those which are
completely homogeneous, and not formed by the
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compound societies are those formed by the fusion,
mainly as a result of conquest, of two or more
different societies.
The second mode of classification is into the two
groups of military and industrial. The militant
types of society are those in which the structures
of offence and defence are highly developed, and
in which social life is carried on by compulsory
co-operation. The industrial types are those in
which the military predominance is reduced, and
in which social life is carried on by voluntary
co-operation. The militant type is encouraged
and developed by international conflicts and
preparations for war
; the industrial type is a
product of peace. Metamorphoses occur in socie
ties from time to time
; they oscillate from the
one type to the other, according as the times are
of peace or war.
With this doctrine
&quot; The Inductions of Socio
logy
&quot; come to an end
; and we pass to the remain
ing divisions of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology,&quot;
in which we are shown what deductions may be
drawn, in the light of the foregoing principles, and
of the law of evolution.
&quot; DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS.&quot;
The first subject to be dealt with is
&quot; Domestic
Institutions.&quot; Spencer had already shown in146 HERBERT SPENCER
&quot; The Principles of Biology
&quot; that an antagonism
1
exists between individuation and reproduction,
between the interests of parents and the interests
of the species. It follows that the highest con
stitution of the family is that in which the duties \
of parenthood detract least from the individual
lives of the parents. This end is achieved in three
ways by a longer period of life antecedent to
marriage ; by the production of fewer offspring,
which, however, in view of diminished infantile
mortality, is adequate to the requirements of the
species ; and by the lengthening of life, after the
reproductive age has passed.
The primitive relations of the sexes were
characterised by indefmiteness and incoherence.
There are, says Spencer, at first no settled forms of
relationship whatever ; and various primitive races
furnish illustrations of every kind of sexual relation
promiscuity, polyandry, polygyny, and mono
gamy. The practice of exogamy the custom,
that is, of taking a wife from some other tribe than
that to which the man belongs arises among war
like peoples, where the capture of women belonging
to the enemy constitutes a trophy of victory and
valour. From this origin there is established a
strong sentiment in favour of exogamous unions,
and a contempt, rising to moral reprobation, of
marriage within the clan. The custom ultimately
extends to cover union with any woman of a&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
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different tribe, even though not captured in
battle.
[Endogamy, on the other hand, arises, according
to~Spencer, among weaker tribes. If any member
of such a tribe were to seize women of another
tribe, retribution would follow. The tribe from
whom the women had been taken would attack
the tribe of their capturer and bring upon it the
calamities of war. Hence the establishment of a
powerful sentiment in favour of endogamy.
Promiscuity and polyandry are both charac
teristic of primitive peoples. They naturally lead
to a low idea of the family, and are opposed to the
welfare of the children. Doubt as to the paternity
of the children involves the reckoning of inherit
ance through the female line. Polyandry, never
theless, is of service where a paucity of food stands
in the way of rapid multiplication. Polygyny,
or the marriage of one man with several women,
is a higher institution ; for both parents of the
children are known, and, descent being through
the male line, a form of ancestor-worship becomes
possible. In a tribe of warlike habits polygyny is
useful as conducing to a more rapid multiplication,
which makes good the incessant losses among the
warriors of the tribe. Far higher than any of
these forms of union, however, stands monogamy,
which arises when the sexes become more equalised
owing to diminution of war. Whether or not148 HERBERT SPENCER
monogamy is the natural form of human marriage,
it has for a long time past been growing innate in
civilised peoples.
iJPolygyny is the natural form of marriage in
militant societies partly, as already said, owing
to the paucity of warriors and the large demand
for replenishing the population ; partly owing to
the habit of seizing the women of the enemy.
Monogamy, on the other hand, is proper to an
industrial State where, indeed, polygyny is
impracticable, for there is no adequate surplus
in the number of women.
Passing to the social aspects of the family,
Spencer finds that at first there was no settled
headship, any more than there were settled
marital relations. After a time, however, the
patriarchal system appears groups of pastoral
people allied together by kinship, and following
the family chief or patriarch. By coalescence
of several such patriarchal groups compound
societies are formed : all the largest and most
advanced societies have originated in this way.
As the various family groups become more closely
integrated into societies, there takes place an
accompanying disintegration within each family.
The unit of the State, which at first was the
family, becomes at length the individual. It
seems, Spencer adds, that this break-up of the family
has in some cases already gone too far. There is,&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 149
however, a sharp distinction between family-
ethics and State-ethics. In families it is necessary
that each individual should receive attention in
proportion to his incapacity ; for this is obviously
essential with children at different ages. In the
State, however, the law must be that each indi
vidual receives a reward that is proportionate to
his merit and ability. Much mischievous legis
lation arises from a confusion of the two.
An inquiry into the \status of women and of
children elicits the truth that their status is low in
proportion as the society is militant, and high in
proportion as it is industrial. Polygyny, which,
as already seen, is associated with militancy,
involves a low status of women, because they are
compelled to do the servile work. Moreover, the
despotic modes of government prevalent in mili
tant societies are associated with despotic modes of
government within the family itself. The status
both of women and children regularly improves
as the compulsory co-operation of militant societies




with a chapter on
&quot; Domestic Retrospect and
Prospect
&quot;
in the course of which it is fore
shadowed that as societies pass more and more
from a military to an industrial state the system
of monogamy will be further extended and
strengthened, though it will be made to rest uponISO HERBERT SPENCER
the tie of affection rather than a tie of law. The
status of women will at the same time continue to
be raised. Their social disabilities will be removed,
although for the present it is undesirable that
they should attain a political equality with men :
partly because they do not bear the military
responsibilities which belong to men, and partly
because they are more devoted to authority,
and less affected by the higher sentiments of
justice and freedom ; so that entire political
equality is undesirable until the complete stage
of industrialism has been attained.
&quot; CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS.&quot;
We now reach the seconcL_yolume of
&quot; The
Principles of Sociology,&quot; which opens with an
investigation into
&quot; Ceremonial Institutions.&quot;)
These constitute the earliest form of control of
human conduct from which are derived those more
definite forms of control exercised by State and^j
Church. Moreover, although they appear now to
be entirely arbitrary, they all, in Spencer s opinion,
take their origin from some act of real utility.
Advancing towards the enemy carrying the green
boughs of a tree has, for instance, come to be
recognised as a sign of pacific intentions
; but the
custom first arose from the desire to show that no
weapons were being carried a fact which the
enemy would be unable to see, unless something&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 151
else were carried which precluded the holding of
a weapon. In general, ceremonial observances
emanate from the relations of the conquered to
the conqueror. Trophies possessed by a warrior
symbolise his prowess in fighting the enemy ;
and from trophy-taking arise the various customs
of mutilation. The victor, instead of slaying his
opponent and then cutting off some part of his
body as a trophy, spares his life but still mutilates
him to preserve a record of his victory. At length
mutilation comes to be a symbol of subservience ;
and it is practised in order to propitiate not
only living chiefs, but also the dead chiefs who
have become deified. Circumcision arose in this
way, and not for the reasons commonly alleged.
Furthermore, the sacrifice either to a god or man
of some part of the body is supposed to endow the
recipient with peculiar supernatural powers over
the individual mutilated.
The custom of giving presents likewise originates,
according to Spencer, in a desire to propitiate.
When these presents are laid by the tomb of the
dead we have the rudiments of religious sacrifice.
The presents of meat, drink, clothes, etc., at length
becomes a purely ceremonial and arbitrary practice,
from which springs the whole system of the Church
revenues. And just as presents to gods are the origin
of ecclesiastical revenues, so presents to living rulers
are the origin of political revenues. The custom of152 HERBERT SPENCER
visiting originates from that of giving presents ;
for such presents involve the necessity of carrying
them to the recipient. Obeisances were originally
modes of expressing submission to a conqueror
by prostration before him ; and also of professing
pleasure at his presence. All forms of obeisance
and greetings are derived by abbreviation of the
original prostration, as, for instance, in kneeling
down while at prayer. Submission involved,
moreover, the handing over of all one s possessions,
including even clothes, to the conqueror. Naked
ness is an original symbol of subordination ; and
by gradual curtailment and refinement we arrive
at the custom in civilised society of taking off one s
hat to indicate respect. The ruler is further pro
pitiated by kissing, at first his feet, then his hands.
The modern shake of the hands is derived from a
simultaneous attempt of each individual to raise
the other s hand to his mouth in order to kiss it,
counteracted by the attempt of the other to refuse
this sign of humility. The various forms of address
are similarly derived from propitiatory formulae,
some of which indeed still preserve traces of their
origin, as in the termination of a letter by
&quot; Your
obedient servant.&quot;
Spencer carried his passion for logical origins
to an explanation of titles. An individual was
known by some peculiarity in his appearance, and
the title thence bestowed upon him developed&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 153
into a proper name. The title
&quot;
god,&quot; for instance,
was at first associated with the meaning
&quot;
father.&quot;
Titles, moreover, tend to become degraded by
constant application to a larger group of indi




first a title limited to rulers. As it gradually
became extended to larger classes of persons,
seigneur, abbreviated into sieur, took its place as
a form of respect. This again was extended to more
and more people, till monsieur was introduced
to fulfil its original meaning. This also has
now become universalised, as has the English
&quot;
esquire.&quot;
Badges, again, are said by Spencer to be
descended from trophies. The military flag or ensign
is derived from a spear which very commonly carried
upon it some decoration. It was found convenient
for the spear of the commander to bear some par
ticularly conspicuous decoration, so that his men
might know where he was ; and hence is derived
the coloration of flags. The wearing of clothes,
moreover, was originally adopted to gain admira
tion more particularly as nudity was a symbol of
subjection. The various signs of class distinction
similarly spring from origins of a significant and
not an arbitrary character. Fashion is based
upon imitation. The imitation is in part propi
tiatory, as where subjects imitate their ruler,
and partly competitive ; each class endeavouring154 HERBERT SPENCER
to elevate itself by imitating the procedure of those
of higher rank.
Regarding ceremonial institutions as a whole,
Spencer finds that their development is most con
spicuous in militant societies and least conspicuous
in industrial societies. In militant societies the
restraints imposed by ceremony are powerful and
widespread. The regime of compuslory co-opera
tion naturally lends itself to this fundamental
class of restrictions on freedom. Fashion alone,
in so far as it is based upon a demand for equality,
is an offshoot of the industrial system. Militant
societies are eminently characterised by profound
obeisances, elaborate forms of address, etc., etc.
;
in mixed societies these usages still obtain most
among the ruling and military classes. As the
industrial type of society continues to supersede
the militant type, we may anticipate a progressive
disuse of all these ceremonial forms. The change,
however, should take place gradually ; for only
as human nature becomes more perfect can it






Spencer now passes on
to
&quot; Political Institutions.&quot; At the outset a
warning is given against importing prejudice into
our investigations. We must be prepared to find&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 155
that certain kinds of political institutions which
we hold in deep abhorrence have nevertheless
contributed in the past to the formation and
integration of complex societies.
The benefits of social life arise from the fact of
co-operation, different duties being undertaken
by the different elements of the society. This
co-operation is of two main kinds voluntary
and compulsory. Voluntary co-operation is that
which results without any conscious intention,
but entirely from the pursuit by individuals of
their own private interests. Compulsory co-ope
ration is a form of organisation established by
agencies of Government : it is with this form of
co-operation that political institutions are con
cerned. The existence of any established form of
organisation is valuable as maintaining order in
the community, but constitutes an obstacle in
the way of progress or change, and hinders growth.
The growth or integration of societies is deter
mined by various conditions. It begins when one
tribe robs another of its women, or captures and
enslaves its men. It proceeds by enslavement
and annexation on a larger scale. It is, however,
limited by various circumstances, such as the
physical character of the country and its capacity
for holding large social groups. Moreover, the
amount of cohesion in a society is dependent
upon the homogeneity of its component parts.156 HERBERT SPENCER
A society composed of groups of divergent charac
teristics will hold loosely together and easily
become disintegrated ; whereas a firmer cohesion
will be attained where the individuals are com
paratively alike. The main cause of political and
social integration, however, is war. Where several
tribes unite for the purpose of carrying on a war,
they become habituated to constant organisation
and control, and therefore more fitted to constitute
a coherent group. The enforced union, established
by military organisation, involves a loss of indi
vidual freedom
; which is not restored until that
later period of development, when the voluntary
co-operation of the industrial State is adequate
to take the place of the compulsory co-operation
of the militant State.
Dealing with political differentiation, class-
divisions are found to exist at the beginnings of
social life. They first exhibit the form of a subor
dination of women. Then a slave class is formed
by captures from neighbouring tribes. When the
agricultural stage is reached, it becomes possible
to conquer an entire people as well as the land
which they inhabit : the conquered people then
become serfs ; and it is not the case that serfdom
is a mitigated form of slavery. The militant class,
being by force of arms the dominant class, acquire
possession of the land
; and the connection
between militancy and landownership survives&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 157
through long stages of social evolution. The
various class differences thus initiated become
confirmed and strengthened by habit
; each grade
becomes habituated to its own surroundings.
The chief factor in the break-up of these class
distinctions is the rise of industrialism, under
which wealth accruing to various members of
the proletariat establishes a competition with the
power of the militant classes. Moreover, as the
wealth of industry is not based upon subordination
of classes, but upon free contract, the factor
leading to subordination gradually weakens. As
Sir Henry Maine put it, the regime of contract
follows and takes the place of the regime of
status.
From the earliest times political organisation
shows signs of a triple division. In a primitive
tribe, when some public question, perhaps of
defence or of migration, has to be decided, a con
ference would take place of all the individuals of
the tribe. The great majority of these, however,
would be listeners rather than speakers. The
actual discussion would be carried on by a certain
number of the older or more distinguished warriors,
who would thus come to form a sort of oligarchy
possessing more influence and power than the
rest. Among these, again, there would most likely
be one who had greater influence than any other,
and would in course of time come to be regarded158 HERBERT SPENCER
as the chief of the tribe. We find, therefore, the
germs of a general assembly, a council, and a
king ; and, according to the conditions in which
the society is placed, one or other of these elements
becomes the preponderant power. Nevertheless
the force, which resides behind the political
forms whatever they may be, is always the same
namely, popular sentiment. The power of a
king, however absolute, consists in the correlative
orientation of the minds of his subjects. Des
potism, as much as democracy, is a product of the
mental attitude of the people who live under it.
Passing now to the separate elements of this
universal triune organisation, the evidence shows
that the primitive political head is either a pre
eminent warrior or pre-eminent medicine-man.
At first the headship is unsettled ; but as the
hereditary principle becomes recognised the king
ship becomes more stable. The idea that departed
chiefs have become gods, who continue to exercise
power over the fortunes of men, naturally causes
special reverence to be devoted to their sons. The
autocracy thus established, notwithstanding its
evils, is a factor very favourable for the integration
or closer union of the governed people. Com
pound political heads or directive councils are
likewise formed when several tribes unite for
purposes of military co-operation. The essential
fact in all kinds of society, however, is that the&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 159
structure of the society was not consciously or
purposely established, but that it evolved or grew
by natural processes to its ultimate state, without
any conscious endeavour of its own.
Consultative and representative bodies are next
considered ; and the conclusion is reached that
the former have evolved from the primitive council
of war, while the latter begin to flourish when wars
cease to be chronic and the industrial regime
develops. The evolution of military systems is
shown to be towards a gradual decrease of the
proportion of the society devoted to military
pursuits, starting from the time when the whole
society constituted an army and the non-com
batant sections were exclusively occupied in the
sustenance of the warriors. At the same time, the
army, reduced greatly in size, becomes a standing
army, instead of being disbanded at the conclusion
of war. Moreover, military organisation within
the army gradually increases. In the primitive
kind of battles fighting consisted merely of a vast
number of duels between individual soldiers of
the contending tribes ; and the leaders themselves
were mainly occupied during a battle in individual
combats.
Judicial and executive systems have arisen
from the primitive gatherings of people, head-men,
and chief ; laws originate from the supposed
commands of deceased ancestors, and were thus160 HERBERT SPENCER
formerly of the nature of religious precepts.
Property has passed from a state of communal
ownership to a state of individual ownership as the
industrial system has gradually supplanted the
military system. Revenue has a two-fold origin.
Direct taxation, as shown in
&quot; Ceremonial Insti
tutions,&quot; is derived from propitiatory and volun
tary offerings, which ultimately became permanent
and compulsory. Indirect taxation arose from
the habit of taking from traders a portion of their
goods in return for permission to trade. These
contributions were also at first voluntary offerings
of the traders
; but subsequently the Government
adopted the practice of seizing them as a right.






exhibit one or other of two main and fundamentally
opposed types the militant type and the indus
trial type. The militant type, characterised by
universal compulsory co-operation, in the highest
degree subordinates the individual to the State.
The entire community is divided into the army and
the non-combatants who sustain the army ; and
the tendency is to increase the army and reduce
the non-combatant section to the farthest prac
ticable limit. The form of government in militant
societies is typically despotic. The nation, both
combatant and non-combatant, is governed by
a hierarchy of officers ; and obedience is held to&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 161
be one of the highest virtues. Patriotism reaches
a high level in militant societies. Loyalty and
faith in personal agencies are likewise indispensable,
and very highly valued. The citizen is regarded as
the property of the State, which regulates his
life down to small details. There is great rigidity
in the body politic, and obstacles in the way of
changing social position, occupation, or locality.
There is a tendency for the State to do everything,
and for the consequent suppression of private
organisations. The militant society tends to be
self-supporting ; for its constant hostility to sur
rounding societies requires it to produce for itself
all that it needs. Protection is a natural result of
this policy.
Various civilised and uncivilised peoples are
named as illustrating the militant type. Among
modern civilised societies Russia is especially
referred to. Wars invariably tend to strengthen
the military type, and peace to weaken it. In
illustration of this truth Germany is cited ; and
attention is drawn to the rapid growth of militarism
in many different spheres of political life as a
result of her wars. The same tendency is noted in
England.
The industrial type of society presents a strong
contrast to the militant type. An accurate
description of it is hindered by the fact that all
modern societies are to some extent militant,162 HERBERT SPENCER
and it is not possible, therefore, to exemplify
the characters of a purely industrial State. The
type to which the most industrial and least mili
tant States tend, however, is as follows : Corpo
rate activity by the State as a whole is much less
conspicuous. A despotic government is absolutely
excluded. A high degree of individual liberty is
reached complete liberty, indeed, limited only by
the prohibition of aggression on others. Such
orders as are issued, or laws as are passed, are
negative rather than positive
: they prohibit
certain actions by citizens, but do not lay upon
the citizens any injunctions for positive action.
Government is on the representative principle,
but its functions are practically reduced to the
maintenance of order and justice. There is no
state charity or artificial distribution of benefits :
there is, on the other hand, a very wide extension
of private organisations for carrying on much
work which in semi-militant societies is often in
the hands of the Government. The regime of
status is replaced entirely by the regime of contract,
compulsory co-operation by voluntary co-opera
tion. Resulting from these features, the industrial
State shows a relative plasticity, determined by
the principle that the efficient win the rewards
of life. A further tendency is towards the disso
lution of the idea of nationality freedom of trade
between nations leading to a more or less common&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
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organisation running through them all. It is
shown how nations in modern times have advanced
towards this ideal from their more militant
condition in mediaeval times.
It has already been observed that the constitu
tion of any society is a function of the characters
of the individuals composing it. Hence we must
expect to find militant societies composed of
persons of quite different natures from those
typical of industrial societies. The typical member
of a militant society identifies virtue with bravery
and strength
: he regards revenge, especially in
public matters, as a duty ; and the deadening of
sympathies consequent upon war produces a state
of selfishness in peace. Patriotism and loyalty
are powerful sentiments in such a man. Obedience
is regarded as one of the highest virtues. Faith
in authority engenders a low development of
initiative, and an abundant belief in the extension
of official control.
The typical member of an industrial society,
on the other hand, is characterised by wholly
different qualities. He is devoid of feelings of
revenge, and he is full of humane sentiment,
causing him to respect the rights of others. He is
extremely independent and has a high regard for
personal liberty. His loyalty and patriotism are
less marked : he has little faith in authority, but
is of enterprising and inquiring disposition.164 HERBERT SPENCER
After dealing with the militant and industrial




&quot; which terminates with
a speculation as to the future political condition
if societies continue to evolve to their highest
stage. According to this speculation, the office
of head of the State will decline in importance and
will be filled by election. Government will be
carried on perhaps by one or two Chambers elected
in one way or other. The form of government is
likely to vary, while the substance is not. Under
any political form State functions will be brought
within extremely narrow limits the maintenance
of justice and internal order. The other functions
now carried on by Government will be taken over
by private organisations, which will be far more
numerous and extensive than at present. But
above all, and far more important than all, is the
cessation of war. Only through permanent peace
can the highest social evolution be attained
; and
every outbreak of war sets back the progress and
improvement of political institutions. On this
theme, the second volume of
&quot; The Principles of
Sociology
&quot; comes to an end.
Yet we cannot feel that the propositions formu
lated are altogether beyond criticism. Spencer
attempts no analysis of the general causes of war
and militancy ; nor does he make any reference
to that deep instinct in human nature which causes&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY&quot; 165
warfare periodically to break out. Subsequent
progress makes it appear doubtful whether the
industrial regime is really accompanied with all
the virtues attributed to it by Spencer. The facts
with which we have to deal are complex to the
last degree
: the thread of principle which Spencer
runs through them seems too simple and elementary
to unite them all in one. His method may perhaps
once again be impugned
: a superficial survey of
the customs of primitive peoples is scarcely an
adequate foundation for so large a generalisation
More psychological analysis is needed
; and
probably our knowledge of psychology is yet
insufficient. Everywhere Spencer s anti-military
bias is apparent ; and, however strongly we may
share that bias, we must attempt rigidly to exclude
it from influencing our speculations. When all
his theories are in strong support of the sentiments
with which we know he originally set out, our
suspicions are inevitably excited. Probably our
most scientific attitude in the present state of
knowledge is to confess that the whole subject is
as yet insufficiently illuminated to enable us to
draw any very certain conclusions at all.
&quot; ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS.&quot;
The third volume of
&quot; The Principles of
Sociology
&quot;
opens with an account of
&quot; Ecclesias
tical Institutions.&quot; The ghost theory is once166 HERBERT SPENCER
again recapitulated ; and special emphasis is laid
on the proposition that if all forms of religious
worship are derived from the propitiation of
deceased ancestors, the same must hold good
with regard to that form which is embodied in
Christianity. The Jahveh of the Old Testament
means
&quot; the strong one
&quot; &quot; a man of war.&quot;
Originally a local potentate, he came to be wor
shipped after his death as one of the most powerful
spirits of past chiefs.
As soon as the belief in spirits and gods becomes
established, there springs up a class of men whose
duty it is to act as intermediary between them
and people still living. This class is that of the
medicine-men and priests. The medicine-men
deal with spirits by antagonistic measures, such
as exorcism, etc. ; the priests by propitiatory
measures. The medicine-man frightens away or
deceives the spirit by various ruses ; the priest
worships and persuades. With the death of a
chief or head of a family the duty of propitiating
his ghost and attending to its supposed wants
devolves upon his descendants, and especially
upon his eldest male descendant. It thus happens
that in primitive times the ruler and the priest are
combined in one individual. As the ruler becomes
more powerful, and his duties more numerous, he is
compelled to delegate many of his functions, and he
appoints, Spencer continues, some other member ofTHE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
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his family to propitiate his departed ancestry.
As families and societies become welded together
to form larger groups, a great number of gods are
recognised by the various sections of each group ;
and an ecclesiastical class is constituted out of
those who have been specially delegated to the
service of these gods. The state of polytheism
thus arising will by various natural processes
develop towards monotheism. One of the gods
worshipped acquires a gradual ascendancy over
the rest
; and his adherents include an in
creasing proportion of the community, some
of whom perhaps have been dissatisfied with
the assistance received from their own private
gods.
An ecclesiastical organisation, once formed,
develops on lines similar to the political organisa
tion the one being supported by reverence for
the dead, and the other by reverence for the living.
Monasticism takes a place also in ecclesiastical
institutions. The habit of giving clothes and all
sorts of goods in propitiation of the dead generates
the custom of asceticism. For these donations
involve discomfort to the giver
: discomfort
comes, therefore, to be associated with sanctity,
and to be pursued for its own sake. On this thesis
it may be remarked that modern inquiries seem
to indicate a much deeper organic cause for asce
ticism. Spencer s perennial search for a logical168 HERBERT SPENCER
origin blinds him to the truth that the origin is
psychological.
Ecclesiastical institutions, he goes on, have gone
hand in hand with political institutions in advanc
ing social integration. For they have supplied a
further incentive to obedience and self-restraint,
which have facilitated that compulsory co-opera
tion which is a necessary discipline on the way to
voluntary co-operation. The priest class have,
moreover, commonly furthered military activities,
and thus assisted in social evolution in the past.
At first the Church and State are one. By degrees
they begin to be differentiated ; and where the
belief in the supernatural is strong the Church
becomes predominant. With the rise of indus
trialism and a resulting decline of belief in the
supernatural, however, the main power passes to
the State, and the Church becomes subordinate.
The same cause, producing a dislike of authority,
leads at last to Nonconformity of various kinds,
and to a demand for Disestablishment. The
essence of Nonconformity is rebellion against the
authority of the priesthood.
From the moral point of view, Spencer asserts
that the priesthood has been useful in the past by
fostering the spirit of conservatism in social arrange
ments by inculcating obedience and by assisting
the regime of coercion. These advantages, however,
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For a system of ethics then arises that is inde
pendent of a theological foundation : the priests
nevertheless continue to impress moral laws, not
because they are intrinsically moral, but as a
matter of obedience to authority. And thus they
are in various respects inimical to true morality,
especially in their tendency to foster the revenge
ful and military spirit of humanity.
Looking to the future of ecclesiastical institu
tions, we are not to suppose that they will entirely
disappear, although they are likely to alter very
widely that sacerdotal element which they now
exhibit. It is probable, however, that meetings
will continue to be held among the people for the
purpose, not of worship, but of contemplating the
mysteries of the Unknown Power at the back of
the universe. Such contemplation may be carried
out to the accompaniment of music, and will serve
to take men out of the material routine of their
daily lives. Sermons may also be delivered dealing
with the proper conduct of life in all its branches,
but those who act as ministers will be completely
devoid of any sacerdotal character.
Passing from the ecclesiastical prospect to the
religious prospect, Spencer anticipates that the
idea of a God will lose all its anthropomorphic
characters, until nothing remains but a belief in
an Unknowable Power which is the cause and
origin of the universe and all things in it. It does170 HERBERT SPENCER
not follow that because more primitive ideas of
a deity are false therefore the highly refined belief
in an Unknowable First Cause is also false. On
the contrary, it is the germ of truth which has
run through and found expression in all forms
of religion. Science, says Spencer, does not dis
sipate religious beliefs ; for it confirms and places
on a footing of the highest certainty the truth that
we are
&quot; in presence of an Infinite and Eternal
Energy, from which all things proceed.&quot;
l
&quot; PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS.&quot;
The next division of





tions.&quot; The various groups of institutions hither
to dealt with are concerned with the security
or regulation of social life. The professions, on
the other hand, are concerned with the augmen
tation of social life
; they are directed towards
the enhancement of the value and fulness of life.
All the professional institutions have evolved in
course of time from ecclesiastical institutions,
however widely different many of them may now
appear. Spencer proceeds to consider the origin
and development of each one in turn.
The physician is descended from the medicine
man of primitive communities ; and, as already
pointed out, the medicine-man and the priest are
1 This doctrine is criticised in Chapter VIII., dealing with Spencer s
Metaphysics.&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
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originally one. The primitive belief about diseases
is that they are due to an evil spirit, or possession
by a devil
; and the means for curing diseases
depend upon driving away the spirit. Hence the
medicine-man resorts to procedure for the purpose
of making the spirit uncomfortable in its human
habitat, by thrashing or scorching the patient, etc.,
or by giving him foul drugs
&quot;
dung of elephant,
the left foot of a tortoise, liver of a mole, powdered
excrement of rats, etc.&quot; Even in our own day there
survives a belief in an association between the
curative powers of a medicine and the nastiness of
its taste. Barber-surgeons grew up at a much later
date, and were secular long before the physicians
became secular. The idea was that surgeons dealt
with those injuries that were naturally caused and
physicians with those that were supernaturally
caused.
The next profession dealt with is that of dancer
and musician. When the chief of a savage tribe
returns from a successful war his joyful people
come forth to meet him ; and their emotions find
vent in saltatory and vocal activities : here we
find the germ of dancing and music. From being
practised before the living ruler, they come to be
practised before the deceased ruler or god, and
thus acquire an ecclesiastical significance. After
a time a special group of priests would become
differentiated for this purpose and acquire special172 HERBERT SPENCER
skill. Singing and dancing, at first practised
together, would also become differentiated and a
special class formed for the conduct of each.
By degrees these professions would become secu
larised instead of being limited to religious
matters.
Orator and poet, actor and dramatist, have
similar beginnings. They all arise, according to
Spencer, from a single origin in the man who re
counts the deeds of departed warriors and utters
eulogies on their ghosts. His record of heroic
achievements would often be accompanied with
mimicry of their various exploits. With gradual
evolution the orator and actor, the poet and
dramatist, become differentiated from one another
and lose the marks of their religious origin. The
biographer, historian, and man of letters obviously
originate from the same germ
: fiction develops
at a later period from biography ; and all these
professions become secularised.
The medicine-man who has to exorcise diseases
naturally seizes any opportunity of acquiring
knowledge which may help him in his art. He
alone has the necessary leisure and opportunity
for acquiring such knowledge. Hence arise the
philosopher and man of science the one studying
abstract, and the other concrete knowledge.
These professions similarly become secularised,
and, indeed, ultimately come into opposition with&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
J;
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their ecclesiastical parentage. As the priests are
the possessors of knowledge, they become likewise
the teachers of youth ; and the relation between
parson and schoolmaster still subsists to some
degree among ourselves. They also become the
arbiters of law
; for in its origin law was the sup
posed commands of the ghosts of the dead. The
different occupations of judges, lawyers, etc.,
become gradually distinct as law slowly ceases
to be ecclesiastical.
The architect, says Spencer, likewise originated
from the priest. Mounds, temples, etc., were erected
over the bodies of the dead, either to ensure their
preservation from accidents, or as a mark of
honour. Architecture, beginning in this way, slowly
became secularised like the other professions, and
now occupies the energies of a specialised class. But
even earlier than the origin of architecture, it was
customary to make effigies of the dead, into which
their ghosts might enter if they should feel disposed,
and which, consequently, often served as idols.
From the manufacture of these effigies sculpture
was developed. In order to give the effigy
a more realistic appearance, it was commonly
painted ; and it was only by degrees that
sculpture and painting were separated and
developed into two different arts. The ancient
cave paintings found in various countries are
not the ancestry of modern painting, which,174 HERBERT SPENCER
on the contrary, has, in Spencer s opinion, a purely
ecclesiastical origin.
Although painting was therefore limited at first
to figures, a period arose when several figures were
represented together with a landscape as a back
ground. By degrees the lansdcape began to be
painted for its own sake, though it is only in
modern times that the figures have been altogether
dropped out. Even now it is common to include
representations of living animals.
Regarding the evolution of the professions as a
whole, Spencer points out how they conform to the
main law of evolution established in
&quot;
First Prin
ciples.&quot; From an indefinite homogeneity they
gradually attain a definite heterogeneity. They
were at first confused together painting with sculp
ture, music with dancing, oratory with poetry and
drama, etc. ; and all of them were practised by
the priest. But ultimately each becomes sharply
differentiated from the rest and forms the occu
pation of a special class.
From this study we should learn how social
evolution is achieved without conscious purpose,
but purely through the pursuit by each individual
of what he conceives to be his own interests.
Practically the whole organisation of society has
arisen as a result of the pursuit by citizens of their
own private ends. Yet politicians systematically
ignore this immensely significant truth
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think that social evolution may be turned this
way or that by merely passing laws, ordering
people to do what they imagine ought to be done :
they insist upon the superstition that society may
be manufactured by carefully arranged measures,
and will not recognise that it is a natural growth.
Social schemers remain blind to the plainest lessons
of sociological inquiries.
&quot; INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTIONS.&quot;
After drawing this moral, Spencer passes to
the final division of
&quot; The Principles of Sociology,&quot;
dealing with
&quot; Industrial Institutions.&quot; In an
introductory chapter it is pointed out that social
evolution, which at first moves exceedingly slowly,
gradually advances with increasing velocity.
&quot; The
power of the evolving influences augments in a
duplicate ratio, the power of the opposing influ





at length the speed has become such that the
improvements which science and enterprise have
achieved during this [last] century, are greater
in amount than those achieved during all past
centuries put together.&quot;
The main features of division of labour are
next described. The earliest and most natural
form of division of labour was that between the
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of labour between different localities as, for
instance, cutlery at Sheffield, cotton-spinning
at Oldham, etc. Local division of labour is
that division which takes place within the same
locality ; and the
&quot; detailed
&quot; division refers to the
small specialisations within a single establishment.
Division of labour is also simultaneous and suc
cessive : a single product may, for instance, be
passed through a succession of different processes,
or it may be combined with other products simul
taneously manufactured.
In social evolution property is first obtained by
acquisition or conquest of others. Production
by labour gradually supersedes acquisition ; for
without production there is only a narrow range
of objects worth the trouble of acquisition. The
production is at first directed towards satisfaction
of the strongest needs. Originally purely manual,
it passes after a time into the stage of domestic
animals ; and with higher civilisation this stage
again gives place to the era of machinery.
Production and distribution in early times were
not distinct. The man who had made an article
himself got into touch with another man who
required it ; and a common means for effecting
the transference was through the agency of fairs.
Exchange was a form of barter
; and barter, as
already described, arose from the habit of giving
presents for propitiatory purposes. Money was&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 177
introduced at a much later stage. It was intro
duced in various different forms : cattle were used
very commonly for the purposes of money (whence
the term
&quot;
impecunious &quot;). In more recent times
&quot;
promises to pay
&quot; written on paper have to a
large extent taken the place of metallic money ;
and there has been in effect a resumption of a
form of barter where goods only are exchanged,
and the financial transaction is limited to entries
in account-books, the two sides of which generally
balance.
The interdependence and integration of indus
trial institutions with advancing evolution are
next considered. The production of any article
requires the co-operation of many different appli
ances in one machine, and often of various different
machines. In the manufacture of newspapers,
for instance, one machine has to manufacture the
paper, another prints upon it, while others again
cut it into separate sheets and fold it up. It is not
usual to make the paper at the same place where
the printing is done
; but, in the absence of
impediments, it might be arranged that at one end
of the united machines there was supplied a stream
of wet pulp, while at the other there were delivered
the printed and folded newspapers.
The evolution of this complicated system of
industrial interdependence without any conscious
purpose, but purely through the pursuit by178 HERBERT SPENCER
citizens of their private ends, furnishes another
opportunity for criticism of the social schemer,
who imagines that industrial evolution is the result
of direct governmental interposition.
&quot; A fly
seated on the surface of the body has about as
good a conception of its internal structure as one
of these schemers has of the social organisation in
which he is imbedded.&quot;
Dealing next with the regulation of labour, it
is shown that coercive industrial regulation is
allied to coercive political regulation. Whi&_lhe
greatest freedom haft been attflfced in political
institutions, there is least interference with labour
and, industrial institutions. Passing to slavery,
it is shown that this form of compulsory labour is
very general among all races, and that it is proper
to communities which live in a constant state of
war. Trade unionism is considered : the benefits
which it has brought are recognised, but the
tyranny which it is now so ready to exercise is
warmly condemned. Co-operation is then dealt
with the conclusion reached being that, though
excellent in principle, it demands a higher type of
human nature than is at all common at the present
time. Success, therefore, is only likely to be
achieved where the co-operative community is
very select.
Socialism is biologically fatal and psychologi
cally absurd. Under the normal and healthy&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 179
system, rewards are apportioned to deserts : the
inefficient are poorly provided for. If, however,
a Socialistic arrangement rewards people according
to their needs and not according to their merits,
it follows that the least efficient part of the com
munity will be able to multiply like the rest,
leading in course of time to a society composed of
inefficients. Socialism, moreover, is psychologically
absurd in its assumption that men will work as
hard in the abstract interests of the community as
they will in pursuance of their own interests.
An attempt is next made to prophesy the course
of public affairs in the near future. The result
of the inquiries embodied in
&quot; The Principles of
Sociology
&quot; shows that the most fundamental
differences between societies are those which
depend upon the relative positions of the indi
vidual and the State. In recent European history
there was manifest a continual encroachment of
the State upon the freedom of the individual.
This encroachment, Spencer continues, took two
forms the first, military, typified by France
and Germany with their systems of conscription,
and the enormous taxation in those as well as in
our own country for the maintenance of military
armaments ; the second, Socialistic, likewise far
more prominent in France and Germany than in
Great Britain. Militarism and Socialism are two
aspects of the same spirit
: they both implyi8o HERBERT SPENCER
compulsory instead of voluntary co-operation,
though they aim at different results. The further
growth of the military and communistic spirits
are foreshadowed in the near future. Recollecting
the doctrine of the rhythm of motion established
in
&quot;
First Principles,&quot; we cannot expect that
social evolution will continue smoothly along its
destined path. It proceeds rather by a succession
of steps forward, with many retrogressive steps
intervening. After centuries of decline in coercive
rule, there was reached in the middle of last cen
tury in England
&quot; a degree of individual freedom
greater than ever before existed since nations began
to be formed. Men could move about as they
pleased, work at what they pleased, trade with
whom they pleased.&quot; A return movement, how
ever, had set in
; freedom was diminished every
year by new legislation, and by the ever-increasing
burdens of armaments. But the reaction, how
ever long it may last, will ultimately give way to
a renewed period of progress, and to the attainment
of a more perfect freedom, in proportion as human
nature itself becomes more perfect.
&quot; The ulti
mate man will be one whose private requirements
coincide with public ones. He will be that manner
of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own
nature, incidentally performs the functions of a
social unit ; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil
his own nature by all others doing the like.&quot;CHAPTER VII
GENERAL SUMMARY OF
&quot; THE PRINCIPLES OF
ETHICS
&quot;
WE now reach the final division of the Synthetic
Philosophy, and that division which was regarded
by Spencer himself as the most important part of
the whole undertaking. It opens, in consonance
with the general plan of the Philosophy, with a
part on
&quot; The Data of Ethics.&quot;
&quot; THE DATA OF ETHICS.&quot;
It is clear from the beginning that only a certain
part of human conduct has any ethical or moral
colouring, and that very many of the activities of
mankind are neither moral nor immoral, and
therefore do not fall within the scope of Ethics.
Taking the activities of animals as a whole, it is
found that they may be divided into the two classes
of those which have and those which have not a
purpose ; and the higher we climb up the scale of
evolution the more do the purposive activities of
animals predominate over the unpurposive. A
low organism swims or floats about at random in
the water, and depends for its food on the chance
contact of suitable materials. A higher animal
adopts definite activities for the purpose of obtain-182 HERBERT SPENCER
ing food
; its movements are guided far more by
direct reference to the end in view. It is this
purposive kind of activity only that is comprised
within the name of conduct
; and the improve
ment of conduct is nothing else than the better
adjustment of means to end.
Evolution of conduct therefore implies, accord
ing to Spencer, a progress in those kinds of activi
ties which favour the preservation of life. There
are three different ends to which the activities may
be directed : life of the individual, as in the instance
above-named, life of the species, as illustrated by
care of offspring, etc. ; and lastly social life, avoid
ance of anything that may conflict with the lives
of others, and furtherance of anything that may
promote their lives. Good conduct is that in which
these ends are achieved to a high extent
; bad con
duct that in which they fall short to a greater or
lesser degree from the requirements. The essence
of high morality, then, is in the preservation of life ;
and that conduct is most moral which conduces
most to this preservation, and which therefore is
most evolved. Ethics is based on evolution.
The preservation of life is only desirable, Spencer
continues, on the assumption that life brings in its
train more happiness than unhappiness. The at
tainment of happiness is the end of life
; and this
doctrine is one which cannot be denied even by
ascetics, who practise severities and suffer hard-&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 183
ships in the present life with a view to achieving
greater happiness in a future life. While, therefore,
the purpose of an ethical system is the preservation
of life, it is also the attainment of happiness. Our
Ethics is both evolutionary and hedonistic. Nor
is there any opposition between these two ends.
Happiness furthers the ends of life in a great
variety of ways ; and pain, as such, is a falling-
short from the fullness of life and a symptom of
inadequate preservation.
As in so many parts of Spencer s social writings
this particular theory seems to pay inadequate
attention to psychological analysis. No one
proclaimed so emphatically as Spencer that
sociology is dependent upon psychology ; but time
after time his sociological theories suffer from the
imperfections of the psychology of his time.
Spencer s Ethics is based on hedonism, a doctrine
much in vogue among the advanced thinkers of
last century, but now comparatively discredited,
not only in Ethics, but in political economy and
the other branches of philosophy where it was
commonly applied. From the a priori point of
view, it would indeed appear eminently reasonable
to assert that the activities of men are guided by
their desire to procure happiness, and to escape
unhappiness. But actual observation of mankind
quickly dispels this naive supposition. Spencer
never took note of what are called idees fixes,1 84 HERBERT SPENCER
which constitute the true motives of a large part
of human activity. A particular idea or suggestion
once grafted on to the mind tends to work itself
out in conduct, altogether independently of any
reasonable estimate of happiness or unhappiness,
and with disastrous consequences to all theories
of hedonism, or to the cognate doctrine of utili
tarianism. The true way of inducing mankind or
a single man to pursue a certain line of activity
is not by appealing to intellectual considerations
of the happiness which will ensue to him there
from, but by impressing the idea of that line of
activity upon his mind. Suggestion is in any
sphere a more potent motive than hedonism.
Spencer is unquestionably wrong in attributing
the conduct of ascetics to an anticipation of
pleasure in a future life. There are in existence at
the present day many persons who harbour no
such anticipations, and who yet lead lives that are
ascetic in many minor ways. Habit, social con
vention, suggestion, are the instruments at work.
The domination of some particular idea is the all-
sufficient motive in accounting for conduct, and the
question as to how that domination occurred is to
a great extent irrelevant. It is as much a part of
the man s consitution as the shape of his nose.
As already insisted, the explanation of human
conduct and belief belongs to Psychology, and not,
as Spencer persistently assumed, to Logic. Man&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 185
is primarily a being of emotions and feelings ;
and in that region we must seek explanations of
his behaviour. He is only secondarily an intel
lectual being ; but his intellect and knowledge are
exceedingly superficial biologically, and of very
late appearance in evolution. They are not rooted
in his constitution, as are his emotions ; and they
are of incomparably less weight in determining
either his beliefs or his conduct.
Spencer next passes to consider morals from
several different points of view the physical,
the biological, the psychological, and the socio
logical. From the physical point of view high moral
conduct (he says) is that which answers most
closely to the definition of evolution given in
&quot; First Principles.&quot; It is characterised by definite-
ness, coherence, and heterogeneity. The adjust
ment of acts to ends is definite in the sense that
they are precisely adapted to the achievement of
those ends. Appointments are punctually kept,
statements made are strictly accurate, work done
is not slipshod, etc. Coherence is manifested in
the steadiness of purpose, which combines a variety
of actions to the consummation of the end in view.
And heterogeneity is displayed in the wide range
of methods by which different ends are reached.
The conduct of a highly moral man embraces a
wide variety of actions, in addition to its definite-
ness and coherence or singleness of purpose.1 86 HERBERT SPENCER
From the biological point of view, Spencer argues
that pleasure is the normal concomitant of life-
conserving activities, and pain of life-destroying
activities. Had it been otherwise, evolution would
quickly have ended
; for animals in general neces
sarily pass their lives in avoiding pain and seeking
gratifications, and if this kind of conduct had not
been conducive to preservation of life, species
would quickly have become extinct. In the case
of men, however, the immediate relation between
pleasure and the maintenance of life is to some
extent abrogated. As mankind are passing from
a state of separation and independence to a
higher social state, their lives are largely artificial.
They are as yet imperfectly adapted to social life
;
and their feelings are not a true guide to the
kind of conduct which social life demands.
Nevertheless the school of thought which glorifies
pain and depreciates pleasure is in fundamental
error
; for pleasure and pain constitute a true
index to conduct in a large number of cases, and
will become still more reliable as guides in pro
portion as humanity progresses.
From the psychological view, it is pointed out
that the pleasure derived from the higher emo
tions is a more correct guide than that derived
from the lower. Spencer infers that the essential
trait of a moral consciousness is the subordination
of one feeling by another. It is obvious that many&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot;
advantages arise from the suppression of an
immediate feeling by another which interdicts it :
by the sacrifice of immediate pleasures it continu
ally happens that greater and more enduring
ultimate pleasures are attained. From observation
of this fact by primitive peoples a moral con
sciousness gradually developed, which urged the
postponement of present gratification to future
happiness ; and it is from this origin that Spencer
believed the moral consciousness had sprung.
Once again comment must be made on the
astonishing conception which Spencer has of
primitive man forming generalisations in Ethics,
based upon extensive and difficult observations
of what is and what is not good for society at






Rousseau. It credits primitive men, not only
with being philosophers, but with being philo
sophers of most remarkable powers and knowledge.
It credits also successive generations with the main
tenance of the philosophy of their brilliant ancestors.
Probably we may find here evidence of the working
of one of Spencer s biological fallacies. He assumes
in
&quot; The Data of Ethics,&quot; as in many other parts
of his Philosophy, that acquired characters are
inherited. He imagines that if during several
successive generations a particular code of morals
is taught to men, that code will become con-1 88 HERBERT SPENCER
genital. The theory is now discredited, and the
conclusion drawn from it is palpably false. Moral
codes do not engender moral sentiments, but vice
versa. The moral sentiments are truly congenital ;
they call into existence moral codes in harmony
with them, and these of course can be handed
down by tradition from generation to generation,
but never become congenital in the true sense.
If we must seek an explanation in Biology, we
shall find it far more readily in Natural Selection
than in the antique theory of use-inheritance.
Tribes which possess a congenital moral sentiment
can hold together in societies ; and by the strength
of their union they survive. Tribes, on the other
hand, which lack a moral sentiment are quickly
disintegrated and broken up. In the struggle
for existence, they are soon squeezed out by the
strength of the naturally more moral races. How,
then, do the moral sentiments arise ? The answer
to that question may wait till biologists have
informed us how variations arise. At present
nothing whatever is known upon the subject.
All that we can see is that in the earliest ages of
the history of man some fortunate variation
brought into existence a race with some sort of
moral sentiment. Immediately union and social
life became possible
: henceforward that race
was destined to multiply at the expense of the less
fortunate part of mankind which had not under-&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 189
gone the variation. It is quite plain that the
surviving races must be those whose instincts
are social, or moral. Those whose instincts are
anti-social are weak by virtue of their inability
to unite : they are doomed to extinction, and in
fact are extinguished as soon as they come in
contact with a more social race.
Spencer next passes from what he calls the
psychological point of view to the sociological
point of view. He points out that in primitive
societies, constantly at war, the State must
take precedence of the individual. But as hostile
States cease to constitute a danger, the welfare
of individuals becomes the object to be attained ;
for the State, as a State, has no feeling, and its
welfare is a matter of indifference, except as it
may influence the welfare of its citizens. As war
gradually declines with increasing civilisation, a
compromise is reached between the priority of
the State, adapted to war, and the priority of the
individual, adapted to peace. When at length
permanent peace is secured, there will be no
restraint placed upon individuals, except such as
may be necessary for the prevention of direct
aggression, or of breach of contract.
After insisting upon the relativity of pains and
pleasures and the varying sentiments of man
kind towards them Spencer proceeds to a general
discussion of egoism and altruism. The importance190 HERBERT SPENCER
of a rational egoism is set forth
; for without
proper regard for self there is no power of sub
serving the needs of others. But altruism is like
wise of the highest importance for social life.
Though at first it has to be carefully cultivated
and enforced, human nature is gradually advancing
into more complete harmony with social life :
eventually there will no longer be any need for
impressing altruism, since citizens will of their
own accord desire the welfare of others and derive
satisfaction from the furtherance of it. Utili
tarianism errs in emphasising altruism at the
expense of egoism. The wants of each citizen,
being to a certain extent individual and peculiar
to himself, are more easily satisfied by his own
action than by the action of others. If, therefore,
everyone were to abandon the pursuit of his own
happiness, and give up his time to promoting
the happiness of others, the result would be a
smaller general happiness than might be. For
each citizen would have his needs fulfilled less
perfectly than if he himself had attended to them.
The true course, therefore, is a rational egoism,
modified by altruism. Each citizen should be
free to pursue his own ends, so long as the
similar freedom of other citizens is not interfered
with.
The contrast is noted between Absolute and
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individuals have already reached a state of moral
perfection ; and a true system of Absolute Ethics
is that which would prevail among a race of
perfect men. Where men are imperfect, their
relations are not capable of being formulated
within any system, any more than there could be
a geometry where the lines drawn were crooked
and arbitrary. All that can now be attained,
therefore, is a Relative Ethics : in many situations
there is no absolutely right course, but there is
perhaps one which, though not perfect, is relatively
better than any other. Any system of Ethics on
a scientific basis must be an Absolute system ;
and its use in practical life is that we may select
those lines of conduct which come nearest to its
complete fulfilment.
The subject of Ethics falls into various depart
ments. First comes the Ethics of Individual
Life
; then Justice ; then Beneficence, positive
and negative. The most important division of
Ethics is that dealing with Justice ; for here is
described the system of relationships between
individuals which should be maintained by the




to these various departments ;
but before dealing with them we have to take a
general view of
&quot; The Inductions of Ethics.&quot;192 HERBERT SPENCER
f THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.&quot;
The main thesis of this part is that civilised
mankind have two opposing systems of morality
:
the religion of amity and the religion of enmity.
The former namely, Christianity is their osten
sible religion, but the latter is their true religion.
It is illustrated by the feelings of antagonism
existing between different nations, by the conquest
of smaller and less civilised nations by the larger
and more powerful, by duelling in countries which
still retain that institution, and by the accompany
ing code of honour, which inculcates the principle
of revenge in opposition to the religion of amity.
An instance is given of barbaric and militaristic
religion in a general order issued to his soldiers by
the present Kaiser of Germany on his ascent to
the throne :
&quot; God s decree places me at the head
of the Army
&quot;
; and then, after expressing his
submission to
&quot; God s will,&quot; he goes on to
swear
&quot; ever to remember that the eyes of my
ancestors look down upon me from the other
world, and that I shall one day have to render
account to them of the glory and honour of the
army.&quot;
Thus the sentiments of mankind are not truly
ethical, but pro-ethical
: they are sentiments
which fill the place of genuine moral sentiments.
History, consisting largely of a record of wars&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 193
and battles, &quot;is little more than the Newgate
Calendar of nations.&quot;
The remainder of
&quot; The Inductions of Ethics
&quot;
is taken up by a consideration of each of the
ordinarily recognised virtues in turn, and an
attempt to affiliate them with one or other kind
of social type, especially the military and industrial
types. Aggression and robbery are found to be
most marked in military States. Being accustomed
by training to force and violence, such States are
naturally prone to commit corresponding crimes
against other States, and their individuals to
commit them against one another. Revenge is
equally characteristic of military communities : but
from primitive forms of revenge grows Justice ;
and Justice prevails in proportion to the peace-
fulness and industrial development of society.
Generosity and Humanity are likewise developed
in inverse proportion to the warlike qualities of
the people. Truthfulness has a somewhat less
direct connection ; for the Hottentots are an
eminently veracious people, though they have not
infrequent wars. Their mode of government is
singularly free from coerciveness ; this and many
other facts lead Spencer to the conclusion that the
prevalence of truthfulness is directly proportioned
to freedom, and that it is least in those communities
which have the most coercive rule. As these are
generally military communities, there is an indirect194 HERBERT SPENCER
relation between unveracity and war. Complete
truthfulness is very rare
; for even in ordinary
speech it is common to exaggerate, and to make
use of words like
&quot;
very
&quot; on occasions when they
are not called for.
Obedience has a double character. On the
one hand, filial obedience is rooted in Nature,
and has a high ethical warrant ; but other kinds
of obedience, that for instance to authority and to
government, is pro-ethical. It exists most strongly
in militant societies ; and with the advance of
pacific qualities it ceases to be a virtue and
gives way to the only ethical obedience, namely,
obedience to one s own conscience.
Industry is least in military States, where
labour is usually despised and left to the women
and the slaves. As peace becomes more perma
nent, industry becomes honourable. Temperance,
on the other hand, appears to exhibit no relation
ship to any one social type ; it is rapidly increasing
at the present time. Chastity is also difficult to
classify. Unchastity appears to be specially
characteristic of military States ; but it cannot be
said that chastity is characteristic of peaceful
States. The evil caused by unchastity is an
ultimate lowering of the population in number
or quality.
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social evil. Just as many savage tribes are
cannibals or anthropophagous, so our exist
ing communities of Europe are
&quot;
sociophagous.&quot;
&quot; There needs but a continuance of absolute
peace externally and a rigorous insistence on
non-aggression internally, to ensure the moulding
of men into a form naturally characterised by all
the virtues.&quot;
Here Spencer commits himself in a more specific
form to the fallacy of his Biology, that acquired






peace and justice produce a certain effect on
character, and that that effect will be inherited.
This latter opinion, however widely it may be held
by popular ignorance, is untrue. No alteration or
improvement of environment can produce any
direct action on the congenital qualities of men.
It may, of course, elevate the characters of each
successive generation in turn : but the improve
ment does not show even a disposition to be
inherited ; human character is not touched by
it ; no improvement of conditions can
&quot; mould
&quot;
the hereditary qualities of mankind
; nor can any
deterioration of those conditions degrade his
hereditary qualities, except, indeed, by the indirect
method of causing extinction of the best strains
and multiplication of the worst.196 HERBERT SPENCER
&quot; THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE.&quot;
Leaving now
&quot; The Inductions of Ethics,&quot; we
reach part iii., dealing with
&quot; The Ethics of
Individual Life.&quot; The doctrine is laid down that
the moral sphere is wider than commonly supposed,
and that it includes much of the conduct which is
of purely personal concern. More especially the
pursuit of healthy gratifications is enjoined, and
the belief that all pleasure is evil or indifferent is
emphatically condemned. Anything which brings
individual gratification, without injury either to
self or others, is physiologically wholesome, in that
it leads to a more efficient and therefore better
life.
A proper physical activity should be maintained.
Idleness is to be reprobated ; but so also is over
work. It is imperative, Spencer continues, that a
due amount of rest should be taken, though many
people sleep too long and reduce their efficiency in
consequence. So also do others eat too much, caus
ing injury to themselves and waste to the com
munity ; yet variety of food and attention to the
demands of the palate are ethically right as aiding
digestion and a more perfect life. Alcoholic stimu
lation is from the point of view of Absolute Ethics
entirely reprehensible ; but in the present imperfect
condition of mankind the consumption of alcohol
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right. The pursuit of culture is a true ethical
aim
; it should be culture not only of the mind
but of the body, in so far as the acquirement of
manual dexterity is concerned : intellectual culture
is chiefly given by the study of science.
Amusements constitute a further object of
ethical sanction. Reading novels and going to
theatres is right, so long as it is not overdone,
and so long as the books or plays selected are
of a humanising and not a brutalising character.
Music is especially deserving of praise. Passing
to the active amusements, all sport is condemned
by Spencer, in that it inflicts pain on other
creatures and thus sears the sympathies. Foot
ball is reprehensible for the same reason
; and
some indoor games, such as chess, is so (to a much
less extent) because of the humiliation entailed
upon the loser in a game of so purely an intellectual
character. This objection is removed in games
of chance
; though all forms of betting and
gambling are condemned for the reason that the
pleasure of the victor is attained by the pain of
the loser. The same objection is raised to various
forms of outdoor games, such as boat-racing.
On these opinions I have already made some
criticism in a previous chapter.
Marriage and parentage are next dealt with.
Very early marriages are to be reprobated on
physiological grounds ; and so also is the so-called198 HERBERT SPENCER
manage de convenance. The responsibilities of
parentage are emphasised, and condemnation is
expressed of all social legislation which tends to
relieve parents of the care and responsibility of
their children, not excluding even their education.
We have now reached the end of
&quot; The Ethics
of Individual Life.&quot; It represents really a protest
against the somewhat ascetic notions of morality
widely held in Spencer s time. In so far it was no
doubt useful ; but we may be of the opinion that
he travelled too far in the opposite direction. We
may disagree with him altogether in extending
the sphere of morality to cover so many details
of private life. Take, for example, one of Spencer s
favourite illustrations. He condemned the puri
tanical objections which were often raised in his
time to playing a game such as billiards. Personally
he liked billiards, and he thought it incumbent
on him to prove that it was in conformity with
ethical principles. But nowadays Ethics does not
intrude in these minor affairs of life. In such
matters moral maxims no longer enter. We
laugh at the Puritan (if he still exists) and continue
to play. Generally speaking, Ethics, like laws,
may be greatly overdone. If moral principles are
operative in every detail of life, we become
dogmatic and hidebound, tied up in a network
of principles and reduced to the category of prigs.
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tolerant, nor moral ; in straining after gnats
he will swallow a camel. For when everything
presents itself as a question of right and wrong
he loses all sense of moral proportion. The
philosophical tendency of the day is to limit
rather than increase the sphere of Ethics in indi
vidual life ; and the tendency has an excellent
psychological justification.
We pass now to the second volume of
&quot; The




; it opens with the division on
&quot;
Justice,&quot; which was regarded by Spencer as
the most important of all his writings.
&quot;
JUSTICE.&quot;
The roots of the sentiment of Justice are traced
by Spencer in the animal world. There the law
of natural selection decrees that the less fit shall
die out, and that the race shall be carried on from
those individuals which are best adapted to their
environment. In other words, the law of Nature
is that prosperity is apportioned to efficiency ;
there is a natural relation between survival and
competence. Moreover, it is clear that any inter
ference with this relation must be disastrous to
the species. For any such interference must mean
that the less adapted are enabled to survive and
bear offspring; or else that the more adapted are
prevented from passing on their better organisa-200 HERBERT SPENCER
tions to posterity. In either event the species
becomes less well adapted to its environment, and
moves a step towards extinction.
Now in human affairs the same law holds good.
The strongest men in mind and body those best
adapted for social life prosper on the average ;
and, when not interfered with, are enabled to
produce and rear offspring of an equally high
quality to carry on the race. The weaklings, on
the other hand or at least those less adapted
suffer the penalties of their incompetence, and
are unable to rear offspring. The weaker strains
die out, and the stronger strains survive. The
most important law of social life, therefore, is
that which ensures to each man the natural
rewards due to his energy and efficiency ; and
that law is satisfied only by individual liberty.
There must be no interference with individuals ;
for interference abrogates the relation between
fitness and success.
If human beings were not gregarious, there
would be no more to be said ; but in social life
complete individual freedom must be limited in so
far as is necessary to prevent one individual from
interfering with the freedom of another. Spencer s
law requires that all individuals shall be free, and
it seeks to establish the highest sum-total of
freedom within the community. For the fulfil
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may be permitted to intrench upon the life or
liberty of any other individual. Freedom must
be equal and universal ; and the only restrictions
which may be imposed are those required for the
maintenance of freedom itself. The formula of
Justice therefore contains two clauses, of which
the first proclaims the freedom of the individual,
and the second supplies the condition that he
shall not intrude upon the equal freedom of any
other individual. The formula runs as follows :
&quot;
Every man is free to do that which he wills,
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of
any other man.&quot; The rule of Justice embodied
in this formula is the ethical aspect of the law of
evolution.
Spencer of course applies the formula only to
adults. It is only among adults that natural
selection demands the apportionment of benefits to
deserts. Among children the opposite holds good ;
and the most has to be given to the newest infants,
whose capacities are least. Among children, benefits
are proportioned to incapacity. It is with the former
conditions alone that we are concerned in our
study of Justice. It is to be noted, moreover, that
the formula of Justice belongs to the region of
Absolute Ethics, and that in imperfect conditions
it cannot be rigidly applied. More particularly
its complete application presupposes a condition
of permanent peace ; for, so long as wars con-202 HERBERT SPENCER
tinue, individual freedom is subject to severe
restrictions, for the purposes of national defence.
Accordingly Spencer finds that in practice the
formula of Justice is most closely realised in those
communities which are most peaceful ; and con
versely that it is farthest from general recognition
in societies of the most militant type.
Spencer thus reached his law of Justice by a
deductive argument
: from this law, again, he
deduced the various rights of man
; and by
consideration of these in turn he went on to argue
that the development of law had been in the
direction of the continual reinforcement of those
rights which are derived as corollaries from the
formula of Justice.
Firstly we have the right to physical integrity
that is to say, freedom from all forms of personal
aggression. In accordance with this right, it should
be illegal for a sick person to expose others to
infection, as by travelling in a public conveyance.
Developed law recognises the right to physical
integrity
: like all others, however, it is liable to
be suspended in time of war, in the interests of
the community. The rights to free motion and
locomotion are the next corollaries : as in the case
of the former, they are recognised to an increasing
extent by law
; but these rights also may properly
be suspended in time of war. The rights to the
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of new buildings which may exclude the light from
other habitations ; for the prevention of street
noises of disagreeable character, etc. This right
would appear also to justify public ownership
of the land
; and it does in fact establish a State-
suzerainty. The value of the land, however,
resides mainly in the cultivation and improve
ments which have been wrought upon it by indi
vidual effort ; and these rightly belong to the
individuals who have accomplished them, or who
have purchased them with the proceeds of labour
earned elsewhere. Whereas the State has, in
Spencer s opinion, a right to resume the land if it
should wish to do so, such resumption would be im
politic, as the compensation payable to the present
owners would be greater than the gain would be
worth
; moreover, Spencer finds reason to suppose
on general principles that land is administered better
by private individuals than by public officials.
The right of property, other than land, is,
however, on a different footing ; and the law of
Justice prohibits the seizure of property which
rightly belongs to individuals who have made
or purchased it. The right of incorporeal property
is in the same position. The law of copyright
should be strengthened
: inventors should have
proper protection for their ideas, though after
a time inventions may rightly become public




&quot; comes also the prohibition of defama
tion of character which should be punished,
when the allegations made are untrue.
Next come the rights of gift and bequest, with
certain limitations. Among these limitations is
included the practice of entail. This practice
involves a control by the dead over the property
of the living, and thus constitutes an unjustifiable
interference with liberty. The rights of free
exchange and free contract comprise the doctrine
of free trade, which thus possesses, according to
Spencer, not only an economic but an ethical
sanction. Interference with freedom of trade is a
breach of the formula of Justice ; and protectionists
should therefore be called
&quot;
aggressionists.&quot; The
right to free industry is another obvious corollary
from the formula. The rights of free belief and
worship are similarly beyond the reach of inter
ference, unless they create an uproar which con
stitutes a public nuisance, as in the case of the
Salvation Army. The rights of free speech and pub
lication are also inviolate, except during wars, when
they may afford useful information to the enemy.
The publication of indecent matter is a difficult
point ; yet there is likely to be greater harm in
legal prohibition than in the circulation of offensive
matter, which is never likely to occur extensively*
and which may safely be left to the power of
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various rights, which are drawn as corollaries from
the formula of Justice, Spencer finds that the
evolution of law has always been towards clearer
and more definite recognition of them. Conclusions
reached d priori are thus verified by the actual
course of affairs examined d posteriori.
Passing now to the rights of women, the formula
requires that their freedom shall be equal to those
of men. In married life the balance of authority
should, Spencer says, be on the side of the husband
when agreement cannot be reached ; for men are
more judicial and less impulsive than women,
and upon men rests the responsibility of finding
the means for their joint subsistence. A further
difference between men and women is due to the
fact that men are liable to military service for the
defence of the country in time of war. Since this
burden does not fall upon women, they are not
entitled to the franchise, until a state of perma
nent peace has been attained.
After touching on the increasing recognition
of the rights of children, we pass to a consideration
of rights of altogether different character
; of
political rights so-called. Has every man a right
to a vote, and should there be universal franchise ?
Propositions such as these cannot be deduced
from the law of equal freedom : all that is affirmed
by that law is that every man shall be free, so long
as he does not infringe the equal freedom of any206 HERBERT SPENCER
other man. The privilege of casting a vote in a
ballot-box is not a right ; and the proper form of
franchise therefore is that which is most likely
to maintain the fundamental law of Ethics. This
is unlikely to be achieved by universal suffrage.
It is a cardinal maxim that men will vote for what
they conceive to be their interest ; legislation is
carried through by conflict of varying interests ;
and it may and does happen that one interest,
which happens to comprise a great many more
individuals than another, would have an unfair
legislative advantage over that other. Our poli
tical institutions therefore should be based on
the representation, not of individuals, but of
interests. The actual constitution of the State is
a matter of indifference so long as the law of
equal freedom is maintained.
As to taxation, each man has an equal interest in
the protection of life and liberty ; and equal taxation
should be levied upon all to meet this requirement.
The protection of property, on the other hand,
should be provided for by taxation that is pro
portioned to the amount of property possessed
the wealth of the individual. All taxation should
be direct, and should be applied for from each
citizen in a single sum, so that he may know
precisely how much taxation is taken from him in
the course of the year. All indirect taxation or
other methods of collecting money in a way that&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 207
is often not perceived by the citizen are condemned
as encouraging extravagance.
Coming now to the duties of the State, Spencer
held that government originated for the purpose of
carrying on war and the defence of the community.
The maintenance of internal order was not at first
regarded as part of the functions of government ;
and this maintenance was only undertaken by
Government on the ground that internal dissen
sion was a cause of weakness in the face of the
enemy. The functions of government are there
fore two in number : the protection of the
community from hostile aggression of other com
munities, and the protection of the individual
within the community from the aggression of other
individuals i.e., the maintenance of the rights
already enumerated. The protection of the
community requires, of course, the maintenance
of a navy and army adequate for the purpose.
As regards the internal function of the State,
Justice should be administered free of cost.
Offences would be far less numerous than they
are if it was known that reparation could be
immediately obtained without expense. Although
the State is not directly concerned with the
making of railways, roads, etc., yet the alienation
of land required for such purposes must be subject
to the permission of the State, and their breaking-
up or alterations, etc., must be subject to super-208 HERBERT SPENCER
vision, to ensure that no aggression should be
made upon members of the community. In the
same way rivers, lakes and inland waters, and the
adjacent sea are subject to oversight by the
State. These, however, constitute the whole
duties of the State. Its functions are, not to make
attempts to further life, but to maintain intact the
conditions proper for the natural development of
the highest type of life.
From the duties of the State Spencer passes to the
further consideration of the limits of those duties.
All forms of socialistic legislation or parental
government are to be religiously avoided
; for
they traverse the fundamental law which requires
that rewards shall be apportioned to merits. The
popular belief that the State may do anything is
a superstition
: the power of the State should
be very sharply restricted. Many instances are
adduced of the vices of officialism and the ineffi
ciency of State management, particularly in the
departments to which it ought to pay the most
exclusive attention. The administration of justice
is expensive and slow ; the efficiency of the navy
and army inadequately watched. If in all depart
ments of industry and business efficiency implies
high specialisation, this truth is equally cogent
in the sphere of government. A Government
which tries to do many things will do them all badly;
whereas a Government whose sole attention is&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 209
devoted to national defence and maintenance
of internal justice becomes specialised for those
important purposes, and profits by the increased
efficiency which follows specialisation.
As was proved in
&quot; The Principles of Sociology,&quot;
Society is a living organism, and not a manufac
tured product. A society is not made, but grows.
A cardinal vice of opportunist legislation is that
it is based upon the belief that society may be
moulded into one form or other by legislative
enactments. Nothing can be farther from the
truth : the disappointing effects of such enact
ments are shown by the enormous proportion of
laws which, after being passed, are subsequently
repealed. Before their repeal they have been
doing harm. So complicated is the structure of the
social organism, that the indirect and unforeseen
effects of any piece of legislation are commonly
far greater and more important than the direct
effect which it was hoped to attain. The whole of
the wonderful organisation of society, the division
of labour, the manufacture of articles in just the
right proportion to meet the demands, their trans
ference to the localities where they are most
needed, etc., all this organisation has developed
without any conscious intention, but purely as an
incident in the pursuit by individual men of their
personal interests. The daily despatch into London
of the food required for the population furnishes210 HERBERT SPENCER
an instance. All the different kinds of food
arrive in just the right amount to feed the people
without waste : they arrive at the right hours in
the day. Take for example the case of milk. The
supply of milk to London is drawn from innumer
able country districts, not bound together by any
organisation whatever. Yet it happens that the
total amount of the milk sent in from all these
country districts is just the exact amount required
by the population. And so it is with articles of
every kind. If the needs of London were to be
provided for by a carefully-devised organisation,
it is incredible that the supply should be adapted
to the demand with such nicety as it is now,
where there is no conscious organisation whatever.
In short, the affairs of life are very much better
conducted by those natural organisations which
grow up without intent to meet the needs of the
people than by manufactured organisations which
clumsily and stupidly endeavour, at great cost
and by compulsory methods, to supply what they
imagine to be the needs of the people. With
arguments of this character the part dealing with
Justice comes to an end.
&quot;The Ethics of Social Life&quot; is divided by





Benevolence.&quot; The main prac
tical difference which he draws between the two
is that the former may rightly be enforced by&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 211
law, whereas the latter may not. Although
Benevolence should not be a matter for govern
mental compulsion, it yet constitutes an important
branch of Ethics. It occupies the remainder of
Spencer s
&quot;
Principles of Ethics,&quot; and is there







Dealing first with Negative Beneficence, it is
pointed out that the rigour of the social system
based upon the enforcement of justice alone may
and ought to be tempered by many other restraints
which individuals should voluntarily place upon
their own actions. Although competition, for
example, should be absolutely free as far as the
law is concerned, yet competitors ought to observe
proper feeling in their relations towards one
another. They ought not to lower prices to an
unremunerative extent in order to drive others
out of the market and then raise them again. A
doctor or a lawyer ought not to consider exclusively
his own interests, but also the interests of his
friends in the profession. On the other hand, trade
unions have no right to require that wages paid
to the inferior workmen shall be as good as that
paid to the superior. A society which acts upon
such a plan
&quot;
will inevitably degenerate and die
away in long-drawn miseries.&quot;2J2 HERBERT SPENCER
Negative Beneficence should also set limits
upon free contract. It should be held wrong to
take advantage of another s misfortunes, to drive
an unconscionable bargain with him. The relations
between employer and employed should be
softened by mutual regard and assistance.
Restraints should be set upon undeserved pay
ments, as in giving money to street bands or
overpaying cabmen. Restraints likewise should
be set upon displays of ability in social intercourse :
regard should always be had for the feelings of
others. In playing a game of skill, for instance,
with one whose little boy is a spectator it would be
right to play below one s strength and let the
father win, lest he should suffer some diminution
of admiration on the part of his son. So, too,
a man should not generally be defeated in argu
ment or a wit-combat while his fiancee is present.
Corresponding restraints should be set upon
expressions of blame and of praise passed upon
others. A lady who after dinner has played badly
a piece on the piano should not be thanked,
lest she should be encouraged to repeat the
infliction on future occasions. A pretty woman
who expects glances of admiration should not
receive them, lest her vanity be unduly developed.
In these small ways Negative Beneficence would
increase the allurements of social life. So Spencer
says
: but some of us may be sceptical, and think&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS
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that instinct is a better guide than philosophical
principles.
&quot; POSITIVE BENEFICENCE.&quot;
The injunctions of Positive Beneficence are of
a similar character. Marital, parental, and filial
beneficence are included in this division of Ethics ;
and special emphasis is laid on filial beneficence, or
kindness to aged parents, as a duty much neglected
at the present time. Aiding the sick and injured,
succour to the ill-used and the endangered,
pecuniary aid to relatives and friends all these
are named as duties, which, however, are to be
intelligently fulfilled, and not carried out pro
miscuously in a way likely to do more harm than
good. Next we reach the question of relief of the
poor commonly but erroneously supposed to
occupy almost the whole sphere of beneficence.
As already said in dealing with Justice, poor relief
is not properly a matter for the State ; and Spencer
adduces many arguments to show that compulsory
alms-giving and poor laws work injurious effects.
It is
&quot; a kind of social opium-eating
&quot; which leads
to ultimate misery far greater than that imme
diately alleviated. Nevertheless the relief of the
poor constitutes a legitimate opportunity for
private beneficence. When done with care and
personal trouble, it is not only elevating to the
character, but may do much good without sub
sequent harm.214 HERBERT SPENCER
Passing to Social Beneficence, the proposition
is put forward that where more imperative claims
do not interfere, everyone should enter to some
extent into social life, to help and increase the
amenities of existence. It is a duty, moreover,
to rebel against the various injurious conventions
which dominate social life. Such, for instance,
is fashion in clothes, which does harm not only
by extravagance, but also by demanding an
improper amount of time and attention. This
expression of opinion on the part of Spencer
will perhaps appear to many as a platitude. There
are those, however, who hold that, like so many
platitudes, it is untrue
; and in a suitable time and
place it would not be hard to defend even the
vagaries of fashion in women s dress.
Political Beneficence requires men to watch the
course of legislation and public business, and to
do their share in the promotion of a healthy
public life and the prevention of abuses. Inciden
tally the party system is condemned. If all
members of Parliament voted on each question
according to their convictions, it would often
happen that the Government would find itself in
a minority. Under the proposed new conditions,
however, that would not involve their resignation.
The Government would simply be the servant
instead of the master of the House ; and on each
question or each law that was proposed the-THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS&quot; 215
genuine opinion of the representatives of the
people would be obtained. Finally it is laid down
as a maxim for public life that everything should
be presumed to be going wrong until it is proved
to be going right. The opportunities and motives
for negligence or abuse of power are so numerous,
that it is necessary to set up a maxim such as this
in order to safeguard the liberties of the people.
At length we reach the end of
&quot; The Prin
ciples of Ethics,&quot; the last volume of the
System of Synthetic Philosophy. That the
social changes advocated are likely soon to be
attained was far from Spencer s expectations.
Human nature changes slowly ; and our insti
tutions change only with our natures. But as
humanity becomes gradually moulded into more
complete harmony with the social State, so will
the true principles of Ethics be attained. Those
now living can never hope to see the realisation.
&quot; While contemplating from the heights of thought,
that far-off life of the race never to be enjoyed by
them, but only by a remote posterity, they will
feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having
aided the advance towards it.&quot;CHAPTER VIII
METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION l
ju~iW ;
SPENCER was not a metaphysician. On the
contrary, he refers to metaphysicians with undis
guised contempt. Yet it was scarcely possible
to attempt a survey of the whole field of knowledge
without touching on many of the problems with
which metaphysicians endeavour to deal. He
professed to be an agnostic both as regards meta
physics and religion ; but in the former sphere
he reached conclusions admittedly metaphysical,
and in the latter he offered a substitute for religion
which came very near to being a shadowy religion
itself. Nevertheless his views on these matters
stand quite separate from the main body of his
works, and it is possible to agree or disagree with





is divided into two parts,
of which the first, or Metaphysical, portion is
entitled
&quot; The Unknowable.&quot; It might strike
the casual observer that if the title correctly
indicated the subject, it is curious that Spencer
1 &quot;First Principles,&quot; pp. 3 no; &quot;The Nature and Reality of
Religion&quot; ; &quot;The Principles of Psychology,&quot; vol. ii., pp. 305 520.METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 217
should be able to fill more than one hundred




is really unknowable, there is surely nothing
more to be said about it ; and the ascription of
various attributes to the Unknowable is in reality
a sufficient condemnation of the whole doctrine.
The opening sections of the Philosophy set
forth the proposition that any widespread human
belief, however erroneous it may be in detail, is
likely to contain a germ of truth. In all human
affairs opinion tends to be widely divergent ; and
when the truth is ultimately discovered it is com
monly found, Spencer says, that no one of the
contending parties was entirely in the right, but
that each had succeeded in attaining some portion
of the truth. This general doctrine is then applied
to the antagonism between science and religion.
It is improbable that the disputants on either side
are wholly in the right. It is far more probable
that each side has seized some part of the truth ;
and in order to discover what this may be it is
only necessary to elimitate all the antagonistic
factors on the two sides and then see what is left.
That which is common to both will be the ultimate
truth to which science and religion converge.
Dealing in the first place with religion, Spencer
says that there are three main types of hypothesis
concerning the origin of the universe. It may be
self-existent, or self-created, or created by an2i8 HERBERT SPENCER
external agency. The hypothesis of self-existence
i.e., that the universe has existed throughout
all eternity is stated by Spencer to be an
impossible conception. For it involves the idea
of infinite time, which is a thing that cannot be
conceived
; and the theory of self-existence the
atheistic theory is not one that can be genuinely
represented in the mind. Yet, as we shall shortly
see, Spencer subsequently referred to the Unknow
able as both infinite and eternal.
The theory of self-creation the pantheistic
theory is then condemned as equally futile. It
is impossible to imagine the universe arising out
of nothing without a cause : we should be com
pelled on this hypothesis to suppose that it existed
before in a potential form, which then passed to
the actual form. But this in no way brings an
explanation nearer ; for it is no easier to account
for the origin of a potential universe than of an
actual universe.
The third hypothesis the theistic view that the
universe was created by an external agency is
no more tenable than the other two. It only
shifts the problem a step farther back : instead of
inquiring into the origin of the universe, we
have to inquire into the origin of its Creator,
who must either be self-existent or self-created.
But since both these hypotheses have already
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no nearer an explanation than we were at the
beginning.
Spencer next proceeds to consider what common
basis these three divergent hypotheses have.
They all agree that there is a mystery to be
explained ; that there is an inscrutable Power
at the back of the universe something which
accounts for the existence of the universe, but
which defies all our efforts to understand or even
to conceive. It is on this basis alone that a
reconciliation can be attained between science
and religion.
He then passes from a consideration of the
ultimate ideas of religion to a consideration of
the ultimate ideas of science. The Kantian doc
trine that Space and Time are forms of thought,
and therefore subjective, is not one that, in
Spencer s opinion, can be truly rendered from
words into ideas. We are obliged to regard them
as objective ; but we are equally unable to con
ceive Space and Time either as entities or as attri
butes of entities. They must remain for ever
incomprehensible. Matter likewise is beyond our
powers of analysis. We cannot conceive it as
infinitely divisible
; yet we cannot imagine division
to be carried so far that no further subdivision can
be conceivable. Motion is in the same case.
We can only think in terms of relative motion :
what absolute motion or absolute rest may be is220 HERBERT SPENCER
beyond the powers of human conception. Force
and consciousness are likewise inexplicable in their
fundamental nature. All these primary concepts
of science therefore lead us once more to the
recognition of an ultimate mystery, the compre
hension of which is beyond the range of any
weapon in the armoury of the human intellect.
Spencer then goes on to argue that this fact,
to which we are led by induction from the ulti
mate ideas of science and religion, is strengthened
by deduction from the laws of intellectual processes.
Knowledge about a thing consists in classifying
it
; that is to say, in associating it with a group
of other things already known. Explanations
are merely the interpretation of a particular set
of events by reference to a more general law.





of gravitation ; and the progress of knowledge
is towards a gradually increasing comprehen





inclusion under another law of still wider generality.
The widest truth attainable can therefore never
be explained
: for explanation would take the form
of inclusion in some still wider truth ; and any
ultimate and final truth could only be found
at the end of an infinite series ; that is to say, it
could never be found at all.
The conclusion thus emerges, continues Spencer,
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and religion provides the common factor in which
their reconciliation is to be sought. Religion, in
bestowing a personal character on this fundamental
First Cause, passes beyond the limits of possible
knowledge. Science, in assuming that the tools
and materials with which it works are the ultimate
and unanalysable facts of existence, neglects to
take account of that deeper truth on which religion
insists. A true religion and a true science both
recognise the existence of an ultimate and impene
trable mystery as the First Cause of the universe
and of all phenomena. They err only when they
proceed to amplify on this First Cause and to
endow it with attributes which pass the limit of
human knowledge.
Spencer then asks what we are to say about it.
It cannot be relative, for if it is the First Cause
of everything there is nothing left outside for it
to be brought into relation with
; it must therefore
be Absolute. We are unable to conceive it as
finite : it must therefore be Infinite. We can
know nothing of it : we can do no more than
refer to it as the Unknowable. Although this
doctrine is in opposition to the popular views of
religion, it does not follow that the current religion
ought to be suddenly extirpated. It is probable
that the religion of a people is that which is best
suited to their requirements. To a nation that is
still incompletely civilised it is good that there222 HERBERT SPENCER
should exist a belief in a personal God, who metes
out rewards and punishments hereafter. Never
theless it is incumbent on everyone to speak
out as much of the truth as it is given him to
perceive.
The first criticism to be made on this attempted
reconciliation between science and religion is
that, like most compromises, it satisfies neither
party. It was hardly to be expected that those
who believe in religion would be content with the
shadow that is offered them in its place. Religion
is far more than the mere contemplation of a
mystery. Shorn of all ideas of a God, or of wor
ship, or of personal immortality, little is left but
an empty name.






&quot; are beyond the purview
of science, which works only among facts derived
by the methods of observation and experiment.
Science has something better and more useful to
do than contemplate ultimate mysteries. Ignorant
people do indeed often reproach science with being
unable to
&quot;
explain the universe,&quot; or furnish the
answer of some particular question in which they
are interested. It would be as reasonable to
reproach engineers with their inability to affect
the orbit of the moon. It is outside their sphere
altogether ; and the mystical speculations ofMETAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 223
common people are no less outside the sphere of
science. But just as the engineer may deride a
scheme for altering the moon s motion, so may
science deride various mystical theories as being
totally beyond the capacity of human knowledge.
The contemplation of ultimate mysteries is not
a part of science, and cannot therefore be made
the basis of a reconciliation with religion.
If Spencer s doctrine of the Unknowable had
any meaning, it would therefore be false. But in
point of fact it is a tissue of meaningless verbiage ;
the commonest and most discredited type of
Metaphysics. What is meant by Unknowable ?
Already, in specifying its existence, knowledge of
it is predicated. It is affirmed, firstly, that it
exists, and if we know this much of it, it ceases to
be altogether unknowable. In the second place,
it is affirmed that we neither do nor can know
anything of it : which itself is another piece of
information about it, derogating still further from
the propriety of the title. And then with wonderful
inconsistency Spencer proceeds to give us various
other items of information about the Unknowable.
It is infinite, for instance
; and it is Absolute.
Let us examine these two attributes. Why should
it be infinite ? Because we cannot imagine it
to be finite. But in this shadowy region, why
should there not be a third alternative to finite
and infinite ? Why not a thousand other alter-224 HERBERT SPENCER
natives ? Evidently in the region of the Unknow
able the same sort of logic and physics hold
good as in that of the Knowable. It is not
then genuinely unknowable. Its world, after all,
becomes more like ours the more we look at it.




; and here we light upon the most damning
absurdity of the whole doctrine. By
&quot; absolute
&quot;







in most books of logic is
that of cause and effect. Since the Unknowable
is absolute, it does not enter into any relation :
it cannot figure either as cause or effect. It lives
up in the clouds quite independent of all other
existence. And yet Spencer presents it as the
final cause of the Knowable. He invents it in
order to explain the Knowable. If it is absolute,
it cannot explain anything, or be the cause of
anything ; its raison d etre vanishes entirely.
There is in the whole of Spencer s Philosophy no
such striking example of looseness of thought as
in this theory, which invokes as a cause of the
universe a strange monstrosity whose chief attri
bute is that it cannot enter into a causal or any
other relation.
1
1 Of course, every philosopher must agree that a great many
things are and always will be unknowable to the human mind.
There is no metaphysics about that. All that is here criticised is
&quot;The Unknowable&quot; with a capital U; a special entity to which.
Spencer expects you to take off your hat.METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 225
Spencer s Metaphysics exhibits to a marked
degree all the errors which he so frequently charged
against other forms of metaphysics. His entire
ignorance of metaphysics, indeed, makes these
errors in his case far more conspicuous than in
the cases of many of his rivals. It is mere verbiage,









impersonal,&quot; etc. all of which mean literally
nothing. The whole theory is an attempt to gain
popular approval at the outset of his Philosophy
by conciliating science and religion. It is a sop
to the public a compromise which last century
was so greatly in request, that people would not
be likely to examine too closely into its logic.
Without wanting to be harsh, we may perhaps
observe the Bayswater spirit coming out in this
doctrine : there is about it a sort of undisciplined
looseness, that cannot stand squarely up to hard
facts, and evades issues by the copious use of
sesquipedalian terminology.






developed by him into a kind of substitute for
religion. In the final chapter of
&quot;
Ecclesiastical
Institutions,&quot; in the third volume of
&quot; The Prin
ciples of
Sociology,&quot; Spencer deals with the
&quot;
Religious Retrospect and Prospect,&quot; wherein
he forecasts a time when religion will be reduced226 HERBERT SPENCER
purely to the contemplation of the ultimate
mystery of the universe.
&quot; One truth must grow
ever clearer the truth that there is an Inscrutable
Existence everywhere manifested, to which he
[man] can neither find nor conceive either begin
ning or end. Amid the mysteries which become
the more mysterious the more they are thought
about, there will remain the one absolute certainty,
that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and
Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed.&quot;
This chapter formed the commencement of the
controversy with Mr. Frederic Harrison, which
was afterwards re-published in the suppressed
book
&quot; The Nature and Reality of Religion.&quot;
Mr. Harrison, as a Positivist, defended the
religion of humanity as the proper substitute for
theology. He ridiculed Spencer s notion that
religion could ever be reduced to the contemplation
of an empty metaphysical conception, such as
the Unknowable. He pointed out that all the
emotional and aesthetic elements, which constitute
the true basis of religion, were absent from this
conception, which also lacked any character of
moral exhortation or cultivation of kindly human
feeling. And he commented on the theological
terminology of the sentence quoted above. For
the fulness of religious conviction, Spencer offered
for the worship of mankind no more than a cold
logical formula, and he might have added, aMETAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 227
formula which breaks down under the first test of
logic itself. Nearly all of the very few persons who
have had an opportunity of reading this work
1
must agree that Mr. Harrison got very much the
better of the controversy ; yet we may suspect
that the religion of the future may be wholly
different from what either of these two philo
sophers imagined. It is doubtless more likely
to assume an emotional form than to be a mere
intellectual formula, which never has yet, and
never will, sway the deeper convictions of man
kind. But we are not at present called upon to
offer any alternative forecast. It is quite clear
that the doctrine of the Unknowable is untenable
in philosophy ; Mr. Harrison has shown that it
is useless for religion. It is more interesting to
note the air of reverence with which Spencer
regarded the Unknowable as he grew older.
Spencer professed himself to be an agnostic ; but
his agnosticism travelled in the course of years
from the verge of Atheism to the verge of Theology.
As a young man he would no doubt have resented
the charge of Atheism, just as much as, when an
old man, he would have resented the charge of
Theology. Yet he differed from Atheism scarcely
more than in name
; and his rapprochement to
Theology (which he would probably have denied)
1 Kindly lent to me by Mr. Geoffrey Williams, of Messrs. Williams
and Norgate.228 HERBERT SPENCER
is not wholly free from the suspicion of playing
to the gallery ; or rather, let it be said, of allowing
his thoughts to be swayed by the force of popular
belief. It is certainly rarer for an old man to
hold out against the infection of popular senti
ment than for a young man
; and to one reading
his essays and correspondence at this period there
is an indefinable sense of drifting with the stream,
and of an exceptional willingness to meet popular
feeling half-way. The influence of Youmans was
then strong ; and Spencer was undoubtedly animated
by a desire to obtain at least the approval of his
American admirers.
In only one other section of the Philosophy do
we come again on metaphysical doctrines namely,
in the
&quot; General Analysis,&quot; constituting part vii.
in the second volume of
&quot; The Principles of
Psychology.&quot; We are here introduced to a new
theory of knowledge and a criticism of the doctrine
of Idealism.
After various preliminaries Spencer reaches the
important question as to what we are to adopt
as a criterion of truth ? In judging between
realism and idealism, by what test are we to decide
the relative accuracy of the mental processes by
which these opposite deliverances are attained ?
The propositions which go to constitute an
argument or a statement have first to be reduced
to their simplest form ; and the final test of theirMETAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 229
truth in each case is stated by Spencer to be the
inconceivability of their negation. On touching
a body in the dark, for instance, we immediately
have a sensation of resistance, with which arises
also the idea of extension. If, now, we wish to
determine the truth of the general proposition
&quot; whatever resists has extension,&quot; our mode of
procedure is to endeavour to conceive resistance
without extension. Since no mental effort enables
us to form such a conception, we are justified in
saying that the proposition
&quot; whatever resists has
extension
&quot;
is a truth of the highest certainty
that can be attained by human intelligence.
The ultimate test of the truth of any proposi
tion, then, is found in our inability to conceive its
negation ; and this test is called by Spencer the
Universal Postulate. An argument or chain of
reasoning consists of a succession of steps, at
each of which the Universal Postulate is applied
since we pass from one step to another by noting
that the second is inevitably involved in the first
by an inability to conceive the second not follow
ing the first. When we have two chains of reason
ing leading to different conclusions, we must give
the preference to that which has the fewest
links i.e., invokes the Universal Postulate the
least frequently. We must give it the preference,
not because there is any weakness in the Postulate
itself, but because it is always liable to be wrongly230 HERBERT SPENCER
applied
: we may imagine that we cannot conceive
the negation of a proposition, when in reality we
can conceive it. Hence, the fewer steps there are in
a chain of reasoning, the smaller will be the chance
of error in the conclusion
; and Realism is greatly
superior to Idealism, in that it requires only one
application of the Universal Postulate, while
Idealism requires several. The realistic hypothesis
presents itself as an elementary proposition of
which the negation is inconceivable, whereas the
idealistic hypothesis is alleged by Spencer to be
reached by a succession of such elementary pro
positions. The room for error in the establishment
of Idealism is therefore as many times greater
than in the establishment of Realism as there
are steps required for the argument. By a further
analysis it is shown that the realistic belief is a
necessary deliverance of consciousness. All our
thoughts are determined by the relative cohesion
among our component states of consciousness ;
and where two trains of thought differ the only
way of deciding between them is to compare
the strength of cohesion of the ideas in the two
cases.
Whereas Idealism is thus wholly discredited,
the Realism which is forced upon us is not the
crude Realism of the peasant, but a
&quot;
Transfigured
Realism.&quot; We are prohibited from believing
that external objects are in their absolute natureMETAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 231
just as they appear to us to be. For they are
known to us only through our senses : the object
is known relatively only to the subject. We must
therefore regard the object as an appearance
:
objective existence as it appears to us is pheno
menal, not noumenal. There is behind it the
Unknowable Reality of which we can predicate
and imagine nothing (but of which Spencer else
where both predicated and imagined much).
Objective existence is a mode of the Unknowable ;
and subjective existence is another mode. The
Realism we have arrived at is not an absolute
Realism, but a relative Realism. For we can
predicate absolute reality only of the Unknowable.
The hypothesis of Idealism has therefore served its
purpose in discrediting Crude Realism. The true
realism is that called Transfigured Realism, which
is based upon the most certain of all deliverances
of consciousness.
This sums up the whole of Spencer s Meta
physics. The candid reader will perhaps not
perceive any wide difference in the nature of the
arguments used from those commonly employed
in the Metaphysics which he condemns. The
whole argument itself constitutes a long deduc
tive chain, at each link of which there is on
Spencer
s own principle a fresh liability to error.
This particular mode of establishing Transfigured
Realism seems to involve many more links in the232 HERBERT SPENCER
chain of argument than that by which Idealism
is established. It is perhaps hardly worth while
to criticise in further detail a doctrine which is
probably not now held by a single competent
philosopher of any school whatever.CHAPTER IX
EVOLUTION
THE metaphysical portion of Spencer s Philo
sophy is a comparatively unimportant part of
the whole. It is also quite separate from and
irrelevant to the rest
; and we may therefore
pursue our studies of his writings without any
bias derived from our opinion of his Metaphysics.
The largest single doctrine of the Philosophy is
that of universal Evolution, formally set forth in
&quot; First Principles.&quot; The main purpose of the
Philosophy, indeed, is to establish a general
law of Evolution which holds good in every
department of knowledge ; and Spencer con
tends that the true sphere of Philosophy is not
in the province of metaphysics, but in dealing
with those universal laws which transcend the
limits of any individual science. For the conve
nience of scientific workers, knowledge is broken
up into a number of separate compartments,
each of which becomes the preoccupation of a
special class of men of science. But these divisions
have no real objective existence. They are what
Lamarck would have called &quot;parties de Part&quot;
Spencer conceived the function of philosophy to234 HERBERT SPENCER
be that of formulating laws which transcend the
limits of any individual science. He reached this
conception by a mode of argument similar to that
used in his reconciliation of science and religion
namely, by finding the greatest common measure
of agreement in all conflicting opinions as to the
true subject-matter of Philosophy. As a result
of this method he concluded that Philosophy
deals with knowledge of the highest generality.
In each of the separate sciences generalisations
are attained which apply to all the classes of
objects with which those sciences respectively
deal. There are certain general truths of biology,
of physics, of astronomy, etc. In biology, for
instance, we may draw the generalisation that the
temperature of animals is proportional to the
amount of molecular change occurring within
them. But these truths are confined in their
application to the objects with which the science
in question deals. There are truths of a still
higher order of generality, and which are not
bounded by the limits of the special sciences. It
is to the study of these that the name of philosophy
must be applied. Philosophy is completely unified
knowledge, in opposition to the partially unified
knowledge of science.
Spencer begins his exposition by affirming
that the difference between mind and matter, or
between subject and object, is the widest andEVOLUTION 235
most fundamental difference that the human
intellect can grasp. He then proceeds to vindicate
the doctrine of the Indestructibility of Matter.
He characteristically defends this doctrine, not
only on inductive grounds, but on account of the
impossibility of conceiving a portion of matter in
empty space, which should disappear without
leaving any trace whatever. Since matter is only
known to us through the force which it exerts
upon us, the indestructibility of matter implies
the indestructibility of the force exerted by matter.
The continuity of motion is dealt with on similar
lines. If motion were liable to appear and to
vanish at random, none of the conclusions of
science could have been reached, nor could the
activities of normal life be carried on. The con
tinuity of motion implies and corresponds to what
is more generally known as Conservation of
Energy.
These two laws the indestructibility of matter
and the continuity of motion are special cases
of one law still more general, named by Spencer
the Persistence of Force. For there are, he says,
two different kinds of force that by which
matter becomes known as existing and that by
which it becomes known as acting. As already
mentioned, matter can only be known by the force
which it exerts upon us
; and thus, in plain terms,
the two kinds of existing forces are matter and236 HERBERT SPENCER
energy. Both of these are unalterable in quantity,
and liable only to transformations from one kind
of matter or energy into another kind of matter
or energy. Hence it follows that force the
ultimate form of all existence is likewise unalter
able in quantity
: it persists. Nevertheless this
great truth is one that transcends demonstration
;
for its assumption is involved in every experiment
or observation undertaken to prove it. It is the
widest of all truths, and is therefore not capable
of being comprehended under any other.
If force is persistent, it follows that the relations
between forces are also persistent ; and this is
simply another way of expressing the Uniformity of
Law. Where a certain set of conditions is realised,
from which a particular result has been found to
flow, then wherever precisely the same conditions
are realised on another occasion, precisely the same
result as before will ensue. For otherwise we must
suppose that some new force has come into exist
ence out of nothing, or that some old force has
fallen utterly out of existence ; and any such
opinion is contrary to the law of the Persistence
of Force. The uniformity of law, the invariable
sequence of the same consequents upon the same
antecedents, lies of course at the base of the whole
experimental method.
The next step in the argument is an account of
the transformation and equivalence of forces : aEVOLUTION 237
physical truth too well known to need much
comment. Everyone is aware that motion,
though its energy cannot be destroyed, is trans
formable into heat, sound, light, etc. Any one
form of energy is, at least theoretically, capable
of being changed into any other form of energy.
The planetary motions of the Solar System are
adequately accounted for by the forces generated
as the different portions of the system fell together
from the remote distances which originally sepa
rated them. Geologic changes arise from the yet
unexpended heat of nebular condensation. Plant-
life abounds most luxuriously in those regions
of the earth where the sun radiates the greatest
amount of light and heat ; and the distribution
of animal life closely follows that of plant-life.





this part of the argument ended here ; but
with the sixth or final edition a new addition was
made which appears to have been in every way
unfortunate, for Spencer went so far as to affirm
that physical forces might be transformed into
mental forces. That is to say, that when some
physical force, such as light or heat, affected the
organism, that force might be absolutely converted
into a state of consciousness, which again could
be re-converted into some other physical force.
He admitted, indeed, that the transformation was
not easy to observe quantitatively. A minute238 HERBERT SPENCER
stimulus, such as that involved in tickling, may
produce a great volume of feeling as compared with
which a more powerful stimulus would have pro
duced a far smaller volume. So, too, the infini
tesimal stimulus of a word or a sight may produce
boundless emotions, while yet other very similar
words and sights may produce scarcely any
emotion at all. But Spencer stoutly affirmed that
there did exist some proportion between the force
used and the consciousness resulting ; and he was
led in consequence to attack Huxley s Automaton
Theory, which denied to consciousness any motive
power whatever. Concerning this belief of Spen
cer s, that physical force might be converted
into feelings or ideas or other states of conscious
ness, it has only to be said that the theory runs
counter to the whole doctrine of the physical
conservation of energy, and moreover that no
evidence of any kind is tendered in support of
it. It seems, indeed, to conflict with Spencer s
own frequently repeated statement that the gulf
between mind and matter cannot be bridged, but
that these two classes of experience are completely
and entirely separate.
He then goes on to illustrate the transformation
of forces in social life : stating that the amount
of activity produced by any society is proportional
to the quantities of physical force with which it
is supplied by its environment. This propositionEVOLUTION 239
is illustrated by the fact that a good harvest leads
to vigorous activity in every sphere of business ;
and the social forces thus set in motion are derived
through the yield of wheat from the energy of solar
radiation. This proposition again seems suscep
tible to criticism
; for it is difficult to see in what
respect a good harvest may be described as a force.
It is not a question solely of the amount of light
and heat received from the sun, for beyond a cer
tain limit these do much more harm than good.
Moreover, it is not found by experience that races
living in those countries where the supply of
physical force is most prodigal are any more
vigorous or active than those living in less favoured
climates.
Spencer next deals with the direction and rhythm
of motion. A body moves either in the direction
of greatest traction or in that of least resistance.
The planets move round the sun in orbits which
are controlled by the central force of gravitation,
modified by the minor forces which give rise to
perturbations. The denudation of the earth s
surface is effected by the force which draws water
towards the centre of the earth. In the organic
world, natural selection indicates the path of least
resistance. In physiological and mental processes,
as well as in social life, the actions which take
place are the resultant of all the forces at work.
Motion similarly is not regular, but rhythmical.240 HERBERT SPENCER
The periodic character of planetary motions
provides an instance ; and the truth holds good
throughout all orders of existences down to the
pulsations of dancing and poetry, and the varying
rise and fall of birth-rates, crime, disease, etc.
Undulation is a general rule to which all events
in the universe conform.
Spencer had now formulated a series of philo
sophic laws which he regarded as holding good of
all classes of objects in the universe. He next
turned to the discovery of a formula under which
the consequences of these laws might be expressed.
The universe appeared to him to consist wholly
of matter and motion or force
; for, as already
seen, he considered that consciousness might be
converted into motion, just as motion might be
converted into heat. But the matter and motion
existingthroughout the universe was not stationary ;
it was continually undergoing change, and the
formula which he sought was one which summed
up in a single law the characteristics of this change
in every department.
The first and most important characteristic




; that is to say, to be pressed
together more compactly. Motion, on the other
hand, tended to become dissipated or degraded ;
and, instead of being highly concentrated at certain
points, to be scattered more uniformly throughoutEVOLUTION 241
the universe. An obvious illustration came to hand
in the nebular theory of the solar system. We
must suppose that the matter of which that
system is now composed was originally spread over
a vastly larger area than it occupies at present.
Each planet, from having been gaseous, has con
tracted into a compact ball. Here we have an
illustration of the integration of matter. At the
same time, the motion contained in the original
nebula has been dissipated as heat in the course
of integration. Other characteristics of evolution
are found in increasing heterogeneity, coherence,
and definiteness. The original nebula was com
paratively homogeneous throughout. It has now
broken up into a number of discrete and hetero
geneous bodies. There was originally little co
herence between its parts. The parts of the
evolved planets, however, are closely coherent,
and the entire system is bound by gravitation into
a united whole. And again the boundaries of the
nebula were vague and indefinite : the boundaries
of the bodies which have arisen from it are sharply
marked off and definite.
On this latter argument Professor William James
has made the criticism that the outlines of a nebula
are in reality no less definite than those of a solid
body. The indefiniteness is apparent only, due
to the greater difficulty of indicating the exact
outer boundary of the nebula. But the points at242 HERBERT SPENCER
which the most outlying material particles of the
nebula exist are just as definite in real fact and
in position as the points which constitute the
surface of a planet. The criticism appears to be
founded in part on imperfect apprehension of the
theory criticised.
Spencer next went on to trace a parallel series
of transformations on the earth. The integration
of matter by contraction is still in progress. Hetero
geneity has immensely increased between its
various parts. Coherence and definiteness, as well
as heterogeneity, are shown by the sharp separa
tion of land and sea ; the gradual assumption of
a permanent geographical form, with fixed moun
tains, valleys, rivers, etc. In life the same ten
dency is observed. The primitive protozoa, such
as Amoeba, have little coherence between their
parts
: their structure is indefinite and changeable ;
and their substance is comparatively homogeneous
throughout. In man, at the opposite end of the
animal scale, the parts are closely coherent : the
structure is definite and fixed within very narrow
variations ; the body itself has attained a high
degree of heterogeneity. A striking integration
has also taken place ; for each organ or part is
entirely dependent upon the co-operation of all the
other organs and parts. The animal is integrated
into a single unit or individuality.
The human mind as well as language and theEVOLUTION 243
products of society pass through a corresponding
series of changes. It is characteristic of advanced
thought to be definite and coherent. In highly
developed languages each word has a sharply
defined signification. Great heterogeneity has
arisen among the different kinds of words, which
also have become integrated into short syllables
from their original long and cumbrous form.
Human implements betray the same concate
nation of changes. The early flint implement was
indefinite in shape and incoherent in structure.
It has developed into the vast heterogeneity of
implements now used in civilised society ; and the
most developed of these are absolutely definite
in shape and integrated into a coherent unity,
in the sense that one part of them would be useless
without the whole. The same law applies to
music, dancing, poetry, etc., and all manifestations
of the human mind.
In biology, once again, organisms have become
integrated into compact groups. An immense
heterogeneity has arisen among them out of their
primitive homogeneity. They are sharply defined
from one another, etc. The differentiation and
integration characterising social progress is of
the same order. From primitive societies, in
which there was much homogeneity among the
occupations and conditions of all its members,
there has arisen a state of society with innumerable244 HERBERT SPENCER
sharply defined grades both of rank and occupa
tion. Division of labour has taken the place
of the original homogeneity. Integration and
coherence are illustrated by the interdependence
of the different sections of society. No one portion
could be cut off and live by itself independently
of the remainder, as can happen in an unorganised
society. Among every order of existences, then,
from the largest to the smallest, from the most
concrete to the most abstract, evolution is charac
terised by the same series of transformations ; and
the law of evolution is to be formulated as follows :
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomi
tant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter
passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homo
geneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity,
and during which the retained motion undergoes a
parallel transformation.
When Spencer had attained this formula by
inductive methods he at once endeavoured to
place it on a deductive basis by proving its neces
sary derivation from the law of the Persistence of
Force his primary datum of consciousness. In
doing so he said that we should attain a complete
unification of knowledge the deduction from a
single primary law of all the different kinds of
events occurring throughout the universe. This
unification is achieved by naming four general
principles which flow necessarily from the doc-EVOLUTION 245
trine of the Persistence of Force. They are the
Instability of the Homogeneous, the Multipli
cation of Effects, Segregation, and Equilibration.
No homogeneous body, Spencer argued, can
preserve its original homogeneity when exposed to
the action of external forces. For any incident
force must affect its different parts in different
ways ; the exterior will be differently affected from
the interior, etc. There is an inevitable tendency
to increasing heterogeneity. This tendency is
further accentuated by the multiplication of effects.
An external force acting upon a body must become
broken up into a number of different forces, in
consequence of the different reactions of the various
parts of the body. A single cause will have innu
merable different effects reverberating through
out the entire system. Hence heterogeneity is
set up
: the homogeneous condition is unstable.
Further, when once heterogeneity has set in,
external incident forces will act similarly on similar
parts of the body, and differently on different
parts. Similar parts will thus be forced into the
same channel : segregation will be established,
so that the like parts of the body will be collected
together in one place, and the unlike parts will be
separated out. We thus obtain an explanation of
the definite-ness characteristic of advancing evo
lution. Instances are furnished by the pebbles
on a beach, which tend to be segregated together246 HERBERT SPENCER
in accordance with their size : by differentiation
of function in organisms, whereby the general
substance of the animal and plant lose their power
of carrying out all the functions needed by the
organism, and each function receives a special
organ and localised situation : by division of
labour in society, etc., etc.
Evolution, however, according to Spencer, is
not an infinite process
: after continuing for a
certain period, it leads to equilibrium ; either
the absolute equilibrium of death, or the moving
equilibrium displayed by the present state of the
solar system, or in the life of a single animal or
plant. Moreover, Dissolution the reverse process
of Evolution is liable to occur. In dissolution,
the transformations undergone are precisely opposed
to those of evolution. A reversal of the stellar
system to the nebular condition is an instance
of dissolution ; so also is the death of an organism,
accompanied by dissipation of its substance, by
loss of definiteness and coherence in its structure,
and by the resumption of a comparatively homo
geneous form. The decay of a nation is a
further instance of dissolution : the emigration
and scattering of its members constitutes the
dissipation of matter ; the breakdown of division
of labour is a reversion to homogeneity. The
universe, therefore, is in a perpetual state of
flux. It passes from evolution through equi-EVOLUTION 247
librium to dissolution, and from dissolution again
to evolution. And all this, while inductively
ascertained, is regarded by Spencer as a necessary
deduction from the law of the Persistence of
Force the ultimate fact of consciousness, and the
highest expression of unified knowledge.
We here reach the end of
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
It is not easy to form an estimate of the truth of
Spencer s general law of Evolution. Certain parts
of the argument appear to be ill-founded, notably
the attempt to deduce it from the Persistence
of Force. It is highly ingenious ; but is somewhat
reminiscent of Spencer s engineering inventions,
which were not successful in practice. From the
point of view of a man of science, the method
of deduction is greatly overdone, and excites no
confidence whatever. The many dangers and
traps attending that method are such as to render
it of very little value in such a sphere as that
in which Spencer used it. It is plain enough to
the biographer how Spencer reached the theory.
From a casual remark of von Baer, he gradually
perceived that animal development proceeds
towards the heterogeneous, coherent, and definite.
Being interested in astronomy, he quickly appre
hended the fact that the change of a nebula
into stars implied a similar concatenation of
changes. A generalisation was at once formed ;
and all the rest of the universe was forced into248 HERBERT SPENCER
the mould without further ado, whether it really
fitted or not. And it must be admitted that it
does seem as a rule to fit more or less accurately.
The future must decide whether Spencer has
presented a true and genuinely significant account
of evolution in the universe. Up to now it can
only be said that the discovery, if genuine, has
proved sterile. It has led to no progress in any
branch of science : it is, indeed, too uncertain a
hypothesis to argue from. Yet it is undeniably
interesting, and may represent not only a truth,
but a profound one. It is not discredited by
Spencer s failure to prove it, nor by the lightness
of some of his arguments. It was his character to
produce his doctrine in a form of finality, well-
rounded and established for ever on the most
secure basis. But it is not in the nature of
things that such a theory should be indubitably
established by all the laws of physics and logic
the moment it was discovered. If he had put it
forward merely as a suggestion, the critics would
have been much quieter ; but when a pistol is held
at our heads, and we are called upon to accept it
as being in much the same category as the law of
gravitation, then we are bound to protest.CHAPTER X
BIOLOGY
AFTER formulating the law of Universal Evolu
tion, it was Spencer s original intention to write
a succession of works, in which the operation of
that law should be traced in the various depart
ments of concrete science. The first of these
works was to deal with
&quot; The Principles of Astro-
geny,&quot; or the evolution of nebulae into the stars
and solar system. The second was to be
&quot; The
Principles of Geogeny,&quot; giving an account of the
development of the earth. And then there were
to follow the works on Biology, Psychology,
Sociology, and Ethics, in their natural order of
increasing specialisation. These four latter works
were indeed actually written, and, in conjunction
with
&quot;
First Principles,&quot; now constitute the
Synthetic Philosophy. But the volumes dealing
with Astrogeny and Geogeny were never begun.
The execution of the entire work was too large a
task for a single man. Moreover, Spencer was less
interested in these two more elementary depart
ments ; and the working of the law of Evolution
was in their case more obvious and less in need of
exposition than in the more complex regions2So HERBERT SPENCER
of Biology, Psychology, and their subordinate
sciences. Nevertheless, he did not wholly neglect
the subject of Inorganic Evolution ; and these
two gaps in his Philosophy are filled in rough













by a discussion of the chemical composition of
living organisms. They are, he says, constituted
almost entirely out of four elements in various
combination oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and
carbon. The first three of these are gases, which
for long defied any attempt to liquefy them ;
the last is a solid, and remains solid except
at extremely high temperatures. Nitrogen and
carbon, moreover, are among the most inert
substances known. From considerations of this
character Spencer argues that the substance of
which organic matter is made is of exceedingly
mobile constitution, and enters with great readi
ness into new forms of combination. As a result
of this circumstance, organic matter responds with
exceptional facility to the operation of external
forces. Heat, light, and chemical agencies, acting
upon it, easily produce changes of molecular
arrangement, yet without causing decomposition.
In short, Spencer regarded organic matter as so
constituted as to be singularly plastic or modifiableBIOLOGY 251
by external action. It is chemically affected by
the environment far more readily than inorganic
matter. It is admirably designed for undergoing
constant change without degradation.
Proceeding next to a definition of Life, Spencer
insists that change is the most characteristic
feature of living matter. An organism is the seat
of constant change, owing to the processes of
assimilation, reproduction, metabolism, etc. Yet
these changes are not haphazard
: they occur in
direct response to forces of the environment.
Thus a man may perceive some danger while it is
yet far off and take measures for its avoidance.
That is to say, there occurs in the man a change of
activity, in correspondence to a certain external
event namely, a threatening external danger.
A worm, on the other hand, might remain quite
unconscious of the danger, and take no precau
tions for its avoidance ; that is to say, no internal
change would occur in the worm as a consequence
of the external event. There is less complete
correspondence between the worm and its environ
ment ; and the life of the worm is by that amount
less than the life of the man. Spencer in fact
regards the universe as the scene of constant
change. An organism is a small portion of chemi
cally complex matter, likewise exhibiting incessant
change. Life consists in the correspondence
between the changes of the organism with the252 HERBERT SPENCER
changes occurring in its environment. When for
every change in the environment a corresponding
change takes place in the organism, the quantity
of life is high. But when occurrences in the
environment evoke no response in the organism









rates this doctrine. He points out that the corre
spondence or reaction of the organism is at
first limited to few and homogeneous occurrences
in the environment, but that in the higher forms
of life it becomes more heterogeneous
: organisms
can react to more radical changes in the environ
ment
; the tentacles of a zoophyte, for instance,
contract on being touched. With increasing
intensity of life the correspondence becomes
extended both in space and time. Dealing first
with space, it is clear that the most primitive
organisms react to the environment only through
actual contact. An amoeba betrays no conscious
ness of the neighbourhood of food until touched
by it. With the development of the special
senses, however, organisms begin to react to objects
that are yet at a distance. They make movements
to approach food, or to escape an enemy. In this
way the correspondence between inner and outer
events is extended in space, until among human
beings we arrive at the Astronomer, whose innerBIOLOGY 253
relations accurately correspond to outer relations
fixed at an incredible distance away. The corre
spondence is likewise developed in time, from the
lowest animals which only know the passing
moment to human beings who make their arrange
ments to correspond with long sequences of outer
events, and who look forward far into the future
and backward far into the past.
The correspondence likewise increases in spe
ciality. It is at first rude and inaccurate, it
becomes specialised and precise. A low organism
can make very few distinctions among surrounding
objects. A higher organism has a much more
refined perception. It can distinguish particles
of food-material from particles of a deleterious or
indifferent character, and can regulate its activities
accordingly. Among human beings, surrounding
forces can be distinguished down to very minute
shades, and can be met by adaptations equally
detailed and specialised. The process is carried
further by the manufacture of scientific instru
ments, by means of which distances or lengths (for
example) can be measured with a very high degree
of accuracy, thus establishing an extremely precise
correspondence between inner and outer relations.
Although the evolution of life is characterised
by an increasing speciality of the correspondences,
it is likewise characterised by an increasing
generality of correspondences. This truth is254 HERBERT SPENCER
illustrated by the power of perceiving attributes as
apart from things. A human being, after perceiv
ing a number of red objects, can form the abstract
idea of redness. The correspondence with the
environment thus increases in generality until
it culminates in the wide generalisations of science,
whereby inner relations are brought into harmony
with excessively generalised outer relations. The
correspondences once again increase in complexity
:
a higher organism can deal with far more complex
external situations than a lower organism can.
Integration of the correspondences is shown by
the fact that the reactions of an animal become
after practice nearly automatic. Many com
plicated movements become welded into one.
Incidentally it is pointed out that intelligence is
proportional to the tactual powers of the organism.
The greater its capacity for manipulation of an
external object, the higher its understanding. As
a result of all this discussion Spencer formulates
the following definition of Life. It is : The definite
combination of heterogeneous changes, both simul
taneous and successive, in correspondence with
external coexistences and sequences. For practical
purposes, he says, this is the most serviceable
definition of life
; but it may be expressed in
a still more abstract form as : The continuous
adjustment of internal relations to external relations.
Although furnishing a definition of Life, thisBIOLOGY 255
formula in no way explains the dynamic element
in life
; nor does it enlighten us as to what life
really is. On this subject, there is the hypothesis
of a vital principle, accounting for the special
activities of animals and plants. The hypothesis
however, is altogether untenable and must be
rejected. Yet we are still wholly unable to see how
physico-chemical forces can give rise to the
innumerable and varied manifestations of life, and
especially to actions which are said to have a
purpose. Spencer winds up this discussion by the
remark that we are here confronted with one of
the ultimate mysteries to which science leads us
on every side.
&quot; Life as a principle of activity is
unknown and unknowable.&quot;
&quot; The Inductions of Biology,&quot; which are next
dealt with, contain a number of the generally
recognised principles of that science, with a few
original theories, of which the more important
only can here be named. Growth is an integration
of matter the absorption into the organism of
environing substances. The amount of growth
depends upon the surplus of nutrition over expen
diture, but is determined also by the initial size
of the animal or plant at the commencement of
growth. Development is from lower to higher
complexity from relative homogeneity to relative
heterogeneity. At first the lowly organism is
almost without structure, but gradually differentia-256 HERBERT SPENCER
tion takes place
: the special organs make their
appearance ; and with increasing complexity of
structure goes increasing complexity of function.
In primitive organisms every part of the body carries
on all the necessary functions : assimilation, repro
duction, locomotion, etc. In developed organisms





: the general protoplasm has lost its
universal powers ; and each different function
is carried out by a special organ suited for it. As
regards both structure and function, homogeneity
gives way to heterogeneity ; and integration is
shown by the increasing interdependence of the
separate organs and their functions in place of the
comparative self-sufficiency of the different parts
of the primitive organism.
After naming the chief facts of adaptation
the close correspondence between an organism
and its environment and after discussing what
constitutes an individual, we are brought to the
subject of heredity. It is first pointed out that
offspring resemble their parents, not only in general
features, but in small details. The inheritance of
acquired characters is insisted upon. That is to
say, when an animal (or plant) has undergone
some modification of structure on account of use or
disuse of the part, that modification is liable, by
Spencer s theory, to be inherited like any other
variation. We may expect the son of a blacksmithBIOLOGY 257
to be born with potentially stronger arms than
other children. So, too, when any structure is
disused from generation to generation, and when in
consequence it is poorly developed in each genera
tion, that feeble development will become fixed in
the hereditary constitution, and in course of time
with continued disuse the structure will altogether
disappear.
It is unnecessary to comment further on the
much-discussed hypothesis that acquired charac
ters are hereditary. Suffice it to say that no
evidence has yet been produced in proof of that
belief, which is now entertained only by a negli
gible minority of biologists. As already stated,
however, it was at one time regarded by Spencer
as the one and only factor in organic evolution
; for
no better reason than that before the discovery of
natural selection he could think of no other factor.
How is the fact of heredity to be accounted for ?
How is it that the microscopic human ovum
proceeds to develop until it assumes an appearance
closely resembling that of its progenitors
? Spencer
adopts the analogy of a crystal ; for an inorganic
substance always crystallises into the same form.
In this case the fact is due to molecular polarity ;
that is to say, the molecules fall into an arrange
ment in which their axes all point in one direction.
A similar explanation must be sought in the case
of organisms. They must be composed of certain258 HERBERT SPENCER
units which tend to arrange themselves into the
structure characteristic of the species. These
units, however, cannot be chemical ; for the
molecules of organic matter do not show the great
variety that the theory requires. Nor can they
be morphological ; for heredity is obviously not
due to any special arrangement of cells. They must
therefore be intermediate between these two : they
must consist of particular groups of molecules,






&quot; constitutional units.&quot; The special
structure of an animal or plant must be due to
the special constitutional units of the organisms,
which (as in crystals) tend to fall into the specific
arrangement characteristic of the species to which
they belong. The theory differs from Darwin s
theory of gemmules in that it regards the con
stitutional units as being all alike,whereas gemmules
are of as many different kinds as there are tissues
or organs in the body. It differs also from Weis-
mann s theory, partly because Weismann s units,
like Darwin s, are of many different kinds, and
partly because it does not recognise the division
between germ-plasm and soma-plasm, to which
Weismann attached so much importance.
The reasons are next considered for the mingling
of the substance of two separate organisms in
sexual reproduction. The constitutional units of
any individual tend to equilibration ; that is toBIOLOGY 259
say, they become fixed and react less readily to
the operation of incident forces. By fusion with
the constitutional units of another similar indi
vidual an element of instability is introduced.
The new constitutional units are restored to their
needful plasticity ; they are readily affected by
incident forces, and they can respond to those
forces by a renewed activity of growth and develop
ment. Were it not for this fusion, the specific
form would quickly become set hard and lose
its plasticity ; there would no longer be ade
quate correspondence between the changes in the
organism and those in the environment, and life
would come to an end.
After drawing up a classification of animals and
plants, Spencer passes to the subject of Distribu
tion. The argument here is that, whether we
consider the distribution of organisms in space or
in time, we find no evidence of any intelligent
disposition, but only of a blind evolution which
has by slow degrees brought about the state of
affairs now existing. With this argument
&quot; The
Inductions of Biology
&quot; come to an end.
The next division of
&quot; The Principles of Biology
&quot;
is devoted to the Evolution of Life. The hypo
thesis that each species was separately created is
first considered. It fails to account for the great
majority of the acknowledged facts : the existence
for instance of evil in the world appears to imply260 HERBERT SPENCER
a Creator who is either deficient in morality or
else deficient in power. Moreover, the actual
creation of a species is a proposition which cannot
be translated from words into ideas. It is defi
nitely unthinkable, and therefore presents, not a
genuine explanation, but a pseudo-explanation.
We are therefore thrown back upon the theory
of evolution, against which none of the foregoing
objections can be raised. The theory has the
further credentials that it was first originated
among the most highly instructed men of an intel
lectual era, instead of being derived, like the
hypothesis of special creation, from the super
stitions of barbaric times. It is moreover supported
by four converging lines of evidence. The first
of these is derived from the facts of classification.
Animals and plants fall naturally into groups
and sub-groups. A collection of species, not very
different from one another, are comprised within
a genus
: genera again fall naturally into orders
and classes. In short, the resemblances between
species of animals and plants are just such as to
suggest relationship, just such as they would be
if they were all descended from a common an
cestor : these resemblances, on the other hand, are
quite unaccountable by the hypothesis of special
creation.
In the second place, the study of embryology
shows that each individual animal and plantBIOLOGY 261
does in fact pass through the same series of trans
formations as is alleged of the whole species.
Every individual begins life as a single compara
tively homogeneous cell. All individuals thus
start their development from the same point,
and become gradually differentiated to the widely
divergent types proper to their species. This
fact forcibly suggests that the species themselves
come from one stock.
In the third place, the shapes of the adult
organisms show a fundamental kinship, not other
wise accountable. The existence of rudimentary
organs, which have no function, cannot be ex
plained except on the assumption that they are
survivals from a time when they possessed
genuine utility. The rudiments of teeth in birds
and of legs in snakes are difficult to reconcile with
special creation, but at once receive an explana
tion if birds are derived from animals which had
teeth and snakes from animals which had legs.
The fourth line of argument is supplied by the
distribution of organisms in space and time. A
study of fossils shows that those found in recent
strata are more akin to living forms than those
found in deeper strata. As regards geographical
distribution, the facts observed do not bear out
the hypothesis that each species was specially
created in adaptation to its environment
; but
they do bear out the hypothesis that they have262 HERBERT SPENCER
been modified by evolution to harmony with their
surroundings.
Given that Evolution is a true theory, it remains
to record the mode by which it came about. It
is needless to describe Spencer s presentation of
evolution, which was closely similar to that of
Darwin and his other contemporaries. He named
two factors the inheritance of acquired characters
and natural selection. He expressed the view that
in early stages of evolution natural selection was
the main factor, but that in course of time it was
gradually superseded by inheritance of acquired
characters, until in the case of man natural
selection was scarcely operative at all. This part
of
&quot; The Principles of Biology
&quot; derives some
historical interest from the fact that Spencer here
coined and used for the first time the phrase
&quot; Survival of the Fittest
&quot; as a synonym for
Natural Selection.
The second volume of
&quot; The Principles of
Biology
&quot;
opens with a section on
&quot;
Morphological
Development,&quot; where one or two questions of
interest are discussed. Spencer regarded all the
parts of a plant the stem, branches, leaves,
flowers, etc. as representing divergent lines of
evolution from one type of primitive frond, such
as we find in seaweed. A phanerogamic plant
consists, according to him, of a cluster or group
of such fronds, which have become specialisedBIOLOGY 263
in different directions to form the parts of the
plant.
He held that animals were in the same way
compounds of many elementary and homogeneous
units. Thus an annulate creature like a centipede
or earthworm is in reality a chain of similar
individuals, incompletely separated from one
another. With the progress of evolution a higher
degree of integration is attained, until among
insects the successive rings are less conspicuous ;
and the appearance is more that of a single com
plete animal than of a chain of simpler animals
fused together. In spiders and crabs the integration
is still more complete. But Spencer wisely pre
cludes this theory from explaining the segmen
tation of the vertebrate skeleton.
From the subject of morphological integration,
Spencer next turns to that of differentiation.
What are the factors which cause the specific
shapes of animals and plants
? What is it that
controls the polarisation of the constitutional
units and causes the various tissues to grow out
into the particular shapes characteristic of them ?
The fundamental principle which provides the
answer to this question is that
&quot; in any organism
equal amounts of growth take place in those
directions in which the incident forces are equal.&quot;
Take for instance the leaf of a tree. Its upper and
under surfaces are very differently situated as264 HERBERT SPENCER
regards the environment. The upper surface is
far more exposed to many incident forces the
light and warmth of the sun, etc. than the lower
surface. In consequence there is a great difference
of form between the upper and lower surfaces.
The two sides of the leaf, on the other hand, are
not exposed to any difference between the incident
forces which on the average affect them. Wind,
rain, light, etc., fall upon them as frequently on one
side as upon the other. Hence the two sides are
alike, and the leaf itself is bilaterally symmetrical.
In the sea-anemone, again, the environment
acts very differently upon the lower part attached
to the ground from what it does on the free upper
part. Hence a striking difference between the
structures above and below. Food, however, is
equally liable to approach it from any side. The
forces of the environment do not act upon it
differently upon one side from any other side.
Hence the animal presents to its environment the
same structure on every side. It exhibits a radial
symmetry ; and this constant form has been
impressed upon it, in the course of a long evolution,
by those external forces which have in the long
run acted upon it equally from every side. In
the Annulosa again in centipedes and insects
the diverse character of the forces acting upon the
anterior and the posterior segments have caused
marked differentiation between the anterior andBIOLOGY 265
posterior extremities. In mammals the same
truth is exhibited to a still higher degree. In
mammals, again, the forces acting upon one side
of the organism are in no way different, in the long
run, from those acting upon the other side : hence
mammals are bilaterally symmetrical. At the
other end of the scale, creatures like amceba,
which are affected equally by the environment
on every side, are altogether amorphous. Such
differentiation of structure as they exhibit is that
of exterior and interior, etc., where indeed the
incident forces are different.




is devoted to an account of the origin of the verte
brate skeleton. As already observed, vertebrates
cannot be regarded, like annulose animals, as
compounded of a series of individuals incompletely
separated off from one another. Why, then,
have they a segmented skeleton ? Taking a fish
as an example, the lateral flexions and extensions
of its body in swimming must establish certain
mechanical stresses and strains in its body-sub
stance. The part of its body least affected by
these forces is its central axis. This, therefore,
may and must become differentiated from the more
lateral portions. Being less bent from side to
side, it becomes less pliant, more rigid, and finally
develops into bone. The need for some bending
from side to side produces, however, a series of266 HERBERT SPENCER
lateral incisions, which, while leaving the main
axis of sufficient strength to serve for muscular
support, yet ensures the requisite flexibility.
Ordinary mechanical principles in fact are quite
sufficient to account for the origin of this series
of lateral incisions. The intervening portions of
the column become the vertebrae. Where there is
no need for flexibility, as in the skull, there is no
segmentation ; and the theory of Goethe and
Oken that the skull is formed from the fusion of
segments must be rejected.
Part iv. of
&quot; The Principles of Biology
&quot; deals
with Physiological Development, and proceeds
on lines very similar to those just described in
the case of Morphological Development. Much
of it indeed might have been included under that
heading ; for, as functions cannot be studied apart
from their corresponding structures, the exposition
must be largely founded upon the development
of structure. The main purpose of the argument
is to show that functions, like structures, are
evolved as a result of the external forces acting
upon the organism.
As already pointed out, the most primitive
organisms, both animal and plant, are com
paratively homogeneous throughout, and every
part of their body is capable of performing every
function necessary to their existence. Incident
forces, however, soon break up this aboriginalBIOLOGY 267
homogeneity ; for (as shown in
&quot;
First Principles &quot;)
they must act differently on different parts of the
organism. Very early in evolution there is thus
established a differentiation between the exterior
and interior of an organism, for it is here that the
incident forces differ most widely. The difference
between exterior and interior remains throughout
evolution one of the most important manifes
tations of heterogeneity, whether we consider it in
a single cell with its cytoplasm and cell-wall,
or in a forest tree, in which the exterior of the stem
becomes modified to form bark. The fixed and the
free ends of plants are widely different, because
the forces which act upon them are widely different.
Fishes, swimming in a medium which acts uni
formly on every side, are nevertheless more exposed
to the action of light from above than from below
;
and this difference in external forces has set up a
difference of colour between their superior and
inferior surfaces. Very numerous instances are
cited in further substantiation of the same doctrine.
The origin of the vascular system in plants is
then discussed. As their stems sway backwards
and forwards in the wind, the sap will be squeezed
at intervals out of some parts into others. It will
tend to move in the direction where the resistance
is least, and, constantly moving along the same
channels, will necessarily give rise by ordinary
mechanics to just that system which is actually268 HERBERT SPENCER
found. These paths are gradually cleared and
made definite by constant use
; and their per
manency in future generations will be ensured
by inheritance of the effects thus gradually brought
about. Spencer even makes the suggestion that
the blood-vessels of animals have originated in a
similar manner.
The general result of Spencer s whole discussion
is this : Every structure and every function of an
animal or plant is moulded gradually in the course
of evolution by the forces of its environment.
Where equal forces have acted equally on different
parts of an organism, those parts will be similar
both in structure and in function. Where forces
act unequally, the structures and functions will
be different, and the greater the inequality the
greater the difference. Spencer reaches the con
clusions, therefore, that the environment modifies
any individual organism by direct action upon it :
the modification thus wrought is perpetuated by
heredity, and is increased from generation to
generation by continued action of the environ
ment in the same sense, till at length there are
evolved the actual structures and functions of
animals and plants as we know them. Those
structures, such as the mammalian skull, which
never can have been produced by any direct
forces are explained by reference to natural
selection.BIOLOGY 269
The last division of
&quot; The Principles of Bio
logy
&quot; deals with the Laws of Multiplication.
The propagation and spread of species depend
upon the balance preserved between two antago
nistic sets of factors. One set of factors tends
towards the extinction of species namely, natural
death, enemies, lack of food, atmospheric changes,
etc. The other set of factors tends towards
the increase of species namely, the endurance,
strength, swiftness, and sagacity of its members,
as also their fertility. In a species which is not
becoming extinct, the fertility must be sufficient
to counterbalance the forces of destruction
; and
the demands consequently made upon the repro
ductive powers of a species must vary inversely
as the power of self-preservation possessed by
its individuals. That is to say, if individuals have
small power of self-preservation, if there is a large
wastage of life, or, in other words, a high mortality,
there must be a high fertility in compensation.
If both fertility and individual power of self-
preservation were highly developed, the species
would quickly multiply to a prohibitive extent :
it would be confronted by famine, disease, or
enemies, which would quickly reduce the power
of individual self-preservation. If, on the other
hand, this power were already low, and there
was no compensating fertility, the species would
become extinct. There must exist, therefore, on270 HERBERT SPENCER
a priori grounds, an antagonism between individua-
tion and reproduction. Spencer then goes on to
show that such antagonism actually exists.
The size of an animal or plant is one index
of the extent to which its individuality is developed.
And, in general, the largest animals and plants
reproduce the most slowly, while the smallest
reproduce with the greatest rapidity. Minute
organisms like Bacteria can multiply a millionfold
in a few hours ; moreover, their reproduction
is largely asexual. The lowest kind of organisms
reproduce simply by dividing in two, or by grow
ing out buds which then drop off and become new
individuals. The highest kind, on the other hand,
invariably reproduce sexually. The same an
tagonism between growth and genesis is observed
in species where reproduction is exclusively sexual.
Small birds lay more eggs than large birds
; an
oak produces fewer acorns in the course of several
centuries than a fungus does spores in a single
night ; a rotifer may lay fifty eggs within a week
or two, whereas an elephant lives thirty years
before it gives birth to a single young one. The
inverse relation between fertility and growth is
paralleled by an inverse relation between fertility
and the activity or energy spent by an animal :
it is those animals which spend least energy in
locomotion, or heat-maintenance, or otherwise,
that reproduce with the greatest rapidity.BIOLOGY 271
On the other hand, reproduction or genesis
is directly proportional to the amount of nutri
tion. Animals and plants which receive abundant
nutrition are correspondingly fertile. It is true
that fatness hinders fertility in domestic animals
;
but this is because the fat is in reality a product
of degeneration rather than any addition to the
individuality of the animal. Spencer cites many
instances to show that where individuals have much
to eat and little to do they are highly fertile
; but
where they have much to do and little to eat they
are comparatively barren. The general antagonism
between genesis and reproduction is, however, to
be qualified by the statement that genesis decreases
not quite so fast as individuation increases.
The operation of this same law is traced by Spen
cer in the multiplication of the human species. Men
are relatively fertile in districts where food is abun
dant and work moderate. The Cape Boers and the
French Canadians are cited in illustration of very
fecund races, which have abundance of food and
a small output of physical and mental labour.
The popular belief that highly-fed men are com
paratively infertile is erroneous, except in so far
as the feeding may give rise to fat and
&quot; abnormal
plethora.&quot; The future of the human race is then
considered. Evolution will probably proceed along
the lines of a higher intellectual, and still more of a
higher moral, development. The main factor of272 HERBERT SPENCER
advancing evolution is the excess of fertility ; and
it is to be anticipated that this fertility will decline
as the capacities of individuals increase. At
length there will be reached a time when equili
brium will be almost attained. Man will have
reached so high a stage of individuation that his
fertility will be diminished to such a point that no
excess of population is brought into the world.
His high emotional and intellectual development
will cause him to feel the ordinary duties of life
as pleasurable
: there will be nothing laborious
in his existence
; and the main factor of discom
fort (over-rapidity of breeding) will have dis
appeared. Yet this happy state of ultimate
equilibrium can never be entirely attained. For
the gradual changes of the environment will ever
introduce new disturbances, which will have to
be met by corresponding modifications of the race.





to an end.CHAPTER XI
PSYCHOLOGY
SPENCER S Psychology is most nearly related





is a work of the highest originality ;
though we are apt in these days to lose sight of
that fact, owing to the circumstance that so many
of his leading ideas have become incorporated
into the common knowledge of the times. Its
leading and most original feature, perhaps, is the
treatment of psychology from the standpoint of
evolution. Spencer further showed true scientific
insight in basing the work on a careful study of
the structure and functions of the nervous system.
It is unnecessary to follow him through
&quot; The
Data of Psychology,&quot; which merely furnishes a
singularly lucid account of the functions of the
nervous system in so far as they were known at
the time when he wrote. He bestows the title of
&quot;
Aestho-Physiology
&quot; on the study of the relation
between mental and nervous phenomena, and
endeavoured with remarkable perspicacity to show
that feeling and nervous activity were two sides
of the same thing.
&quot; The Inductions of Biology
&quot; enters into an274 HERBERT SPENCER
inquiry as to the nature of the substance of which
mind is composed, and the conclusion is reached
that the problem is insoluble. We can decompose
mind into the various elements of which it is built
up
: we can say that it consists of emotions,
intelligence, etc.
; but we cannot say what it is,
in its ultimate nature, any more than we can say
what matter is.
When we analyse mental processes or (as Spencer
always calls them) feelings, we find reason to
believe that they are compounded from certain
elementary units. A sudden sound produces a
mild and instantaneous shock
; and from some
such unit of mental action Spencer supposes that
all feelings (including sensations, emotions, etc.)
are built up. In the case of musical sound, we
know that this is so. A rapid succession of taps are,
if they are not too rapid, perceived as a series of
individual sounds. When the speed is increased
to more than sixteen a second, they cease to be
individually distinguishable and become blended
together to form a musical tone. By further
blending of different tones differences of timbre
are produced. While auditory sensations are thus
shown to be compounded from multitudes of
single units, variously arranged as regards coexist
ence and sequence, we may assume that all
sensations, whether of sight, smell, etc., are
produced in a similar way ; and in fact that thePSYCHOLOGY 275
basis of all feeling consists in some single unit or
unspecialised shock, and that the numberless
different variations in the quality and intensity of
feeling are due to differences in the way this ele
mentary unit is compounded in the different
systems of coexistence and sequence into which it
is woven.
Passing from the ultimate composition of mind to
its proximate composition, Spencer finds it to consist
of two main kinds of components Feelings, and
Relations between Feelings. A feeling is
&quot;
any
portion of consciousness which occupies a place
sufficiently large to give it a perceivable indi
viduality ; which has its individuality marked
off from adjacent portions of consciousness by
qualitative contrasts
; and which, when intro-
spectively contemplated, appears to be homo
geneous.&quot; A relation between feelings, on the
other hand, is characterised by occupying no
appreciable part of consciousness.
Feelings are further subdivided into the two
main categories of emotions and sensations, the
former being centrally initiated and the latter
peripherally initiated. Sensations, again, are divi
sible into those initiated at the ends of nerves
on the outer surface of the body and those initiated
at the ends of nerves distributed within the body.
The class of feelings may be divided otherwise
into those that are vivid and those that are faint.276 HERBERT SPENCER
The vivid or primary feelings are those corre





or secondary feelings are those that correspond to
&quot;
ideas.&quot;
Relations between feelings may be analysed
into the detection of differences between two
successive feelings. Relations between feelings
last no appreciable time, and consist purely in the
recognition of the amount of likeness or unlikeness
between any feeling and that which immediately
succeeds it in the mind. Relations between feel
ings, moreover (when the feelings are recognised
as dissimilar), fall into one or other of the two
main categories of coexistence or sequence. The
recognition of simultaneity or succession is charac
teristic of relations between feelings.
Consciousness of the emotional type is widely
different from consciousness of the sensational
type, the difference consisting of the larger or
smaller proportions of the relational elements
present. Emotions are vaguely marked off from
one another, and have few and indefinite relations.
Sensations, on the other hand those, at least,
initiated on the surface of the body are charac
terised by abundance of sharp and definite rela
tions. Objects seen by the eye set up impressions
of colour, whose mutual limitations are sharp and
numerous. Sounds in the same way are separated
from&quot;each other by clear and precise demarcations.PSYCHOLOGY 277
Further distinctions are then drawn between
emotion and sensation. Sensation readily enters
into association
; emotion does not. Sensations
can be easily recalled
; emotions cannot
; and so
on. All this probably constitutes the most philo
sophic presentation of the associationist school ;








the next two divisions of




been referred to in the previous chapter. It
defines Life as the correspondence between inner




carries the same theory into a purely psychological
sphere. But the main importance of this part
resides in Spencer s attempted reconciliation
between Transcendentalism and Empiricism.
Locke and the Empirical School affirmed that
intelligence was exclusively based upon the results
of experience accumulated within the life of the
individual. Kant and the Transcendental School
affirmed, on the contrary, that intelligence was a
natural endowment & priori, and had little or
nothing to do with experience. Spencer took up the
position that each party had seen one side of the
truth. He said that every individual inherits from
its predecessors the results of their experience,
and thus starts upon a higher level than they did.
In every individual the growth of experience has278 HERBERT SPENCER
its counterpart in structural modifications and
development of the nervous system
: those struc
tural modifications acquired during the individuals
life are handed down by heredity to its posterity,
which thus commences life at a higher level of
intelligence than its predecessors. Spencer held
that Locke was right in saying that all intelligence
is derived from experience, but it is the experience,
not of the individual, but of the race. It was
equally true, as Kant said, that intelligence is
largely preordained as regards the individual
;
but that prearranged disposition is not transcen
dental in character it is the accumulated result
of the experience of former generations. According
to Spencer, therefore, intelligence is a priori as
regards the individual and ^ posteriori as regards
the race.
This theory has had a considerable vogue. But
unfortunately it is based, again, on the belief
that acquired characters may be inherited. It has
a neatness and conciliatory aspect that is immensely
attractive to most minds
; but it is a mere piece
of imagination a theory not only unsupported
by facts, but in opposition to the direction in which
the available facts appear to lead. Instinct is
explained by Spencer on the same principle as
acquirements that have become hereditary. He
imagined that instinctive animal actions were
originally intelligent. Among ourselves we knowPSYCHOLOGY 279
that things laboriously learnt, such as playing
the piano, become after a time easy and as it were
instinctive. It becomes possible to play off a tune
while thinking of quite different things. In the
same way, Spencer supposed that all instincts
among animals were at first acquired by a laborious
experience of their ancestry
: that with each suc
cessive generation the actions became easier, until
at length they became pure instinct requiring no
thought or intelligence whatever. This theory,
again, scarcely needs comment ; it is now almost
unanimously rejected by biologists.
A far more scientific theory on the part of Spencer
was that in which he regarded instinct as com
pound reflex action, and reason as a still more
compound process of instinct. This belief is now
tolerably well established. Spencer s error is only
as to the relative order in which reflex action,
instinct, and reason first appeared. He repre
sented reason (or experience) as coming first in
evolution. It gradually settled down in numerous
often-repeated actions to instinct ; and finally
the instinct assumed the purely automatic form of
reflex action. But in point of fact evolution has
proceeded in the opposite direction. Reflex action
came first, then instinct, and last of all intelli
gence. Nor could it have come about in the way
that Spencer suggested ; the perpetual repetition
of one act during an individual s lifetime does280 HERBERT SPENCER
undoubtedly lead to a sort of instinctive facility,
but that acquired facility shows no tendency to
reappear in subsequent generations, which have
each to learn these same acts from the beginning
with as much labour as their predecessors. This
result, so contrary to expectation, has emerged
after long researches by biologists. It is small
blame to Spencer that, in the middle of last cen
tury, he had failed to recognise it.
Spencer next turns to what he calls the
&quot;
Physical
Synthesis,&quot; which is in reality a hypothesis as to
the origin of the nervous system. Assuming the
earliest forms of animal life to consist of undif-
ferentiated specks of protoplasm, in which an
external stimulus is immediately followed by
contraction, a stage is reached at which a stimulus
is habitually experienced at some point of the
surface of the animal its tentacles, for instance
and spreads a wave of molecular change throughout
the organism. But as a result of differences of
composition in the different parts the wave will
travel more readily in some directions than in
others
; and contractions will therefore occur
more readily in those directions. The fundamental
law is that a wave of molecular motion travelling
along a particular path facilitates the passage of
subsequent waves along the same path, just as
water running over sand does not spread evenly
over it, but cuts out a number of sharply-definedPSYCHOLOGY 281
channels leaving the intermediate spaces dry.
So there will after a time be set up in the undif-
ferentiated protoplasm channels of easy communi
cation between certain parts. Starting from a
point subject to frequent external stimulus,
waves of molecular motion will tend always more
insistently to pursue definite channels instead
of being dissipated at large throughout the
organism. The terminal points of these channels
will mark the portions of the animal which con
tract in consequence of the stimulus. Now since
this acquired modification in the permeability of
the protoplasm is, according to Spencer, inherited,
each generation will derive from its parents a body
which is already endowed with paths of easy com
munication. As these paths become always more
definite with each generation, and as the general
protoplasm loses its conductivity in the same pro
portion, we may at length expect to find strands
of specially adapted protoplasm spreading through
the animal s body. We have, in fact, a mechanical
theory of the genesis of nerves.
All this is extremely ingenious and in great part
true. It is vitiated to some extent by the fallacy,
already pointed out, of supposing that instinct
is inherited habit. Spencer defends his theory
from the charge of materialism by saying that the
intimate nature of mind remains entirely inex
plicable and wholly different from the intimate282 HERBERT SPENCER
nature of matter. If none the less his theory
appears to us materialistic, it is certainly not more
so than many of the later developments of nervous
physiology.
We pass now to the second volume of
&quot; The
Principles of Psychology,&quot; and to that division of
the work entitled
&quot;
Special Analysis.&quot; We are
here concerned only with intellectual operations ;
feeling is expressly excluded from the purview
of the
&quot;
Special Analysis,&quot; for sentiments and





begins with the highest
type of intellectual operation and gradually works
down to the simplest. The highest type is described
as compound quantitative reasoning, and the
following is an example of it.
An engineer who has constructed a tubular
bridge is required to construct another of the same
kind, but double the span. It might be imagined
that he would simply have to magnify the previous
design in all particulars ; but this would be inade
quate. For whereas the weight of the bridge
varies as the cubes of the linear dimensions, its
power of resistance increases only with the squares
of the linear dimensions. If, therefore, all the
linear dimensions were merely doubled, the weight
of the bridge would be increased by a greater
ratio than its supporting power, and it would
collapse.PSYCHOLOGY 283
This intellectual operation consists in the detec
tion of an inequality between two relations. The
first relation is that between the sustaining forces
of the first and second bridge, and is represented by
i 2
: 22
. The second is that between the destroying
forces, and is represented by
I3
: 23
. It is in the
perception of the difference between these two ratios
that the mental act of the engineer consists ; and
the instance is to be regarded as typical of all
reasoning. Expressed in an abstract form, the
process is an application of the axiom ratios
(or relations) which are severally equal to certain
other ratios that are unequal to each other are
themselves unequal. In the same way we reach
the axiom that relations which are equal to the
same relation are equal to one another
; and
upon this axiom is based the whole of mathematical
analysis, together with important parts of geo
metry. Compound quantitative reasoning consists,
then, in a succession of steps, each of which may
be regarded as the statement of an equality
between two relations. The recognition of equality
or inequality between relations is the basis to
which all reasoning may be reduced by analysis. It
is moreover a direct mental intuition. The process
by which the mind perceives the identity or
the difference of two relations is ultimate and
axiomatic ; it is not capable of any still more
minute analysis.284 HERBERT SPENCER
Quantitative reasoning in general involves three
ideas coextension, coexistence, and connature.
That is to say, each step in the reasoning process
is concerned with two terms : and of these terms
it asserts either that they occupy or do not occupy
equal spaces (coextension) ; or that they occur or
do not occur at the same time (coexistence) ;
or that they are or are not of the same kind (con-
nature). The intuition underlying all quantitative
reasoning consists in a perception of the equality
of two magnitudes. The most simple form of
quantitative reasoning arises when the equality of
these two magnitudes is inferred, from the fact
that they are each equal to some third magnitude.
The introduction of further magnitudes is the
source of further complication, so that in an ulti
mate analysis all quantitative reasoning is reduced
to the recognition of equality or inequality between
two relations.
Qualitative reasoning differs from quantitative
reasoning by omission of the factor of coextension.
Instead of predicating equality between two rela
tions in Space, Time, and Quality, we predicate it
only in Time and Quality. Quantitative reasoning
proceeds by a comparison of the quantity of certain
existences of determinate quality. Qualitative
reasoning, on the other hand, proceeds by a
comparison of the quality of certain determinate
existences, or by an examination of the coexistencePSYCHOLOGY 285
of certain determinate qualities. The kind of
reasoning commonly embodied in the syllogism
is of this type. But the syllogism itself is, accord
ing to Spencer, an erroneous representation of the
true method of reasoning. It is erroneous in that
it expressly includes a major premise in the pro
cess
; and in actual fact we do not usually in our
mental operations refer back to the major premise.
Take for instance the syllogism
&quot; All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man,
therefore
Socrates is mortal.&quot;
But in point of fact we do not in thought go back
to the proposition that
&quot;
all men are mortal.&quot;
The value of the syllogism is not as explanatory
of the actual process of reasoning, but as testing
the method by which the conclusion has been
reached by forcing us to recognise the full impli
cations of our statements. From perfect quali
tative reasoning we pass to imperfect qualitative
reasoning. This is characterised by the fact that
relations are no longer considered as equal or
unequal, but as like or unlike. This holds of that
kind of syllogistic reasoning in which there is a
considerable difference between the subjects of
the major and minor premise, so that the argu
ment is more or less one of analogy. It also
applies to inductive reasoning, or reasoning from286 HERBERT SPENCER
particulars to generals, as well from particulars
to particulars.
Classification, naming, and recognition are
obviously intellectual processes which consist in
the perception of a resemblance between external
things or relations. A newly-discovered animal is
referred to the class of mammals if it presents
characters like those which are distinctive of mam
mals. The perception of external objects depends
upon the same process. The immediate sensations
derived from an external object have a resem
blance to previous sensations which are associated
with the idea of the object in question.
The perception of Space is derived from ex
perience of matter. All matter is presented to us
as extended in form : by abstraction we attain
the idea of empty space. Space, being a universal
form of the non-ego, inevitably generates a corre
sponding universal form of the ego. Space becomes
known from the coexistence of two or more separate
spots, and is thus founded upon a relation between
at least two elements of consciousness. The idea of
Time is similarly derived from an experience of
successive states of consciousness
; and is therefore
founded upon a perception of the difference between
two states. The idea of time is an abstract of all
relations of position among successive states of
consciousness.
Various forms of relations are next considered
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and they are all found to be reducible by analysis
to the recognition of likeness or unlikeness between
two terms. When the likeness between the two
compared terms rises to indistinguishableness, it is
called Equality. Likeness and unlikeness are
known only by the fact that a change in conscious
ness does or does not occur. On passing from one
term to another, either no change of consciousness
is experienced in which case there is a judgment
of likeness
; or some change is experienced in
which case there is a judgment of unlikeness. All
intellectual operations therefore depend upon the
occurrence of some change in the sequence of con
sciousness. If consciousness continued without
change, it would be equivalent to no consciousness




; its only basis
is the recognition of similarity or dissimilarity
between two successive states of consciousness.




comes to an end.
There still remain two divisions of Spencer s
Psychology which demand attention. The first
of these is entitled
&quot;
Congruities.&quot; It passes in
review the doctrines previously established in the
course of the work, pointing out the harmony
existing among them. A comparison is instituted
between nervous and mental phenomena, with a
view to showing their parallelism. If mind
consists of feelings and the relations between288 HERBERT SPENCER
feelings, the nervous system consists of nerve-cells
and of fibres which place them in communication
with one another. Both mental and nervous
processes may be analysed into a succession of
rapid pulses
: each is based upon a single unit of
function ; and in each the developed whole is
built out of these units compounded and re-com
pounded with one another in innumerable different
ways. The laws of association in thought are shown
to be paralleled by the structure of the nervous
system, etc. Numerous other congruities are
mentioned before we are once again brought round
to the doctrine of Transfigured Realism.
The final division of
&quot; The Principles of Psy
chology
&quot; deals with the Corollaries flowing from
the body of the work. It is preparatory to the
succeeding portions of the Philosophy, dealing with
Sociology and Ethics
; and in modern times it would
be described as Social Psychology. First we are
introduced to a classification of mental faculties.
The primary division (as already stated) is into
feelings and the relations between feelings, or, in
more ordinary language, into feelings and cogni
tions. Each of these main groups is further
sub-divisible according to degrees of abstractness.
Dealing first with cognitions, we have
&quot; Presen-
tative Cognitions,&quot; the most concrete of all, in
which consciousness is occupied simply in localising




in which consciousness is occupied with the relation
between an immediate sensation and the associated
ideas formed through previous experience. This
corresponds to Perception. Thirdly, we have
&quot;
Representative Cognitions,&quot; corresponding to
memory ; and lastly
&quot;
Re-representative Cog
nitions,&quot; in which past ideas are not merely
reproduced, but combined in new forms, as in
imagination or abstract thought.
Feelings are subdivided in a parallel manner.
&quot; Presentative Feelings
&quot; are Sensation, from the






are those in which an imme
diate sensation is associated with emotions derived





in which there is no present external stimulus;
these include the emotions which consist of








the higher sentiments, such as the love of property,
justice, and liberty. These are built up from
great aggregates of elementary sensations. Take,
for instance, the sentiment of love of freedom.
In isolated cases, previously experienced, restric
tion has involved pain. A painful sensation in
many instances may be arrested by making
H.S.290 HERBERT SPENCER
certain movements away from the source of
pain, for example. The feeling of repugnance to
pain therefore becomes associated with any cir
cumstances which prohibit the necessary move
ments. By generalisation from a great number of
such cases there ultimately becomes established
a sentiment in favour of freedom in the abstract.
Such a sentiment is a re-representative feeling.
The language of the emotions is then dealt with.
Emotion is always accompanied by a powerful
nervous discharge, and this leads to muscular
movement. In pain, for instance, the vocal
organs, being the smallest, are moved first, and
cries are given out. As the pain increases all the
muscles in the body may become involved. In
addition to a diffused nervous discharge, there is
a restricted nervous discharge for each separate
emotion. This discharge is an incipient activity
of the muscles which would be set in motion by the
act to which the emotion leads. Thus a car
nivorous animal in eating its prey has to retract
its lips and uncover its teeth. The act of snarling
is simply this preliminary ; and the mental
expression of anger is nothing else than the
incipient movement of those muscles which would
be used in devouring the prey.
Surveying Spencer s Psychology as a whole,
we cannot but be struck with the magnitude and
brilliance of its conceptions. It is unquestionablyPSYCHOLOGY 291
what is called an epoch-making work. It intro
duced the idea of evolution into the science of
psychology ; and this fact is the more remarkable
when we remember that
&quot; The Principles of
Psychology
&quot; was first published four years before
the appearance of
&quot; The Origin of Species.&quot; To this
circumstance, however, is due the inherent weakness
of many parts of the work. Spencer based evolution
throughout on the inheritance of acquired charac
ters : in the main doctrines there is no attempt
to utilise natural selection. Hence, while he was
usually right in his main evolutionary propositions,
he was wrong in the details. If the book had been
based upon natural selection, it would probably
have been the most remarkable philosophic pro
duction of last century. As it is, Spencer s Psy
chology is of the first importance in the history of
the subject ; and even now is far better worth
reading than the great majority of text-books
which have been produced since his time. For the
general point of view and the general method are
quite beyond criticism : it is only minor points
that have been affected by the progress of know
ledge.CHAPTER XII
EDUCATION
SPENCER S little volume on Education is almost
the only one of his works that has been recognised
by the official world. More than any other single
text-book it is the foundation of all the so-called
&quot; modern
&quot; ideas in education. To anyone ignorant
of Spencer s methods, it would appear highly
surprising that this classical work should have been
written by a man not yet forty, who had had only
two or three months experience of teaching, who
was unmarried and had come into very little
contact with children. But the achievement is
typical of Spencer s methods. His principles
were always d priori ; the verification of them
by practical experience came afterwards. If in




succeeded in formulating new theories of great
importance and interest, his success was in neither
case due to preliminary study or knowledge, but
to a happy instinct which guided him safely in
these difficult subjects.
The first question he discusses, with regard to
education, is
&quot; What knowledge is of most
worth ?
&quot; He points out that the choice ofEDUCATION 293
subjects which may be taught to a child is almost
unlimited
; and nearly all of these subjects will
be of some value to it in adult life. But since the
actual amount that can be learnt is strictly
limited, it becomes a question of selecting from
the various possible subjects those which will
be of greatest value subsequently. From this
utilitarian point of view Spencer reaches the
conclusion that science is of far greater value than
any other subject whatever. The most important
information that can be imparted concerns the
maintenance of life and good health : hence the
elements of hygiene and physiology are the first
essentials. The next necessity is for success in
earning a livelihood. Spencer enumerates many
instances to show the failure which occurs in
business owing to ignorance of science ; and he
infers that the most valuable knowledge as a
foundation for practical life is an acquaintance
with the natural properties of objects
-- the
elements of physics and other sciences. The next
necessity for the adult is to fit himself for the duties
and responsibilities of parentage ; and for this
purpose psychology and education should be
studied. After the duties of the family come
those of the State : the child should be prepared
to play its part in the government of the country,
and should be taught the rudiments of the social
sciences in order that the future man may be in294 HERBERT SPENCER
a position to cast a well-informed and intelligent
vote. Spencer points out, moreover, that in time
of war a knowledge of science may be the turning-
point of the national safety. It may be noted,
however, that he does not inculcate the teaching
of patriotism. In his time nationality was far
less developed than it is now.
Lastly, Spencer expresses the view that one of
the highest enjoyments of life is in art of all forms.
The final essential of a good education, therefore,
is a training in the appreciation of art ; and it is
rather surprising to find that here also the first
requisite is a knowledge of science. Spencer
cites instances of technical errors in the works
of well-known painters, and shows how these
errors are due to ignorance of the properties of
light, or of perspective ; and he concludes that
scientific knowledge is the true basis of aesthetic
appreciation. He is perhaps on stronger ground
when he affirms that science is itself an art, and
that it cultivates a certain kind of artistic instinct
in those who most tenaciously pursue it.
From the question of the utilitarian value of
different kinds of knowledge he turns to the effect
of each kind on mental development, or to its
value as mental training or discipline. Here once
again he finds that science has a greater value than
any other kind of knowledge. He deprecates the
learning of dead languages, and considers that theEDUCATION 295
acquirement of languages in general is a far less
useful intellectual discipline than the study of
science. He condemns rote-learning altogether,
as being entirely mechanical and divorced from
the exercise of intelligence. Science alone fully
develops the intellectual faculties
; and he points
out that as an exercise for memory it is at least
as efficient as learning a language. Languages
and rote-learning have the further important
disadvantage that they are purely arbitrary and
given by authority without making any appeal to
reason. Science, on the other hand, abhors
authority. The child is told almost nothing
ex cathedra ; it learns direct for itself from Nature
by means of observation and experiment. It
comes thus to know how things actually hang
together in the world ; it learns to reason, and to
judge and to find out things for itself. Not only
from the utilitarian point of view, therefore, but
also as a mental discipline, Spencer concludes
that the study of science should be the pre-eminent
ingredient in a good education.
Since he wrote this work (at the end of the
fifties), his views on the subject have gained a
popularity which must then have seemed almost
impossible. Science has been everywhere intro
duced into general education, and each year sees
an extension of the principle and a demand always
for more science in our schools. If the present296 HERBERT SPENCER
movement continues, we shall in time attain the
realisation of Spencer s ideas. Whether or not
we think them sound is still largely a matter of
personal constitution.
There are many now who hold that Spencer s
exaltation of scientific training is rational and
wise, so long as science is well taught. Bad
teaching, in their opinion, may counterbalance
every advantage claimed for science, and may
introduce into it a dullness and irrationality
much exceeding that of languages. And they go
on to argue that, so long as teaching is a poorly
paid profession, it cannot on the average be very
good
: and hence that in practice science does
not have the great advantages which it might
have under a more theoretically perfect regime.
It is pointed out, moreover, that, as regards
utility in after life, many living languages have a
far greater value than Spencer was prepared to
admit. Children s minds are very different; and
Spencer s theories are plainly those which would
have been most suitable to his own mind. That
these ideals should be the goal of a large part of
public education seems indubitable
; but univer
sality is a hard word, and it may very well be
that a purely scientific education would not be
the best training for all minds. These questions,
however, are for the expert, and to be settled by
an appeal to experience. The chief point for usEDUCATION 297
to note is that Spencer was the pioneer of the
modern movement.
His next chapter deals with intellectual educa
tion ; and here also modern fashion is largely
due to his work. He carried a step farther the
principles of Pestalozzi, and expunged many of
the pioneer crudities of that reformer. His
methods showed, indeed, a strong affinity with
those expressed in a more primitive form in
Rousseau s
&quot; Emile
&quot; a work, however, which
he never read. He lays down a certain number of
general maxims. Education should lead from the
simple to the complex ; from the indefinite to
the definite. Grammar, for instance, should be
the last and not the first study in the acquisition
of a language. In every sphere precision is not to
be expected in a young child
; it is a later develop
ment, and the teacher should be content at first
with the inculcation of rough and crude concep
tions, without aiming at accuracy or detail.
Education should proceed from the concrete to
the abstract an idea which has now been widely
adopted on the Kindergarten principle. The
order in which subjects should be taught as the
child grows up should be the same order as that in
which knowledge was gradually acquired by the
human race. The mind of the child is like the
mind of primitive man ; and the succession of
human discoveries provides a true index to the298 HERBERT SPENCER
order in which the various subjects should follow
one another.
The next principle is that education should lead
from the empirical to the rational. All knowledge
imparted should at first begin with observations
and experiments by the child itself. General
laws and principles should be allowed slowly to
grow up from this experimental basis, and should
on no account be taught from the beginning.
Children should always be encouraged to work
on their own initiative, to find out as much as
possible for themselves, and to be told as little
as possible by other people. Spencer s final test
of a good education is whether it creates a pleasur
able excitement in the pupils. Knowledge gathered
under the stimulus of interest and pleasure is a
permanent possession. That which excites only
dislike and boredom is soon lost
; and the dislike
itself is evidence that the child s mind is still
unripe for that particular subject. Needless to
say, the success of any such scheme presupposes
a high degree of intelligence in the teacher
; but
that is a drawback of all advanced systems of
education, and Spencer very truly observes that
the indifference of teachers is no argument against
the validity of the principles themselves, though
it may be against the universal application of them.
Spencer next proceeds to a study of moral edu
cation. He does not advocate the express incul-EDUCATION 299
cation of moral maxims (we have already seen that
he did not propose to teach patriotism). His
view was that moral education should work
through the feelings and sentiments rather than
through the intellect
; and he was certainly right,
according to more recent studies, in his opinion
that morals are based on feeling and not on know
ledge or intellect. With regard to punishments,
his general principle was that they should, to as
small an extent as possible, be meted out by
parents or teachers in an arbitrary fashion
; but
that reliance should be placed upon the natural
discipline of consequences. Take for instance the
case of unpunctuality
: it is a mistake to allot
a particular penalty to this offence. The natural
punishment of unpunctuality in ordinary life is
that of missing the advantages derived from
keeping time. Hence, when the child is late for
any amusement or play which it expected, it should
be excluded from participation. Again, if it shows
a tendency to play with lighted matches, and
disregards warning, it should not be commanded
imperatively with threats to desist. The mother
should take care to be about when it is so engaged,
that there may be no serious damage ; and the
punishment of burning its fingers will be far more
effective than arbitrary chastisement, as well as
lead to a greater faith in future warnings instead
of to an attitude of hostility between parent and300 HERBERT SPENCER
child. But of course Spencer allows that there are
limits beyond which this principle (now so well
recognised) cannot be applied.
Spencer does not suggest that a child should
never be punished by its parents. On the contrary,
when it has knowingly acted contrary to their
wishes, it is part of the natural consequences
that they should be temporarily less well-disposed
towards it than usual. Punishment of this kind
should be of a negative rather than positive
character. It should not take the form of chas
tisement, but rather of withholding benefits or
manifestations of affection. Just as, in adult
life, wrong actions bring their own punishment,
so in child life the best form of moral education is
that which proceeds on the same principle. And
even that should not be applied too harshly. In
harmony with its low physical and intellectual
development a child has a low moral development ;
and too much should not be required from it.
Moral precocity is as undesirable as intellectual
precocity. Commands should seldom be issued,
but when they are issued the most rigorous
obedience should be exacted. But the regime of
command and obedience is false
; the child should
be taught to govern itself rather than to acquiesce
in being governed. In the world it will have to
look after itself, form its own judgments, and
control its own conduct. That end is not attainedEDUCATION 301
by the habit of deferring always to the authority
of others.
Lastly Spencer points out that as a rule the
treatment of children is determined by the mere
approbation or annoyance of the moment, instead
of by a methodical system. Education is a highly
complex art, demanding exceptional qualities in
teachers. And Spencer rightly perceived that the
first essential of a good teacher is the capacity for
sympathising with the child s mind and discerning
its various thoughts and motives. The principles
which he formulated are intended to be those
natural to a teacher of high sympathetic powers
:
no principles are of any avail to a teacher who
lacks these powers ; in such a case we have
merely the form without the substance of a good
education. Doubtless this is sufficient reason why
most people may find these, as also any other
principles, disappointing in their results.
Finally Spencer deals with Physical Education,
a branch of the subject to which he attached great
importance. He repeats what we now regard as
a time-honoured fallacy, that the younger genera
tion are physically inferior to the old, that they are
lower in stature, and tend to be degenerate physi
cally. It is curious how this same fallacy is
endemic and permanent in all ages. In England
it appears regularly in the writings of every period
since Gildas wrote his
&quot; De excidio Britanniae
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in the sixth century. It was entertained by
Shakespeare and many poets. It was taken up by
the philosopher Berkeley in his
cc
Essay towards
preventing the Ruin of Great Britain.&quot; John
Stuart Mill committed himself in the same way,
and here we see Spencer expressing again the
old fallacy. But he unfortunately attempted to
explain it by reference to newer fallacies. He
speaks of a lady of robust parentage, who as a
result of under-feeding and over-working developed
an enfeebled constitution, which her children had
inherited from her. Few biologists will allow
the possibility of such an occurrence. Never
theless, Spencer was undoubtedly right in the
main outlines of his physical education, and his
ideas here as elsewhere have been very generally
adopted. The criticism which he made upon the
physical education of his time was that it erred
by deficient feeding, deficient clothing, deficient
exercise (at least among girls), and excessive
mental application. As regards feeding, he refers
to the alternating tendencies to give either too
much or too little, and insists that the best guide
is in the promptings of the child itself. When its
natural feelings have not been perverted by
surfeiting or by withholding particular kinds of
food, it knows better what it needs than its
instructors can. Spencer very strongly condemns
excessive mental application at an early age.EDUCATION 303
Certainly he was free from any such forcing
himself
; and his own education furnishes a curious
contrast to the intensive system applied to John
Stuart Mill. Yet though the milder system may
have the majority of advantages, the severe
methods do bring out certain qualities which we
find in Mill but not in Spencer. In his philosophy
Mill was usually prepared to face a disagreeable
conclusion if logic compelled him to it ; Spencer
was not. Severity bestows a tinge of asceticism,
which in many philosophical studies is a valuable
mental trait.
Thus we see that Spencer s education, like
Rousseau s, aimed at being a natural system. It
reflected his own personal character, and was no
doubt well suited to him individually. It was all
part of his unified system of thought. The central
idea was liberty, and the main objections were
to any form of compulsion. The child, like the
nation, was to be freed from over-government.
Government in fact was to be reduced to the
smallest possible sphere. His ideas have been
widely adopted in education, but scarcely at all
in politics. Yet it is the case that the arguments
are sometimes identical in both spheres. In
education, for instance, it is well known that
truth-telling and freedom are associated together ;
while coercive methods are almost invariably
associated with lying. The fact is derivative from304 HERBERT SPENCER
the foundations of human nature itself ; and
Spencer believed the same relation to subsist in
communities of men. But education, complex as
it is, is far less complex than politics. In a couple
of decades the child has grown up, and long before
then the results of education may be observed.
In society effects follow causes at a far longer
interval, and we should probably have to substitute
generations for decades in the preceding statement.
Moreover, a child is permanently under control
and observation ; it is far more plastic and modi
fiable than a society. Education makes or un
makes it far more easily than government can
make or unmake a nation. Still it is true that in
both cases it is human nature that we have to
deal with
; and a society or a crowd has many
resemblances to a child. It is impulsive, cruel,
emotional, and stupid. Its moral consciousness,
its intellectual capacities, its capacity for self-
restraint are much below those of the average
individual composing it. But, however we may
view these subjects, it is beyond question that
Spencer s educational ideas sprang from the same
mental peculiarities as those which gave birth to
his social and political principles.CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
IT was one of the cardinal maxims of
&quot; First
Principles
&quot; that all motion is rhythmical in
character. Among the numerous illustrations
which Spencer cited in favour of this belief is
the movement of public opinion with regard to
popular authors. He pointed out that the judg
ment of men tended to fluctuate between excessive
admiration and excessive depreciation
: it did not
maintain an even level. The illustration is at
all events very forcibly brought before us by
his own case. In the seventies and eighties of
last century his reputation was at its height. His
name produced an almost magical effect in many
social circles. He was the fashionable philosopher
of the time. He summed up the spirit of the age
more accurately than any other writer.
Within a quarter of a century, however, an
immense change of public opinion had taken
place. On the scientific side the doctrine of
Evolution with which his name was so largely
associated had been accepted by nearly everyone,
and had ceased to be a matter of current con
troversy. Moreover, the mode of evolution which306 HERBERT SPENCER
had found favour among men of science was not
that which Spencer advocated. The belief in the
inheritance of acquired characters was generally
condemned ; and the other factor that of Natural
Selection was associated with the name of Darwin
rather than that of Spencer. In 1900, also, the
new movement in Biology began, which relegated
even natural selection to quite a secondary place
in the thoughts of men of science. Of the other
principles of his Biology and Psychology many
had come to be taken as part of common know
ledge ; and from being highly original suggestions
had degenerated into platitudes. Other principles,
again, had been condemned
; and the remainder
had passed for a time out of the arena of public
attention.
On the social side an even greater change had
come about. Spencer stood for peace and indi
vidual liberty ; and both these ideals had suffered
a grave decline in public favour. In so far as
liberty was concerned, the chief infractions of it
which had existed at the beginning of the century
had been abolished ; and political movements
travelled along new lines, wholly opposed to
Spencer s teaching. And as regards war, the
country was plunged in the midst of the fight
with the Boer Republics ; the military spirit was
growing, and was fostered by circumstances. The
Imperialist and Protectionist agitations were bothCONCLUSION 307
in deep opposition to every sentiment of Spencer s
mind
; and he uttered his opinions with charac
teristic force and disregard of all opposition.
Accordingly, when the present century opened,
he found himself one of the most unpopular public
men in England. His death evoked indeed a
chorus of praise in the newspapers ; but mainly,
it is to be feared, from journalists who had found
no opportunity of studying his views. The Times,
on the other hand, published an attack upon him,
which in those days was very strongly worded even
for that journal of uncompromising beliefs.
Notwithstanding the long notices of his death
in the newspapers, it was widely felt that the
English people as a whole did not adequately
realise how great a personality had passed from
among them. Comment was made on the fact
that in many foreign countries his death was more
deeply mourned than in his own country
: in
Italy, for instance, the Chamber immediately
adjourned when the announcement of Spencer s
death was made, and in France there were many
criticisms upon the comparative indifference of
the English people. The greatness of Spencer s
reputation throughout the world was indeed
scarcely appreciated in England. His name was
as well known in America, and carried even greater
influence perhaps in that country than it did in
England. In all the European countries he was3o8 HERBERT SPENCER
eagerly read
; even in Russia his works were
studied by every social student of advanced
thought.
Although Spencer s Philosophy won many dis
ciples in every country of the world, it cannot
be said that he founded any individual school of
philosophy. And the reason is not far to seek.
Spencer s philosophy is animated from beginning
to end by a contempt of authority, by a cham
pioning of individual views, by a tendency to
emphasise the importance of reasoning for oneself :
all of which are in complete opposition to the
spirit of discipleship. Spencer himself never was
or could have been a disciple of anyone ; his whole
constitution rebelled against it
; and it may be
said that the same trait characterises those who are
most imbued with the Spencerian spirit. They,
too, are not cut out for discipleship
: like Spencer
himself, they are far more ready to criticise than
to follow a master. Spencer teaches us to follow
reason always and authority never : the philosophy
of Spencerism precludes discipleship by its very
nature. Thus, although even at the present day
we find numerous individuals who profess them
selves as ardent disciples, we usually discover
that they have only an imperfect acquaintance
with his works, and have missed the true spirit
in which he wrote. And thus, notwithstanding
all the criticism passed upon him in the course ofCONCLUSION 309
the present work, I may claim without paradox
to be a better Spencerian than they
: I may claim,
moreover, to represent the views which he would
have certainly held for the most part had he
flourished in the present century. We may be
Spencerians either in spirit or in letter ; but if we
are dogmatic adherents of Spencer s words we are
no true Spencerians at all : we have missed the
spirit and the real greatness of his work. We must
not claim for Spencer that sort of finality which
is claimed by the followers of Comte and other
philosophers. For the only result of so doing is to
belittle his great position in the history of thought
and to betray also our own inability to appreciate
the true significance of his work.
If we are true Spencerians in spirit if, that is
to say, we are prepared to pass the doctrines
even of Spencer himself through the fire of uncom
promising criticism then, and then only, can we
attain the right to speak of him as one of the
greatest and most powerful minds of the nineteenth
century. If we can see his faults in detail, we can
then appreciate his fundamental greatness. We
can see that in the whole history of the world there
never has been a philosopher so deeply imbued
with the spirit of liberty and of reason. We cannot,
indeed, maintain that his doctrine of liberty was
always well applied, nor that his reasoning was
always correct. But if we Spencerians have310 HERBERT SPENCER
imbibed the true feelings of liberty and reason,
we shall be the first and not the last, to criticise
the dogmatic theories of Spencer. And we shall
believe that there is still no finer introduction to
the sciences of biology, of psychology, of sociology,
and of ethics than is to be found in Spencer s monu
mental works on these subjects. We know that
most of his original theories are well founded ;
but we wish to celebrate his name not by his words,
but by his memorable battles for liberty and for
reason, his impetus to the progress and refinement
of civilisation. If, therefore, the reader has been
inclined to cavil at the numerous criticisms of
Spencer made in the present work, let him remem
ber that that is the true Spencerian spirit, to which
any acquiescence in authority is repugnant even
though it be the authority of Spencer himself.
We have seen in the course of this work that
Spencer s life was wholly bound up in his philo
sophical convictions and principles. We need not
raise any suggestion of egoism or amour-propre to
explain the extreme unhappiness entailed upon
him by the general deliquescence of his doctrines.
When to that misfortune we add the wretched
nervous condition into which he had fallen, we
can well understand the almost hopeless misery
in which his latter years were spent. He regarded
himself as a man who had sacrificed money and
health and life for what he conceived to be theCONCLUSION 311
public welfare. And this was his reward ! Can
we be surprised if, at the end of his Autobiography,
he uttered a note of warning to those who contem
plated a literary career ?
&quot; Unless his means are
such as enable him not only to live for a long time
without returns, but to bear the losses which his
books entail on him, he will soon be brought to a
stand and subjected to heavy penalties.&quot; But
&quot;
If the prompting motive is the high one of doing
something to benefit mankind, and if there is
readiness to bear losses and privations and perhaps
ridicule in pursuit of this end, no discouragement
is to be uttered
; further than that there may be
required greater patience and self-sacrifice than
will prove practicable. If, on the other hand,
the main element in the ambition is the desire to
achieve a name, the probability of disappointment
may still be placed in bar of it.&quot; ...&quot; Even
should it happen that, means and patience having
sufficed, the goal is at length reached and applause
gained, there will come nothing like the delights
hoped for. Of literary distinction, as of so many
other things which men pursue, it may be truly
said that the game is not worth the candle. When
compared with the amount of labour gone through,
the disturbances of health borne, the denial of
many gratifications otherwise attainable, and the
long years of waiting, the satisfaction which final
recognition gives proves to be relatively trivial.312 HERBERT SPENCER
As contrasted with the aggregate of preceding
pains, the achieved pleasure is insignificant. A
transitory emotion of joy may be produced by the
first marks of success
; but after a time the con
tinuance of success excites no emotion which rises
above the ordinary
level.&quot;
Readers of the present work will perhaps already
have discovered reasons for the belief that, if,
Spencer was over-estimated in the nineteenth,
he is certainly under-estimated in the twentieth
century. He was plainly a product of his age.
Figs do not grow from thistles, nor grapes from
thorns. The great men of any age are the expres
sion of the spirit of that age. In every era there
are numerous men who possess the potentiality of
becoming great if the environment is favourable
to them. And each age brings out the peculiar
type of men who most adequately represent it.
The others remain dormant, or fill minor spheres.
If John Bright had lived in our times, he would
scarcely have been a distinguished politician ; he
would probably not have been a politician at
all. The age represents certain tendencies : the
individuals who hold those ideals with the greatest
conviction and urge them with the greatest force
come to the fore. The rest drift into other lines of
interest. So, too, Spencer was a pure Victorian
a
&quot; Maker of the Nineteenth Century.&quot; He
flourished while his ideals were in fashion
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withered when they passed away. But if we wish
to estimate his real greatness, apart from the
adventitious fluctuations of his environment, we
shall inquire, not what was thought of him at
different times, but what he did. We shall find
that, without money, without special education,
without health, he produced eighteen large volumes
of philosophy and science of many diverse kinds
;
that he invented an entire new system of philosophy
which for half a century filled the attention of all
thinking people ; that he led the chief controversies
on Evolution and Biology without ever having
received any tuition in those subjects ; that he
wrote perhaps the most important text-book of
Psychology of his century, without any acquaint
ance with the works of his predecessors, and
scarcely any with those of his contemporaries ; that
he established the science of Sociology in England ;
that in all branches of so-called Moral Science
he was recognised as a leader
; that he became
the philosophic exponent of nineteenth century
Liberalism
; that he published a variety of
mechanical inventions
; and that on endless other
subjects, great and small, he set forth a profusion
of new and original ideas. A stable judgment
will recognise in these achievements a true great
ness, that may withstand all passing gusts of
popular opinion.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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